This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

020943Z Dec 03

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 007804 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2013 
TAGS: PGOV SOCI KDEM JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN ELITE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT NEW GOVERNMENT, 
REFORM; THE STREET, MUCH LESS SO 
 
REF: AMMAN 7507 
 
Classified By: CDA David M. Hale for reasons 1.5 (b) (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) A recent opinion poll showed that, despite falling 
confidence in government on the part of "ordinary" citizens, 
"opinion leaders" have higher hopes for the success of the 
new government's reform agenda.  Embassy sources split along 
similar lines, with members of the well-educated elite more 
upbeat about reform than more street-wise Jordanians.  One 
reason for this dichotomy may be the extensive campaign of 
personal contacts PM Fayez has undertaken with politicians, 
MPs, and opposition elements in the elite since taking 
office.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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AND THE POLL SAYS . . . 
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¶2.  (U) The Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at Jordan 
University released a public opinion poll November 10 
regarding public expectations for the new government.  This 
was the latest in a series of CSS polls conducted as 
successive governments are sworn in to gauge popular 
expectations of government performance.  The poll showed a 
continuation of a trend of slipping confidence in government 
among "ordinary" Jordanians.  Interestingly, however, the 
poll showed that "opinion leaders" were less pessimistic -- 
or even optimistic -- on the government's ability to fight 
the country's economic woes.  Opinion leaders --  senior 
officials, journalists and writers, and leaders in 
universities, political parties and professional associations 
-- were also more optimistic that the new government would 
successfully tackle King Abdullah's political reform agenda. 
Faris Breizat, coordinator of the CSS Public Opinion Unit, 
stated that this was "the first time that opinion leaders 
appear to be less pessimistic than the national sample on 
major issues." 
 
¶3.  (U) On the economic front, 26 percent of the national 
sample believed the government would be successful in 
fighting poverty, while the corresponding figure among 
opinion leaders was 35 percent.  41 percent of the national 
sample believed that the government would succeed in reducing 
corruption, while 48 percent of opinion leaders held this 
view.  With respect to political reform, 49 percent of the 
general public expressed optimism for progress on political 
development and a modern political parties law, compared to 
56 percent of opinion leaders. 
 
¶4.  (U) Both the national sample and opinion leaders were 
considerably more optimistic about the government's 
capability to achieve its foreign policy goals (an 
unprecedented 68 percent among the general public and 75 
percent among opinion leaders) and to empower women in the 
political and social arena (66 percent and 71 percent, 
respectively, among the national sample and opinion leaders). 
 
 
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WHY THE DIFFERENCE? 
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¶5.  (U) According to Breizat, the greater enthusiasm among 
opinion-makers could be because of "the more than 400 
telephone calls and personal contacts that the Premier made 
to public opinion leaders and representatives of political 
parties, social, economic and political institutions" after 
being installed (see ref).  With respect to confidence levels 
for certain issues being notably higher than others, Breizat 
attributed the difference to King Abdullah.  "On issues in 
which His Majesty is known to get personally involved, such 
as foreign policy and foreign investment, expectations of 
success are very high," commented Breizat. 
 
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A VIEW FROM THE GOVERNMENT AND COURT 
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¶6.  (SBU) In a series of courtesy calls on the new ministers, 
the Ambassador found an unusually high level of enthusiasm, 
feeling of empowerment, and certainty of the King's desire to 
see political and economic reform move forward. 
 
¶7.  (C) Hussein Adwan, Director of the Office of Crown Prince 
Hamzeh, pointed out the poll results to PolCouns and said 
that he agreed wholeheartedly with them.  Adwan noted that 
elite Jordanians had high expectations for the new government 
and were upbeat about prospects for the future.  This was 
particularly true among the younger generation of Jordanian 
elites.  According to Adwan, Jordan was the only Arab country 
that was making a real generational change in its leadership, 
as reflected in the comparative youth of the new ministers. 
 
¶8.  (C) In contrast to Jordanian leaders, Adwan said most in 
the Palace feel Jordanians on the street have much lower 
expectations for the new government and are not optimistic 
about the future.  Adwan, echoing a frequently heard 
observation on Amman's salon circuit, described PM Faisal 
al-Fayez as a "nice" person and a capable mediator, but was 
not sure he had the strong personality required to push 
through difficult political and social reforms.  He would 
need to use his close ties to the King to succeed as prime 
minister.  Another Palace insider who had shared an office 
with Fayez for eight years said Fayez had not displayed any 
"flashes of brilliance" during their time together and was 
ignorant of economics and budgeting, but that he was 
agreeable and professional in his conduct. 
 
A FEW DISSENTING VOICES 
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¶9.  (C) Embassy soundings outside the west Amman elite tend 
to support the results of the CSS poll.  An informal survey 
of FSN family and friends showed little notice or attention 
given to the new government, much less a conviction that a 
change in government ministers would have a concrete impact 
on their lives.  Embassy sources indicate that ordinary 
Jordanians are, in general, not enthusiastic about the new 
government, see it as no different than previous governments, 
and dismiss its promises of reform as tired rehashes of 
previous unfulfilled pledges. 
 
¶10.  (C) We also heard some dissenting voices from the elite, 
especially among jilted former ministers and statesmen from 
the older generation who believe that King Abdullah has moved 
them out of positions of power and influence too soon. 
Former advisor to King Hussein, Adnan Abu Odeh, for example, 
commented to PolOff that the ministers' lack of experience 
and "cultural context" -- particularly those young ministers 
who spent a good deal of time abroad -- could hinder their 
efforts to implement much needed changes in Jordan.  (The 
King and others would argue that it is precisely Abu Odeh's 
"cultural context" -- the decades of Arab political and 
economic paralysis -- which Jordan needs to escape.)  He also 
criticized the government's decision to postpone dealing with 
the election law, which he believes politically marginalizes 
the Palestinian community in Jordan. 
 
¶11.  (C) There are also a few young dissenters.  During a 
meeting with the Ambassador November 23, MP Raed Qaqish (a 
Christian from Salt) expressed disappointment with the new 
government and little optimism for real change.  Qaqish 
thought that PM Fayez had made a mistake in not consulting 
with Parliament before forming the cabinet.  He claimed that 
the ministers were, in general, "out of touch with the 
reality of the people."  Young, pro-reform members of the 
Parliament (like Qaqish himself, he volunteered) should have 
been included in the new cabinet, but were instead being 
"shut out" of government decision-making. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶12.  (C) The CSS poll mirrors post's sense of a gap between 
the expectations of the Jordanian street and the elite 
regarding the new government and its reform agenda.  As is 
the case with most changes here, those who believe they have 
the most to gain from reform and liberalization (or simple 
participation in the government) are optimistic about the new 
government.  Those in the elite who have been sidelined, and 
poorer Jordanians who do not feel they have a real stake in 
the government, are less optimistic. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman 
 
or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET 
home page. 
HALE