This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T  ROME 005008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2013 
TAGS: PREL IT EUN ESDP NATO AFGHANISTAN IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: PM'S DIP ADVISORS ON REQUEST FOR TROOPS IN IRAQ 
AND AFGHANISTAN; CONFUSING SIGNALS ON STRUCTURED COOPERATION 
 
REF: A) STATE 303817 B) ROME 4907 C) ROME 4974 D) 
     ROME 4957 E) ROME 4933 
 
Classified By: POL MINISTER COUNSELOR TOM COUNTRYMAN.  REASON: 1.5 (B)( 
D) 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. On October 31, Deputy Diplomatic Advisors to 
the PM, Paolo Dionisi and Francesco Talo, confirmed that 
Italy will likely approve our request for an extension of its 
deployment in Iraq.  They asked that the Italian role in Iraq 
security and stabilization be given more public and official 
US acknowledgment, that Italy be given a senior role on Amb. 
Bremer,s team, and that Italian firms be given more 
opportunities to compete for contracts in Iraq.  They said it 
would be difficult for Italy to agree to  the US request to 
provide a task force of 1000 troops to Khowst, noting that 
the significant Italian troop presence in Iraq and ongoing 
stabilization operations in the Balkans were stretching 
resources.  They were more optimistic about the possibility 
of Italy deploying a Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) to 
Ghazni, and asked for more specifics on scope and number of 
personnel required.  In an apparent contradiction of ref. b 
readout, the PM's advisors assured us that structured 
cooperation as it relates to European security currently 
under discussion in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 
would not delegate operational decisions to a core group. 
They insisted any use of force would require consensus at 25. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
FORCES IN IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (S) In discussing the US request for Italian forces in 
Iraq, Talo and Dionisi confirmed that Italy will probably 
agree to the request for continued deployment of personnel in 
Iraq well into 2004.  They stressed, however, that Italy,s 
strong support  should not be a "secret"; indeed, it would 
help them to push our requests with parliament and the public 
for additional resources if there were more public 
acknowledgment of Italy's role in Iraq.  They noted that 
while Italy is the third largest contributor to stabilization 
efforts in Iraq, Poland's effort, which is largely funded 
through NATO, gets far more mention in the US press and 
official statements.  It would also help if Italy could be 
assigned one of the deputy positions in the CPA, and if 
Italian private industry had a larger role in infrastructure 
reconstruction.  That said, they predicted that the 
US/British request to extend troop deployment in Iraq would 
be considered favorably. 
 
¶3. (S) POL-Mil Counselor acknowledged the need for more 
recognition and  publicity.  He promised to pass Italy's 
concerns to Washington, and suggested that President Ciampi's 
upcoming visit to the US would be an opportunity to 
acknowledge, at the very highest levels, Italy's outstanding 
contribution to stability and reconstruction in  Iraq. 
 
¶4. (S) Our request that Italy provide a task force of 1000 
troops to Khowst in March 2004 would prove more problematic, 
Talo and Dionisi said.  When the US first asked Italy for a 
significant troop deployment to Afghanistan, the Iraq 
conflict had not taken place.  Italy now had a significant 
troop presence in Iraq.  This, coupled with the ongoing 
stabilization operations in the Balkans, was stretching 
Italian military resources.  They confirmed that  the MOD is 
examining  the request, but were pessimistic that it would be 
approved.  (Comment:  This negative signal on OEF deployment 
accords with others we have received in recent days from MFA 
NATO Director Brauzzi, CHOD Mosca Moschini, and Vice CHOD 
Camporini.   End comment.) 
 
¶5. (S) Talo and Dionisi were more optimistic about the 
possibility of Italy deploying a PRT to Ghazni.  The issue 
was more about resources rather than concept; they asked for 
specifics on scope and number of personnel required. 
Pol-Military Counselor stressed that we find 60-90 PRT 
personnel to be sufficient, and said there was no need to 
follow the more numerous German model.  We promised to follow 
 
 
up and noted that additional operational details would be 
available through Italy's liaison officers at CENTCOM. 
(Septel reports PRT discussion with MFA experts.) 
 
IGC/STRUCTURED COOPERATION 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Dionisi and Talo said that the US should not be 
concerned over recent developments regarding European 
security and Structured Cooperation.  The initiatives under 
discussion in the IGC process are designed to close 
capabilities and operations gaps.  Additionally, underlined 
Talo, the participation of like-minded nations, such as 
Italy, the UK and Spain, in any defense core group will 
ensure that US interests and Berlin-plus are protected. 
 
¶7. (C) Talo and Dionisi stressed that structured cooperation 
parameters within which the core group could operate would be 
decided at 25.  They also said that any decision to go 
operational (use of force) would require a consensus 
decision.  Embassy note: this contradicts ref. b readout in 
which Senate President Pera told us that he had been briefed 
by FM Frattini on the latest thinking on structured 
cooperation.  Pera said Frattini had discussed with his 
German, French and British counterparts a structured 
cooperation proposal which would include allowing the core 
group authority to make operational decisions.  End note. 
 
¶8. (S) Comment.  While no formal reply is in, it is becoming 
clear that our three-pronged request will yield a mixed, 
albeit generally positive, response.  Iraq extension looks 
increasingly likely.  An Italian PRT in Ghazni (septel) now 
looks more likely, although details of command and control 
and lines of authority will have to be ironed out.  A renewed 
deployment of Italian troops to Khowst, however, remains 
uncertain, primarily because Italian forces are already 
stretched thin on other overseas missions (Iraq, Balkans). 
We will continue to press on all three fronts. 
 
¶9. (S) Comment continued.  PM Berlusconi has loyally 
supported US policy in Iraq despite deep reservations in 
Italian public opinion, so the requests of his diplomatic 
advisors for more official recognition, and more policy and 
commercial participation in Iraq,s reconstruction, make 
sense.  We recommend that Washington and the CPA explore 
opportunities to address these concerns, and will work 
closely with them in this process. 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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	2003ROME05008 - Classification: SECRET