This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 002163 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  MAOIST WEBSITE, LEADERSHIP ELABORATE ON 
NEW POLITBURO DIRECTIVES 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 2048 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) Recent public announcements by Nepal's Maoist 
leaders indicate an awareness of the movement's dwindling 
popular support and a continuing attempt to explain 
ideologically their failure to win power.  For example, 
following the recent Maoist Politburo meeting (Reftel), the 
Maoists have posted a lengthy, turgid exposition on the 
Nepali version of their website (cpnm.org) that purports to 
provide a doctrinal framework for the policy shifts announced 
at the meeting.  Highlights include an assessment of the U.S. 
as a declining global power; an assertion that constitutional 
monarchy is incompatible with the 21st century; a discussion 
of a three-phase military strategy; an acknowledgement that 
Maoist abuses in the field have cost them popular sympathy; a 
commitment not to undermine NGO projects run by countries 
"not hostile to the People's War"; and a decision to seek 
broader international support, including from the United 
Nations.  The site also carries a separate interview with 
Maoist leader Prachanda explaining the rationale for the 
policy changes and reiterating that the Maoists will not harm 
US citizens.  Consistency between rhetoric and behavior has 
never been a Maoist strength, but we believe that this recent 
bombast signals a shift in the leadership's thinking away 
from rural warfare in favor of greater emphasis on propaganda 
and public relations.  Part of this public relations strategy 
appears to be a continued effort to drive a wedge between the 
US, which is consistently portrayed as "hostile" to the 
Maoists and supportive of "royal fascism," and other donors . 
 End summary. 
 
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MAOIST VIEW OF THE WORLD 
------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U)  The Nepali language version of the Maoist website 
cpnm.org has posted an elaboration of the policy decisions 
referred to in Maoist leader Prachanda's October 21 press 
statement following a recent Politburo meeting (Reftel).  Not 
surprisingly, the self-congratulatory text, entitled 
"Supplementary Resolution on the Current Situation and Our 
Historic Task," asserts the rapid decline of the Maoists' 
enemies (principally, the U.S. and the Palace) and predicts 
the certain victory of the People's War.  U.S. strategy, the 
resolution claimed, has been to divert attention from its 
diplomatic and military failures in the Middle East, Iraq, 
and Afghanistan by "tightening its hegemony in South Asia." 
The Maoists' success in exposing true U.S. aims has won them 
sympathy not only with "anti-imperialist masses the world 
over" but also with unnamed "reactionary forces" purportedly 
troubled by U.S. policy. 
 
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DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) The text charges the Palace with perpetuating a 
system of "military fascism," dismissing as "insane" the 
Prime Minister's call for parliamentary elections in 
mid-2004.  (Note:  The statement conveniently does not 
explain that Maoist threats and terror have forced the 
indefinite postponement of both local and national elections. 
 End note.)  The democratic political parties, according to 
the Maoists, are contributing to the situation through their 
passivity, thus "gradually causing their own extinction."  In 
an astounding leap of logic, the statement asserts that 
because constitutional monarchy is inappropriate for the 21st 
century, "the development of civil war in the country is 
quite natural" and attacks on "military fascism" justifiable. 
 
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THREE NEW PHASES IN STRATEGY 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (U) The web statement reveals a certain amount of Maoist 
sensitivity to speculation that the insurgents' failure to 
mount successful large-scale attacks against Government 
security forcs since the end of the ceasefire could indicate 
that Maoist strength is declining or its command structure 
compromised.  On the contrary, the statement claims; the 
Politburo decision to plan and execute the "strategic 
offensive" in three phases (small-scale, decentralized 
attacks; medium-sized, somewhat centralized attacks; 
large-scale, centralized actions) has been successful so far. 
 Since the offensive is still in the first stage, the failure 
to mount large-scale attacks thus far is all part of the 
plan.  "A section of the masses, particularly urban middle 
class intellectuals, appear to be in some confusion . . . 
Even some revolutionary cadres seem to be disappointed in the 
absence of big shock attacks," the statement acknowledges. 
Perhaps in an effort to reassure these disappointed cadres, 
the statement promises that once the first phase is completed 
at some unspecified date in the future, "stress should be 
placed on organizing centralized large-scale actions." 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
REFORMS TO WIN HEARTS AND MINDS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U) Much of the statement addresses reforms that seem 
intended to curb the excesses and arbitrary cruelty that have 
cost the Maoists much of their popular base, even among their 
purported constituency in rural areas.  The text acknowledges 
that in "areas that have come under the leadership and 
influence of the Party" the Maoists have not done enough to 
win hearts and minds.  In particular, three abuses--the 
destruction of key rural infrastructure, the arbitrary, often 
savage murders of local residents, and extortion--are cited. 
First, the statement attempts to answer recent criticism in 
the local press that the Maoist "jana sarkar" ("people's 
governments") supposedly established in areas under insurgent 
control provide to local residents little or no development 
services, security, or institutional structure analogous to a 
government.  While the aim of a revolutionary power is to 
tear down the apparatus of the old regime, not enough has 
been done to reconstruct or develop such infrastructure in 
areas under Maoist influence.  (Or, as the text so eloquently 
puts it, "the dialectical relationship between destruction 
and construction has not been properly expressed.")  Instead, 
in many areas some local commanders seem bent on destroying 
all vestiges of the old regime--even important infrastructure 
on which the local population depends.  Continued destruction 
"raises the danger of increasing people's grievances against 
us and the enemy's ability to capitalize on that."  Instead, 
the Maoists should "mobilize the masses" to "carry forward 
construction and development activities" in those areas under 
their control. 
 
¶6.  (U) Second, indiscriminate killing of "class enemies" and 
spies without proper analysis of the perpetrator's class, the 
nature of the crime and due process is detrimental to the 
cause as well, the statement continues.  "In the past some of 
the killings have taken place on flimsy grounds" such as not 
heeding "donation" demands, not having provided food and 
shelter, or even on the basis of a personal vendetta with 
local comanders or members of the "people's government."  To 
safeguard against such excesses, when killing class enemies, 
"a certain minimum legal method (must be) adhered to. . . . 
Red terror does not mean anarchy." 
 
¶7.  (U) Third, because "enemy" propaganda about Maoist 
extortion is spreading "illusion" among the middle class, 
"our donations policy (must be) more systematic and refined. 
In the past, while collecting donations there have been some 
lapses in making adequate class analysis of persons and 
organizations, in studying their background and dealing with 
them accordingly."  To avert future lapses, "concrete 
criteria" for assessing "donations" on a class basis must be 
developed, and Party Regional Bureaus should control the 
collection of all "donations" and taxes. 
 
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INTERNATIONAL APPEAL 
--------------------- 
¶8.  (U) The text announces a revised policy toward NGOs and 
INGOs "not linked politically with the old regime" and not 
"directly financed by US imperialism, which has been most 
hostile towards the People's War at the international level." 
 From now on, "we should not carry out any physical action or 
coercion against the INGOs associated with neutral countries 
or those not hostile to the People's War, like the European 
Union."  The statement calls on the Party to "appeal to the 
United Nations and other international fora" for recognition 
as the legitimate government of Nepal and for the support and 
cooperation of all nations against the old regime. 
 
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PRACHANDA ON THE NEW POLICY . . . 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) An interview with Maoist leader Prachanda posted on 
the same website on November 3 offers further explication of 
the reforms.  The policy changes are based on "lessons from 
various shortcomings and weaknesses of the Party," Prachanda 
admitted, including the need to "organize the people's state 
power" in areas under putative Maoist control.  When asked to 
explain the "legal" process under which class "enemies" would 
now be tried, Prachanda said that the People's Liberation 
Army or militia henceforth will hand over all suspects "to 
the Justice Department of the People's State Power for 
prosecution through the judicial process."  Further 
clarification will be available in an interim draft 
Constitution and "other necessary directives" soon to be 
announced, he promised.  While the Maoists have not "closed 
the door" on future negotiations, "there is no possibility of 
talks immediately," he cautions. 
 
--------------------------- 
. . . AND THE FOREIGN HAND 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (U) The Prachanda interview echoes recent rhetoriocal 
efforts by the Maoists to depict U.S. policy in Nepal as 
"interference" and "imperialism," aimed at destabilizing the 
region and threatening the national interests of India and 
China.  The Maoists, Prachanda asserts, "have been 
maintaining correspondence with UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan" and welcome the interest the UN has shown in 
"peacefully resolving the problem by establishing the 
sovereign right of the great Nepali people to 
self-determination."  The Politburo has decided to request 
international organizations, including the UN, to recognize 
the Maoists as the legitimate representatives of the Nepali 
people, instead of the "representatives of the old regime 
which has fully lost the people's trust and which functions 
under the direction of US imperialism."  That said, "we would 
like to make it clear that it has been our Party policy not 
to take physical action against any US citizen, tourist or 
personnel except the US soldiers who come with the so-called 
Royal Army to fight in direct encounters." 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶11.  (SBU) The Politburo decisions--at least as characterized 
on the website--clearly indicate Maoist sensitivity to their 
deteriorating public image.  The insurgents' unbridled 
campaign of murder, destruction, and perhaps most important, 
extortion in the countryside has decimated their popular 
following and created serious doubts about their ability to 
control their cadres.  While the policy "reforms" seem an 
obvious effort to address these concerns, we have observed 
little practical effect so far, as wanton killing, 
destruction of infrastructure, and "donation" demands by 
Maoist cadres continue undiminished.  The website apologia 
also attemps to respond to other recent criticisms that 
question the Maoists' longevity as an insurgent movement, 
i.e., their failure so far to provide any kind of 
quasi-governmental services or structures in areas they claim 
are under their control and their inability since the end of 
the ceasefire to mount large-scale attacks on government 
forces. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Comment Continued:  In an effort to deflect 
negative attention from themselves, the Maoist leadership 
continues to try to externalize the conflict, attempting to 
depict USG policy as "intervention" that directly threatens 
both India and China and that differs significantly from the 
purportedly more tolerant and sympathetic attitudes of other 
donors.  The Maoists are plainly trying to practice the same 
technique of divide-and-conquer--which they have employed to 
such advantage in pitting the Palace/Government and political 
parties against one another--to the international community. 
The Politburo ramblings, followed closely by Prachanda's 
long-distance exegesis, signals to us a movement under 
increasing pressure, both from its own excesses and 
consequently tarnished public image, as well as from our 
support and assistance to the Government of Nepal. 
 
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