This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 005003 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, SA 
 
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2013 
TAGS: MOPS MASS PREL EAID AF IT EUN AFGHANISTAN
SUBJECT: ITALY:  MFA ON TROOPS AND PRT IN AFGHANISTAN, 
ACCELERATED DISBURSEMENTS, AND EU TROIKA VISIT 
 
REF: A. ROME 4933 
 
     ¶B. STATE 303817 
     ¶C. ROME 4427 
     ¶D. STATE 305542 
     ¶E. 10/31 COUNTRYMAN-BURKHEAD E-MAIL 
     ¶F. USNATO 1111 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: POL MINCOUNS THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (S)  SUMMARY:  KEY MFA INTERLOCUTORS SIGNAL THAT ITALY'S 
ASSESSMENT OF SENDING A PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT) 
TO GHAZNI IS MOVING FORWARD.  THEY DOUBT THAT ITALY WOULD BE 
ABLE TO SEND 1,000 OEF TROOPS TO KHOWST TO REPLACE U.S. 
MARINES THERE (SEE ALSO SEPTEL).  THEY ALSO REPORTED BRIEFLY 
ON THE PRESIDENT'S PHONE CALL TO PM BERLUSCONI, URGING 
ACCELERATED DISBURSEMENT OF ITALY'S AFGHAN ASSISTANCE, AND ON 
THE RECENT EU TROIKA VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (S)  ON NOVEMBER 3, A/POLMINCOUNS, ACCOMPANIED BY POLOFF, 
MET TOGETHER (AT THEIR SUGGESTION) WITH MFA SPECIAL 
COORDINATOR FOR AFGHANISTAN ENRICO DI MAIO AND NATO OFFICE 
DIRECTOR GIOVANNI BRAUZZI.  DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON REF B 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ITALIAN MILITARY SUPPORT IN 
AFGHANISTAN, FOLLOWING UP ON OUR APPROACHES TO DEFENSE 
MINISTER MARTINO (REF A) AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE 
(SEPTEL).  (NOTE:  DI MAIO AND BRAUZZI WERE ALSO AWARE OF, 
    BUT DID NOT DISCUSS, OUR REF B REQUEST FOR ITALIAN FORCES TO 
REMAIN IN IRAQ "WELL INTO 2004."  BRAUZZI HAD INDICATED IN AN 
EARLIER CONVERSATION THAT HE FORESEES "FEW PROBLEMS" IN 
RENEWING ITALY'S DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES IN IRAQ.  END NOTE.) 
A/POLMINCOUNS OUTLINED THE REQUEST FOR A RETURN OF 
APPROXIMATELY 1,000 ITALIAN TROOPS TO AFGHANISTAN TO REPLACE 
U.S. MARINES IN KHOWST AND THE PROPOSAL THAT ITALY PROVIDE A 
PRT IN GHAZNI FROM JANUARY 2004 FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR.  BOTH 
DI MAIO AND BRAUZZI HAD BEEN BRIEFED ON OUR REQUESTS 
PREVIOUSLY. 
 
¶3.  (S)  BRAUZZI LED OFF BY REFERRING BRIEFLY TO THE REQUEST 
FOR A RETURN OF TROOPS TO KHOWST IN MARCH 2004, SAYING THAT 
IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR ITALY TO SEND ANOTHER LARGE 
DEPLOYMENT TO AFGHANISTAN AT THAT TIME BECAUSE ITS FORCES ARE 
ALREADY STRETCHED THIN WITH EXISTING DEPLOYMENTS (IRAQ, 
BALKANS).  A/POLMINCOUNS NOTED THAT DEFMIN MARTINO HAD SEEMED 
MORE FORTHCOMING, INDICATING THERE MIGHT BE SOME QUESTION 
ABOUT TIMING AND THAT HE NEEDED RECOMMENDATIONS FROM HIS 
MILITARY STAFF, BUT NOT SUGGESTING THAT THE REQUEST WOULD BE 
REJECTED (REF A).  BRAUZZI CONFIRMED THAT THE MOD IS STILL 
ASSESSING THE REQUEST, AND SAID A REPLY WOULD NOT BE READY 
BEFORE THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 10. 
 
¶4.  (C)  BOTH BRAUZZI AND DI MAIO WERE QUITE FORTHCOMING IN 
THE ENSUING DISCUSSION ON A POSSIBLE ITALIAN PRT, HINTING 
THAT ITALIAN AUTHORITIES ARE LOOKING FAVORABLY AT AGREEING TO 
THIS REQUEST.  THEY UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANCE ITALY WILL 
PLACE ON PRT LINES OF AUTHORITY.  BRAUZZI SAID ITALY WOULD 
WANT ITS PRT (AND, EVENTUALLY, ALL PRTS) TO BE UNDER THE 
AUTHORITY OF NATO VIA ISAF, NOT AUTONOMOUS OR "A PART OF 
    PHASE IV OEF OPERATIONS".  WHILE ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL 
DETAILS WOULD BE WELCOME THROUGH CENTCOM OR THE EMBASSY, 
ITALY WOULD EXPECT TO MAKE ITS PRT CONTRIBUTION THROUGH ISAF. 
 (COMMENT:  WHEN WE PRESSED THEM ABOUT THE OPERATIONAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, BRAUZZI AND DI MAIO 
CLEARLY WANTED TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS:  WHILE THEY WANT ANY 
ITALIAN PRT TO OPERATE "UNDER NATO AUSPICES", THEY ARE 
EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT PRT SECURITY VULNERABILITIES AND 
WANT OEF (READ AMERICAN) FORCES ON TAP TO INTERVENE IF 
NECESSARY.  END COMMENT.) 
 
¶5.  (C)  THE TWO DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF PRTS FOR 
EXTENDING SECURITY AND STRENGTHENING PRESIDENT KARZAI'S 
POSITION IN THE RUN-UP TO ELECTIONS, BUT ALSO SAW PRTS AS A 
WAY TO EXTEND ISAF-BASED SECURITY BEYOND KABUL.  BRAUZZI SAID 
ITALY WAS LOOKING AT THE PRTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ITS 
BALKAN EXPERIENCE.  CIVILIAN PRT PERSONNEL MIGHT FALL UNDER 
THE AUTHORITY OF THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN KABUL, WHILE THE 
MILITARY COMMANDER WOULD REPORT TO THE NATO-ISAF COMMANDER. 
BOTH EXPRESSED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN WASHINGTON'S VIEWS ON 
THE LATTER ARRANGEMENT. 
 
¶6.  (C)  DI MAIO AND BRAUZZI CITED THE ITALIAN MILITARY'S 
 
ROME 00005003  002 OF 002 
 
 IN THEIR JUST-CONCLUDED 
SERVICE IN KHOWST AND IN ONGOING WORK IN THE BALKANS.  DI 
MAIO SAID POLICE TRAINING, COUNTER NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT, AND 
JUDICIAL REFORM COULD BE EXPANDED BY INCORPORATING TRAINERS 
AND JUDGES INTO PRTS.  HE ENCOURAGED THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY TO CHANGE ITS PERSPECTIVE ON AFGHANISTAN -- TO SEE 
SECURITY AS THE MEANS TO DEVELOPMENT, AND THUS TO KARZAI'S 
RE-ELECTION, NOT ONLY AS A SUBSET OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM. 
 
¶7.  (C)  WHEN WE CITED OUR EARLIER DISCUSSION WITH MOD 
MARTINO ABOUT PRT SIZE, BRAUZZI SAID THE MILITARY WOULD HAVE 
TO MAKE THE FINAL DETERMINATION ON THAT ISSUE (AGAIN HINTING 
THAT THE DECISIONS WERE IN THE DETAILS, NOT IN WHETHER OR NOT 
TO AGREE).  HE SUSPECTED ITALY WOULD GO WITH A LARGER, RATHER 
THAN A SMALLER, PRT IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE RISK.  WE POINTED 
OUT THAT A LARGER PRT COULD ACTUALLY INCREASE VULNERABILITIES 
BECAUSE OF ITS LARGER FOOTPRINT.  AS FOR TIMING, BRAUZZI SAID 
A JANUARY 2004 START WOULD BE "TOUGH", BUT THE MILITARY WOULD 
HAVE TO PROVIDE THE FINAL ASSESSMENT AND REPLY ON THE 
DETAILS.  BOTH MEN ADDED THAT ITALY WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE 
PRIORITIES AND NEEDS IN AFGHANISTAN.  "WE PUT OURSELVES UNDER 
A TIGHT TIMELINE IN BONN," DI MAIO SAID RUEFULLY TO 
A/POLMINCOUNS, BOTH OF WHOM PARTICIPATED IN THE BONN 
NEGOTIATIONS. 
 
    ¶8.  (C)  DI MAIO NOTED THAT ITALY HAS A LONG-STANDING 
RELATIONSHIP IN GHAZNI, THROUGH AN ITALIAN NGO, THE 
"INSTITUTE FOR AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA."  THIS 
ENTITY HAS BEEN WORKING WITH AFGHANS IN GHAZNI TO PROTECT 
CULTURAL HERITAGE AND TREASURES THERE FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, 
SENDING MISSIONS APPROXIMATELY TWICE A YEAR.  DI MAIO SAID HE 
IS ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
PROJECT TO HEAR THEIR IMPRESSIONS OF GHAZNI, INCLUDING THE 
SECURITY SITUATION THERE. 
 
¶9.  (C)  ON OTHER TOPICS, DI MAIO REPORTED ON THE PRESIDENT'S 
OCTOBER 31 TELEPHONE CALL TO PRIME MINISTER BERLUSCONI, 
REQUESTING ITALY TO ACCELERATE DISBURSEMENT OF ITS PLEDGED 
ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN (REFS D, E).  ITALY HAS ALREADY 
DISBURSED ALMOST 90 PERCENT OF ITS PLEDGE, HE BELIEVED, SO 
ACCELERATED DISBURSEMENT MIGHT NOT BE ALL THAT MEANINGFUL. 
(MFA OFFICE DIRECTOR FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO ASIA, 
AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA, ALESSANDRO GAUDIANO, TOLD ECONOFF 
ESSENTIALLY THE SAME THING, SAYING ITALY HAS ACCELERATED 
DISBURSEMENTS OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS.)  HOWEVER, ITALY 
WOULD LIKE TO FIND STILL MORE FUNDS TO ASSIST IN THE UPCOMING 
ELECTIONS.  THIS WOULD BE COMPLICATED, DI MAIO WARNED, 
BECAUSE THE MONEY WOULD NOT COME FROM WITHIN THE MFA, BUT 
ITALY WAS INTENT ON FINDING ADDITIONAL RESOURCES.  ON 
ELECTIONS, DI MAIO ASKED IF THE U.S. HAD TAKEN A POSITION ON 
WHETHER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD PRIOR TO 
GENERAL ELECTIONS, AS A WAY TO STRENGTHEN PRESIDENT KARZAI'S 
POSITION VIS-A-VIS "THE PANJSHIRIS."  FINALLY, DI MAIO SAID 
THE EU TROIKA, LED BY ITALIAN MFA U/S FOR ASIA AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS MARGHERITA BONIVER TO KABUL OCTOBER 18-21, EXTRACTED A 
COMMITMENT FROM KARZAI THAT THE NEW CONSTITUTION WOULD 
    PROVIDE THAT ELECTIONS WOULD "ABIDE BY" INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS.  THE TROIKA WAS DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE INFLUENCE 
OF THE NARCOTICS TRADE IN AFGHANISTAN.  DI MAIO WORRIED ABOUT 
THE NEGATIVE INFLUENCE NARCOTRAFFICKERS COULD PLAY ON THE 
UPCOMING ELECTIONS. 
 
¶10.  (C)  COMMENT:  DI MAIO TOLD US ITALY WOULD WELCOME ANY 
ADDITIONAL INPUT THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN FORMULATING ITS 
ASSESSMENT OF OUR REQUESTS, BUT SUCH INPUT SHOULD PREFERABLY 
ARRIVE PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 10.  WE NOTE FROM REF F THAT THE 
CONCEPT OF PRTS UNDER NATO-ISAF LEADERSHIP SEEMS TO BE 
WINNING ACCEPTANCE, BUT WOULD BE HAPPY TO FORWARD WASHINGTON 
VIEWS ON THIS, OR ANY OTHER ASPECT, TO OUR ITALIAN 
INTERLOCUTORS. 
 
¶11.  (U)  KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
SEMBLER 
 
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 2003ROME05003 - Classification: SECRET