This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002701 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2013 
TAGS: PTER PREL IR YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S 11/8/03 CT COORDINATION MEETING WITH 
MOI/PSO DIRECTORS 
 
 
Classified By: CTC AUSTIN G. GILREATH, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  On 8 November 2003, the Ambassador was 
called to a meeting with Minister of the Interior, Dr. Rashad 
al-Alimi, and the Director of the Political Security 
Organization, BG Ghalib al-Qamish, to discuss current levels 
of cooperation on the counter-terrorism front.  The 
Ambassador presented a number of requests for further 
information on threats to American targets and details of 
Al-Qa,ida presence in Sana,a, and reaffirmed the need for 
the ROYG to commit fully in word and deed to the Global War 
On Terrorism.  Alimi and Qamish confirmed Yemen,s interest 
in cooperating with America.  End summary. 
 
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THE AL-SHARIF CELL 
 
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¶2. (C)  The Ambassador told attendees that based on 
information given to him by MOI Alimi on the 28 October, he 
understood that the Amr al-Sharif al-Qa,ida cell arrested in 
September 2003 had attempted to conduct two attacks on the 
Ambassador,s motorcade.  The Ambassador requested additional 
information, to include weapons, locations and timings of the 
aborted attacks.  The Ambassador also asked for additional 
threat targeting information, developed from cell member 
interrogations, on western restaurants, institutes, USG 
residences and the Hadda Compound.  The Ambassador told the 
attendees that because the cell members were currently in 
jail, and the arrest team had discovered a wealth of 
information (computer disks, written targeting packets, and 
casing videotape), these requests were not unreasonable. 
 
¶3.  (C)  After some initial confusion regarding the existence 
or non-existence of a videotape containing casing information 
of the British Embassy, Dr. Alimi finally produced the 
original and promised that copies would be made and delivered 
to the embassy and the British Ambassador.  (Comment:  It 
appears PSO, the designated conduit for materials, was not 
provided with a key piece of material.  End comment) 
 
¶4.  (S/NF)  The Ambassador said that it was his understanding 
that seventeen individuals had been arrested in connection to 
the cell.  The Ambassador asked why their names had not been 
provided to the Embassy yet.  Qamish told the Ambassador that 
he had indeed provided those names to his liaison Pol/Mil 
contact at the Embassy.  After the meeting, the Pol/Mil 
Section Head confirmed to the Ambassador that he has not 
received any of these names, but that he would check with PSO 
liaison to see if such material was in the pipeline. 
Subsequently, the names were turned over in memo format on 9 
November. 
 
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THE IRANIAN DEPORTEES 
 
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¶5.  (S/NF)  Referring to a recent Yemeni press article 
detailing the extradition by Iran to Yemen of thirteen Yemeni 
al-Qa,ida terrorists, the Ambassador pointedly asked 
attendees why the Embassy, and officials in Washington, had 
to receive such information late from open sources and not 
early from our committed CT partners in the ROYG.  Qamish 
responded that this was in fact old news and that the 
transfer had taken place in January 2003.  He continued by 
saying that these individuals had targeted objectives outside 
of Yemen, did not present a threat to the Embassy, and that 
it was a Yemeni-Iranian matter.  The Ambassador asked if 
Embassy interlocutors had been made aware of the transfer 
during the time of its execution, and attendees responded 
that while Washington knew of the transfer, the names had not 
been conveyed at the Iranians' request.  Qamish said he would 
provide these names in official channels since Iran has now 
leaked them. 
 
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ESCAPED FUGITIVES 
 
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¶6.  (C) The Ambassador queried the current status of ROYG 
efforts to capture Ahmed al-Quso and Jamal Muhamad Ahmad Ali 
al-Badawi.  Attendees confirmed that the two individuals were 
in Yemen, but that they did not have specific locational data 
on the fugitives.  Attendees confirmed that two of the ten 
March 2003 Aden prison escapees had been recaptured.  Qamish 
again reiterated that if the Embassy had any information on 
the current location of Abu Asim al-Makki, this information 
should be turned over to the PSO. 
¶7. (C)  Comment:  A joint Alimi/Qamish meeting is rare, and 
this one was at the Yemenis request.  It was obviously an 
effort by the Yemenis to respond to concerns raised by FBI 
Director Mueller and the Ambassador. (Septel)  The episode of 
the missing UK Embassy videotape indicates the lack of 
coordination between Yemeni agencies.  In Ambassador,s 
judgment, it illustrates dramatically why we need to develop 
close and constant contact with the MOI.  Embassy,s DCM will 
take the lead in this regard. End comment. 
MISENHEIMER