This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 007510 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
H-PASS 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO REP. COX'S STAFF 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP AMGT AFIN ASEC PTER PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL COX VISIT TO TURKEY 
 
REF: SECSTATE 329331 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Your CODEL arrives in Ankara at a 
time when the GOT is seized with the issues of security 
and counterterrorism.  GOT leaders and security forces 
have reacted responsibly to the November terrorist 
attacks in Istanbul, though some politicians and 
commentators have tried to score political points by 
blaming the attacks on the ruling Justice and Development 
(AK) Party or the U.S.  Our GOT contacts across the board 
emphasize that concrete U.S. action against the terrorist 
PKK/KADEK in northern Iraq will ease Turkish suspicions that 
the U.S. favors the Iraqi Kurds over Turkey in the region. 
Turkey cautiously supports USG policy objectives in Syria 
and Iran. 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) AK, led by PM Erdogan, came to power with an 
overwhelming Parliamentary majority in November 2002 and 
continues to pass democratic reforms in support of Turkey's 
EU candidacy.  However, elements within the Turkish 
establishment, asserting that AK is a radical Islamist party, 
continue to oppose AK at every turn.  On the economic front, 
two years of sound fiscal/monetary policy, the rapid and 
successful conclusion of the Iraq war, expected U.S. financial 
assistance, and unprecedented IMF support have combined to 
bring down inflation and interest rates, restore modest 
growth, 
and create some hope that Turkey can work its way out from 
under a high public debt burden.  However, the Government has 
been reluctant to implement the structural reforms that are 
essential if the economy is to achieve the sustained growth 
needed to bring prosperity and reduce the risk of renewed 
financial crisis.  The government has an opportunity in the 
coming months to win the economy some much-needed breathing 
room, but this will require committed implementation of 
IMF-supported reforms as well as wise conduct of foreign 
policy. 
End summary. 
 
 
---------------- 
Istanbul Attacks 
---------------- 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) The GOT has generally responded in a balanced manner 
to the November terrorist bombings that killed more than 50 
people and wounded 750 in Istanbul.  Some members of the 
opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) have tried to blame 
the AK Party, arguing that AK's Islamist roots compel it to be 
soft on terrorism.  PM Erdogan drew criticism from secular 
circles 
when he rejected the term "Islamic terrorism" in connection 
with 
the attacks; under pressure, he later labeled the attacks 
"fundamentalist terror."  A number of press commentators have 
blamed 
the U.S., arguing that the Istanbul attacks were a side 
effect of 
the war in Iraq.  Some have gone further, claiming that the 
CIA or 
Mossad were behind the attacks.  However, the statements of 
high-level 
GOT officials have been responsible and the police appear to 
be 
conducting the investigation in a professional manner. 
 
 
--------- 
PKK/KADEK 
--------- 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Turks also remain very focused on the presence 
of PKK/KADEK terrorists in northern Iraq.  Parliament 
recently passed 
a "Reintegration Law" offering reduced sentences to 
non-leadership 
PKK/KADEK combatants who turn themselves in.  However, the 
law has 
persuaded few PKK/KADEK militants to come down from the 
mountains 
and surrender.  GOT officials have publicly and privately 
pressed 
the USG to follow through on its commitment to eliminate the 
PKK/KADEK 
threat from Iraq.  State's Counter Terrorism Chief Amb. Black 
was in 
Ankara October 2 to discuss PKK/KADEK and agreed with the 
Turks on a 
plan of action using the full range of statecraft tools 
against the 
terrorist organization.  The Turks also remain disturbed by 
what they 
consider to be Kurdish (vice U.S. or Iraqi central authority) 
control 
of the Iraqi side of the Turkey-Iraq border, and they accuse 
the U.S. 
of favoring Iraqi Kurdish interests over Turkish interests in 
the region. 
GOT Justice Minister Cicek met in Washington Dec. 2 with Amb. 
Black, 
DOD A/S Wolfowitz, and DOS U/S Grossman, and later issued a 
statement 
declaring that Turkey and the U.S. were prepared to cooperate 
broadly 
against terrorism. 
 
 
----------- 
Middle East 
----------- 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Turkey prides itself on its good relations with both 
Israelis and Palestinians.  While it supports the 
U.S.-sponsored Road Map, Turkey is leery of getting too far 
ahead of a Turkish populace that generally sympathizes with 
the Palestinian side.  On Syria and Iran, Turkey argues that 
Turkey: 1) lives in a rough neighborhood and has an interest 
in minimizing friction with its neighbors; and 2) shares the 
same values and goals in the Middle East as the U.S. 
(stability, democracy and prosperity).  GOT officials have 
recently indicated to us their belief that Syria is currently 
engaged in a gradual process of democratization, which they 
believe should be encouraged.  In this regard, Foreign 
Minister Gul delivered a call for democracy and reform in the 
Islamic world at the June OIC Summit in Tehran. 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) The U.S. Mission in Turkey is a designated post for 
processing visa applications of Iranian nationals.  The 
Turkish 
Government does not require Iranians to have visas in order to 
enter Turkey, though Embassy has recommended that the 
Government 
start requiring them. 
 
 
------------------- 
Terrorist Financing 
------------------- 
 
 
¶7. (U) Turkey's efforts to combat terrorist financing have 
been 
hampered by inadequate laws, insufficient training, and 
limited cooperation among agencies.  Both the EU and 
State/DOJ are planning programs to address these problems; 
however, without top-level GOT support, we can expect only 
limited results.  In particular, the GOT needs to pass laws 
that will: 1) criminalize the financing of terrorism; 2) 
resolve jurisdictional disputes between courts; 3) make it 
easier to seize terrorists' assets; 4) improve the 
functioning of MASAK (the Turkish financial intelligence 
analysis unit); and 5) strengthen the Suspicious Transaction 
reporting regime. 
 
 
------------------------ 
Domestic Political Scene 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) The governing AK Party, which came to power with an 
overwhelming Parliamentary majority in November 2002, 
continues to pursue democratic and political reform (para 
9).  Meanwhile, AK's principle challengers -- the opposition 
CHP and the xenophobic Genc Party -- have lost momentum.  AK 
insists its substantial and pathbreaking democratic reform 
packages demonstrate it is wedded to democracy and strong 
relations with the EU and U.S.  However, elements of the 
military and State bureaucracy question AK's sincerity and 
remain concerned about its religious roots.  There are also 
questions about AK's ability to field an experienced and 
competent bureaucratic team.  Turkey's generals are keen to 
protect their status as Guardians of the (Kemalist) Republic 
and the version of "secularism" that has prevailed in Turkey. 
They, and much of the status quo forces in the State, assert 
AK is a challenge to the founding ideology of Ataturk's 
Turkey; AK in turn says that its "secular" opponents have 
hijacked Ataturk's intentions and are responsible for the 
stagnation in Turkey's political, economic, and social 
development. 
 
 
------------------------ 
Political Reform Process 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) In its first year in power, the AK Government has 
passed 
a series of democratization and human rights reforms in the 
context 
of EU harmonization.  Turkey is garnering praise from the EU, 
which 
should decide by Dec. 2004 whether to begin formal accession 
talks 
with Turkey.  The reform packages include legislation 
designed to 
expand freedom of expression and religion, protect the rights 
of 
detainees, crack down on torture, and raise the relative 
authority 
of elected civilians vis-a-vis the military.  There are 
questions, 
however, about whether the AK government will be able to 
implement 
these reforms rapidly, particularly given the resistance from 
those 
in the judiciary, military and other elements of the state 
which are 
content with the status quo and suspicious of AK, the EU and 
the U.S. 
The AK Government has also launched an anti-corruption drive 
that 
appears far more comprehensive than any conducted by previous 
governments.  Nevertheless, many Turks wonder how far AK will 
take its 
anti-corruption effort, including against allegations of 
corruption 
in the military and within AK itself. 
 
 
----------- 
The Economy 
----------- 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) Two years of sound fiscal/monetary policy, the 
rapid and 
successful conclusion of the Iraq war, expected U.S. 
financial 
assistance, and unprecedented IMF support have combined to 
bring 
down inflation and interest rates, restore modest growth, and 
create 
some hope that Turkey can work its way out from under a high 
public 
debt burden.  The GOT has an opportunity in the coming months 
to 
build on this momentum and thus push the economy away from 
the 
financial precipice on which it has been perched for the past 
three 
years.  This will require the government, which so far has 
implemented the IMF recovery program with muted enthusiasm, 
to 
accelerate reforms, proceed with scheduled privatizations, 
and improve 
the environment for foreign direct investment. Failure to 
take 
advantage of this opportunity will not necessarily mean 
another crisis, 
but will leave the economy extremely vulnerable to external 
or internal 
shocks and undermine the potential for prosperity.  In late 
September, 
the U.S. and Turkey signed an agreement under which the USG 
will 
provide $8.5 billion on low-interest loans to support 
Turkey's economic 
reform efforts.  However, the Government has delayed 
ratification 
because of criticism over accepting the political 
conditionality 
(related to cooperation on Iraq) in the agreement. 
------------- 
Turkish Media 
------------- 
 
 
¶11. (U) Turkey has a lively and colorful media scene. 
Reporting often includes absolute fantasy passed as fact. 
Despite the large number of newspapers, however, readership 
is not as broad and deep as might be expected.  Newspapers 
are influential in major cities but not far beyond.  Most 
Turks get their news from television.  Except for 
government-owned TRT television, all television stations in 
Turkey, like the print media, are owned by either individual 
businessmen or conglomerates.  The press will be interested 
in your visit and seek comments at a number of venues. 
EDELMAN