This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007354 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2013 
TAGS: AJ AM GG PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: DAS PASCOE'S NOVEMBER 21 TRIP TO ANKARA 
 
 
 (U) Classified by CDA Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  EUR DAS Lynn Pascoe visited Turkey on 
November 21 for a series of meetings with MFA officials.  In 
all his meetings, Pascoe urged MFA officials to think about 
the period leading up to the NATO Summit as a critical 
opportunity to showcase Turkey's achievements before the 
December 2004 EU decision on whether to grant Turkey a date 
to begin accession negotiations.  He told officials the U.S. 
was ready to help in this effort.  With U/S for Economic 
Affairs Kilic, Pascoe discussed the upcoming Economic 
Partnership Council (EPC) meeting, Iraq reconstruction, and 
the Habur border gate.  Pascoe encouraged the GOT to think 
about how to improve the foreign investment climate and Habur 
gate operations.  U/S for Political Affairs Sensoy said the 
GOT needed better information about progress on the action 
plan against the PKK/KADEK in Northern Iraq; Pascoe briefed 
him on the progress of the U.S. action plan.  With Caucasus 
DDG Tezgor, Pascoe reviewed his recent trip to the region and 
encouraged the GOT to improve relations with Armenia and its 
economic involvement in the region.  End Summary. 
 
 
Deputy U/S for Economic Affairs Kilic 
 
 
¶2.  (C) MFA Deputy U/S for Economic Affairs Alev Kilic said 
Turkey was focusing on developing economic relations with the 
Caucasus and Central Asia.  Kilic viewed the Caucasus as part 
of "greater Europe," and agreed with Pascoe without strong 
economic ties to Europe the region could be manipulated by 
unhelpful actors in Russia.  Pascoe noted that Turkey had not 
yet opened the border with Armenia, forcing trade to go 
through Georgia's Ajara region.  Kilic said "we do not see 
Armenia as a good neighbor," adding that the issue was 
political, not economic.  Pascoe said his sense was that the 
Armenian government was enthusiastic about initiatives that 
would increase activity at the border; Turkey should view 
this as a a strategic imperative. 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Pascoe asked how the U.S. and Turkey could use the 
upcoming December 2-3 Economic Partnership Council (EPC) 
meeting and the NATO Summit to bolster U.S.-Turkey relations 
and show Turkish achievements.  Kilic said economic relations 
needed strengthening but the GOT was uncertain about the way 
forward.  He asked for U.S. ideas about how to make Qualified 
Industrial Zones (QIZs) work better.  He also agreed with DCM 
that Turkey needed to think about how to improve its foreign 
investment climate. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Kilic said Turkey would be raising the issue of how 
to get more economic involvement in Iraq reconstruction, 
including opening more border gates.  DCM said activity at 
the current gate was idle for 5-6 hours every day and that 
lines of trucks on both sides were growing.  This was 
hampering the Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) 
effort to meet the deadline for winding down the Oil-for-Food 
Program.  Kilic said he had heard Habur was working at full 
capacity and that FAO trucks were given priority.  Pascoe 
urged the Kilic to make sure the GOT took action on the 
border gate issue. 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) DCM urged Kilic to have the GOT send a senior 
prosecutor to the December 11-12 preparatory meeting for the 
Southeast Europe Prosecutors Working Group; Kilic said the 
GOT supported the Group and he would check to ensure the GOT 
sent a representative. 
 
 
Deputy U/S for European Union Affairs Bozkir 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Pascoe told Deputy U/S for European Union Affairs 
Volkan Bozkir that the months leading up to the NATO Summit 
would be a good opportunity for Turkey to highlight its 
reforms and achievements and that the U.S. was prepared to be 
helpful.  This would be the critical period in the run up to 
the EU's December 2004 decision about giving Turkey a date to 
begin accession negotiations.  Bozkir expressed appreciation 
for U.S. support.  He said the government had passed the 
"critical mass" of laws needed to satisfy the Copenhagen 
Criteria and was now focusing on implementation.  On Cyprus, 
Bozkir said the GOT wanted a solution, but Cyprus was not 
part of the political criteria.  He expressed concern that 
the EU's emphasis on Cyprus would strengthen Turkey's 
domestic critics of EU accession who argue that the EU was 
looking for excuses not to admit Turkey.  He predicted that 
the GOT would not be able to continue the reform process if 
it did not get a date in December 2004. 
 
 
Deputy U/S for Political and Security Affairs Sensoy 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Deputy U/S for Political and Security Affairs Nabi 
Sensoy said the GOT had a clear idea of the U.S. action plan 
against the PKK/KADEK in Iraq.  However, he said that the GOT 
was unhappy with the information exchange about progress on 
the plan and that "frustration is building."  The GOT needed 
concrete information about progress on the action plan. 
Sensoy expressed appreciation for U.S. recognition of the 
so-called "KHK" as another iteration of the PKK/KADEK 
terrorist organization.  Sensoy said that Turkey would work 
to create the conditions to encourage those in the Makhmour 
refugee camp to return to Turkey, and he reviewed the 
timetable laid out in his recent discussions with PRM A/S 
Dewey. 
 
 
¶8.  (S) Pascoe noted that the GOT had expressed no 
dissatisfaction with progress on the action plan during the 
recent High Level Defense Group (HLDG) meeting in the U.S.; 
on the contrary, DCHOD Basbug had made positive statements. 
He noted that the U.S. had recently made a show of force 
against the PKK after U.S. forces came under PKK fire.  The 
U.S. was preparing courses of action (COAs) against the PKK 
that should be ready soon.  The question was now one of 
timing and opportunity for execution of the COAs. 
 
 
Deputy DG for Caucasus Tezgor 
 
 
¶9.  (C) Pascoe reviewed his recent trip to the Caucasus with 
Caucasus Department Deputy Director General Tezgor.  Tezgor 
expressed appreciation for Pascoe's readout.  Tezgor said he 
was continuing to have had productive discussions with the 
Armenians; the two countries were working on "step-by-step" 
improvements in relations with measure such as increased 
charter flights, NGO and journalist exchanges, and joint 
restoration of historical monuments.  However, Tezgor said 
that Turkey would not open the border until Armenia made some 
concession on Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), such as a partial 
withdrawal from the occupied territories.  Pascoe said the 
Kocharian would want a concession on NK status before any 
withdrawal.  Tezgor said Armenia would have to take the first 
step, perhaps by officially recognizing the Turkey-Armenia 
border. 
 
 
¶10.  (C) Pascoe pointed out the size difference between 
Turkey and Armenia:  Turkey had no realistic fear of border 
problems and could not realistically expect a much smaller 
country to take the first steps.  On NK, the GOT could help 
by preparing public opinion for a settlement.  He told Tezgor 
the U.S. would seek ways in which to keep Turkey better 
informed about the Minsk Group process. 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Tezgor worried about increasing Russian influence in 
the Caucasus.  Pascoe said the U.S. was aware of the Russian 
push and was active in the Caucasus.  He told Tezgor the U.S. 
was continuing to train Georgian forces, would step up 
military cooperation with Armenia over the next few months, 
would push for PfP funding in the region, and would seek to 
get the EU more involved.  He said Turkey was a good 
counterweight to Russia and that Turkey should seek to 
increase its economic activity in the region. 
 
 
¶12.  DAS Pascoe was unable to clear this message before his 
departure. 
DEUTSCH