This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SANTO DOMINGO 006826 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR WHA AND DRL 
NSC FOR SHANNON AND MADISON 
LABOR FOR ILAB 
TREASURY FOR OASIA-LAMONICA 
USDOC FOR 4322/ITA/MAC/WH/CARIBBEAN BASIN DIVISION 
USDOC FOR 3134/ITA/USFCS/RD/WH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: DR PGOV
SUBJECT: DOMINICAN ELECTION SERIES #3: POLITICAL PARTIES 
GIRD FOR CAMPAIGN 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Following is the third in our series on the 
Dominican presidential election: 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES GIRD FOR CAMPAIGN 
 
The May 2004 presidential election in the Dominican Republic 
will be the first in more than two decades not to be decided 
by the late strongman and ex-president Joaquin Balaguer.  The 
charismatic founders who long dominated the Dominican 
Revolutionary Party (PRD), Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), 
and Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC) -- Jose Francisco 
Pena Gomez, Juan Bosch, and Balaguer -- lingered beyond their 
prime and died in recent years.  The passing of the 
"caudillos" has made the contest for leadership far more 
lively and far more divisive in the parties. 
 
The ruling PRD and opposition PRSC have each split into 
warring camps led by rival contenders.  The PLD,s candidate, 
former president Leonel Fernandez (1996-2000), is the 
strongest figure in the electoral arena.  The PRD, weakened 
by President Hipolito Mejia,s recent plunge in popularity, 
nonetheless will benefit from his allocation of official 
resources -- public jobs, pork-barrel spending, and 
government favors.   The little-known PRSC candidate Eduardo 
Estrella ranks a distant third.  It is still too early to 
predict who will prevail, since the candidates have barely 
unlimbered their rhetoric and patronage in the opening 
skirmishes of the campaign. 
 
The Tattered White Banner of the PRD 
- - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - 
 
At first glance it appears that the PRD of President Hipolito 
Mejia -- which claims to have 1.6 million loyal voters and 
has committees in every corner of the Dominican Republic -- 
is well enough organized to overwhelm the opposition. 
Centrist and pragmatic, the PRD long ago abandoned its 
revolutionary stance of the 1960s.  But Mejia, a popular 
president during his first two years, has slipped badly in 
approval ratings since 2002 -- voters blame him for the 
country,s severe economic slump and many PRD colleagues 
blame him for seeking reelection after having denied 
repeatedly that he would do so, a shift they believe violates 
party principles.  His low domestic performance rating comes 
close to a negative image of his vision and engagement in the 
international arena.  Dominican voters are more concerned 
about jobs, affordable food and fuel, and electric lights 
than about headlines from Madrid, Brasilia, or Kuwait. 
 
The President,s PPH (Proyecto Presidencial Hipolito) faction 
still controls much of the PRD machine.  Our contacts 
indicate as many as 70 percent of convention (party primary) 
delegates will vote to re-nominate him.  Seven other PRD 
pre-candidates, including influential Tourism Secretary (and 
PRD Secretary General) Rafael "Fello" Subervi and Vice 
President Milagros Ortiz-Bosch, have challenged Mejia, based 
on the party,s history of opposing the 'continuismo' of the 
dictator Trujillo and the perennially (and fraudulently) 
re-elected Balaguer.  Subervi, Ortiz-Bosch and minor figure 
Enmanuel Esquea have cut a deal with Mejia to participate in 
a nominating convention on December 14.  PRD president Hatuey 
DeCamps and three other pre-candidates have announced plans 
for a separate convention December 7 that would exclude 
Mejia.  Negotiations involving senior PRD mediators have 
failed to patch up the schism, and prominent figures in civil 
society including church organizations have taken up the 
anti-reelection cause.  Ortiz-Bosch, Subervi, and others 
expect a Central Election Board (JCE) ruling on the legality 
of whichever multiple PRD candidates emerge from the fog of 
this battle. 
 
The PLD and the Purple-Robed Knight 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
The PLD, with fewer hard-core voters than the PRD (perhaps 
700,000), draws its strength from having (1) a popular former 
president as its candidate and (2) a disciplined party cadre. 
 Leonel Fernandez won the presidency in the 1996 election 
with the help of the conservative Balaguer as much as from 
the PLD founder, leftist intellectual Juan Bosch.  Leonel,s 
accomplishments, particularly privatization of state 
enterprises and economic policies that spurred consistently 
high economic growth, convincingly retired the PLD,s radical 
ideology.  He retained symbolic remnants by establishing 
relations with Fidel Castro,s Cuba.  This year, Fernandez in 
his opposition role has criticized Mejia,s troop 
contribution to the Iraq stabilization force and the plan to 
negotiate a free trade agreement with the United States.  But 
our PLD contacts and Leonel's campaign statements on 
attracting investment and creating private sector jobs to 
restore prosperity suggest that if elected he would promote 
common U.S.-Dominican interests in an open economy. 
 
The PLD organization is the leanest of the three, with only 
12,000 full members who have attended the party,s political 
training institute.  Although without official committees in 
all of the nation,s localities, the PLD is strong in Santo 
Domingo and other major cities.  The sense of discipline 
extends even to other senior PLD leaders.  Former 
presidential candidate (in 2000) Danilo Medina now serves as 
Leonel,s campaign manager, and former Dominican Vice 
President (1996-2000) Jaime David Fernandez Mirabal, the 
other contender in this year,s PLD nominating convention, 
recently attached his troops to Leonel,s campaign. 
 
The PLD often tries to portray itself as less corrupt than 
the other parties.  However, the recent massive BANINTER 
banking scandal here reflects inadequate supervision and 
irregularities that predate the present administration, and 
Leonel has acknowledged receipt of consulting fees from the 
collapsed BANINTER.  Additionally, while in office he faced 
accusations of corruption and personal and family enrichment. 
 Some critics speculate that BANINTER-related prosecutions 
might link him to the bank,s illegal financial transfers. 
If hard evidence were to unexpectedly appear in court, PRD 
campaigners would be quick to blast him.  Still, 
anti-corruption themes can cut both ways, so Dominican 
politicians may be reluctant to use them aggressively in the 
campaign. 
 
PRSC Reds in a Cockfight 
- - - - - - - -  - - - - 
 
"Reformistas" still lack a convincing champion.  They are 
generally seen as a smaller but still nationwide party that 
will throw its vote to either the PLD or the PRD when the 
time comes. 
 
Reformista veterans of Balaguer,s entourage are mesmerized 
by the current bloodletting in their own camp.  Eduardo 
Estrella won the nomination last March, defeating main rival 
Jacinto Peynado -- a controversial outcome probably swung by 
PRD/PPH supporters crossing over to vote in the PRSC primary. 
 Estrella is a former Secretary of Public Works.  So far he 
has failed to inspire the hundreds of thousands of PRSC 
voters and local organizers throughout the country, despite 
his campaigning in the interior and among Dominicans in New 
York.  Reformistas are frustrated by their low poll numbers 
and leaders' lax performance.  Indicative is the party,s 
national headquarters, now usually shuttered and surrounded 
by weeds. 
 
Growing pressures exploded in a November 14-16 confrontation 
between Estrella,s group and elder statesmen led by 
Balaguer's former vice presidents Jacinto Peynado and Carlos 
Morales Troncoso.  Even if the insurgents succeed in their 
bid to take over the PRSC -- complaints by both sides may 
oblige the JCE to choose between them, implying recognition 
of one or the other -- the party's candidate will probably 
have to run against a sitting president (PRD) and a former 
president (PLD).  Peynado remains in the United States under 
treatment for serious illness, commanding lieutenants from 
afar, and Morales Troncoso served too long ago to attract 
many voters.  Neither, alone, has the following or charisma 
to revitalize the party. 
 
If no candidate wins a majority next May 16, the PRSC could 
well be a swing force in the second round.  Mejia,s PPH has 
a cordial relationship with Estrella,s PRSC faction and 
would hope to use this to deliver a PRD victory.  Likewise, 
Leonel,s PLD would appeal to Reformistas, mainly in the 
Peynado wing, who want to unseat Mejia.  No one knows how 
PRSC voters would divide in a second round.  Their squabbling 
leaders are hoarding bargaining chips with which to demand 
cabinet or sub-cabinet posts in the next administration.  And 
hope is not completely extinguished.  If closely matched PLD 
and PRD candidates cut each other to pieces in either phase 
of the battle, even a lackluster Reformista might rally 
enough confused voters to win a second-round upset. 
 
¶2.  (U) Drafted by: Bainbridge Cowell. 
HERTELL