This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANTO DOMINGO 006671 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR WHA, WHA/CAR, WHA/EPSC, EB/IFD; DEPT PASS USAID; 
NSC FOR SHANNON; TREASURY FOR U/S TAYLOR, NLEE, LLAMONICA; 
DHS PASS CUSTOMS FOR MIAMI:FUENTES; BRIDGETOWN FOR D CHAINER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2010 
TAGS: EFIN PGOV EAID CJAN DR
SUBJECT: DOMINICAN BANKING SERIES #1: BANINTER CASE - WILL 
IT GET PROSECUTED? 
 
Classified By: DCM Lisa Kubiske.  Reason:  1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) Following is the first in a series of reports on the 
Dominican banking sector. 
 
(Begin Text) 
 
BANINTER CASE -- WILL IT GET PROSECUTED? 
 
(C) Dominican banking officials have been gratified by USG 
interest in the investigation of the case of "Ramoncito" Baez 
Figueroa's Baninter, which collapsed last April and left 
behind it bad debts of more than USD 2.1 billion.  They and 
others remain deeply pessimistic that the Dominican judiciary 
will stay the course and obtain convictions of Baez and his 
colleagues.  The best outcome, many Dominicans muse, would be 
for the United States to extradite the whole lot and try them 
in the United States. 
 
(SBU) The Ambassador and embassy staff have discouraged such 
expectations and challenged Dominicans to demonstrate to a 
doubting public the firmness of their intentions.  Even so, 
many remain convinced that the upcoming elections season will 
provide enough distraction for a deal to be struck by 
someone, somewhere. 
 
(C) In early September, President Mejia passed to the Embassy 
six thick binders of Baninter material, including summary 
reports of the documented activities.  That same week, at the 
conclusion of a working visit by Homeland Security (Customs) 
regional attache Bob Fuentes and Treasury's regional 
contractor David Chainer, the Monetary Board authorized 
Central Bank Governor Jose Lois Malkun to make a formal 
request for cooperation with their agencies. Informal 
exchanges have been cordial and effective since then; for 
example, on October 18-20 Central Bank contractor Jose Duarte 
and an emboff went to Miami to talk business with Homeland 
Security, with the law firm hired by the GODR to pursue asset 
recovery, and with the U.S. attorney's office. 
 
(C) Central Bank Governor Lois Malkun and Banking 
Superintendent Julio Cross have been dogged in their pursuit 
of the Baninter case.  They persist in the face of the lack 
of technical expertise to guide investigators, the obvious 
inexperience of the Dominican jurists in defining and proving 
a case, and the misgivings of those many individuals inside 
the government and out who accepted Baez's favors in the 
glory days.  Ramoncito had his hooks into almost everyone. 
 
(C) Embassy officers got to interview the Central Bank 
contractor who walked into the bank last May with nothing 
more than verbal instructions to begin the intervention, and 
we have spent a lot of time with lawyers and managers from 
the Bank superintendency.  They tell us that the evidence of 
fraud is ample and undeniable.  Even so, we are concerned to 
find that while lots of time is being spent combing through 
the files, not enough is being done by the Dominicans to 
track assets, to assure an air-tight case against the 
culprits, or to identify the sources of funds.  An Amcit 
consultant we brought in with NAS funds for a two-week 
assessment in October confirmed this impression.  Most of 
Baninter's physical assets have been sold off, but it appears 
that to date almost none of Baez's personal assets have been 
seized, even though the Money Laundering Law effective 
September 2002 provides for that possibility.  The only 
significant exception is the "Listin Diario" newspaper, under 
government-appointed management since June. 
 
The investigation 
 
(SBU) Magistrate Eduardo Sanchez Ortiz was assigned by lot 
last June to investigate the case.  The law provides in most 
cases for only 60-90 days of investigation; Sanchez Ortiz 
recently received his fifth 30-day extension, in recognition 
of his need to consult banking experts to make sense of the 
voluminous material from the bank, drawn not only from 
Baninter headquarters but also from 29 filing cabinets found 
tucked away in a distant warehouse. Almost all the records 
are still available and are stored in a location which the 
experts refuse to name, even to us.  Sanchez acknowledges 
being seriously challenged by the complexity of the task.  We 
understand that one of his first sessions in May was a 
two-hour tutorial in double-entry bookkeeping.  He 
subsequently received tutoring and extensive study materials 
on the 2002 Money Laundering Law.  He recently attended a 
workshop given at the Judiciary School on the legal aspects 
of money laundering and complex fraud cases. In October the 
Supreme Court contracted an expert accountant with banking 
experience to work with Sanchez; he had requested two 
experts. Baez Figueroa's attorneys challenged the expert last 
week as potentially biased, since their client had fired the 
accountant's wife from Baninter. 
 
(SBU) Appreciation of the fine art of accounting is essential 
in this case. For more than a decade Baez Figueroa and 
several close associates systematically ran overdrafts of 
client accounts and covered them up by creating phantom 
certificates of deposit (instruments that until very recently 
were not tracked or verified by the regulatory authorities). 
The complex scheme was tracked in specially created software 
which comprised a "covert" bank, reintegrated daily with open 
accounts but accessible during workhours only to Baez and his 
confederates. 
 
(SBU) Presentation of the facts will be vital.  Under 
Dominican procedure the case against the Bantiner crew will 
be judged exclusively on documents and observations delivered 
by Sanchez Ortiz to the sitting judge; there is no provision 
for the judge to obtain further evidence.  If Sanchez Ortiz 
fails to file an adequate brief -- for whatever reason -- the 
case will be full of holes, making it all the more likely 
that Baez Figueroa and friends will go free. 
 
"Ramoncito" Down and Out? 
 
(C) Baez Figueroa became notorious in the late 90's for his 
flamboyant spending, high profile publicity campaigns and 
generous handouts to individuals, institutions and good 
causes. There appears to be no Dominican law prohibiting 
officials from accepting such donations. The bank collapse 
made a lot of people nervous, as they wondered how far 
prosecutions might extend. In contrast to that high 
lifestyle, Baez has been sitting in jail since last May, 
despite persistent rumors that his political connections and 
vast funds will get him sprung. President Mejia declared to 
the Ambassador earlier this month that Baez deserved to be in 
jail and would damn well stay there.   Of the four bank 
officials originally arrested, only Baez and Marcel Baez 
Cocos remain in jail.  Amcit Luis Alvarez Renta was freed in 
the first week of September to seek medical treatment -- 
which he promptly sought in Miami and Boston.  Despite his 
attorney's pledges of good faith, Alvarez Renta remains in 
the United States.  Vivian Lubrano, also released on medical 
grounds, is still in the Dominican Republic. 
 
(C) Baninter is the grandest bank fraud and collapse in 
Dominican history, but other bank failures are likely to give 
rise to court cases.  Dominicans are watching these cases 
with growing cynicism and with the expectation of being 
severely disappointed by their government and judiciary. 
Knowledgeable observers comment that the institutions to 
maintain, regulate and police the financial system here 
simply do not exist yet.  President Mejia and his 
administration have done more than many expected, but the 
wily Baez has lots of resources -- and many speculate that in 
the current electoral climate, time is on his side.  The 
matter-of-fact acceptance of corruption across Dominican 
society is a continuing sore.  Much more must be done to 
strengthen investigations and to provide prosecution 
expertise, so as to demonstrate to the many bad guys, to 
complaisant officials and to the Dominican public that 
corruption can - -  and should - - be detected and deterred. 
 
 
 
KUBISKE