This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 FRANKFURT 009404 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR PDAS RIES, EB, EUR/AGS, AND EUR/ERA 
STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD 
STATE PASS NSC 
TREASURY FOR DAS SOBEL 
TREASURY ALSO FOR ICN COX, STUART 
PARIS ALSO FOR OECD 
TREASURY FOR OCC RUTLEDGE, MCMAHON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN EUN
SUBJECT: European Financial Market Regulatory 
Infrastructure:  Bigger Before it Gets Better; A European 
Financial Services Authority a Matter of Time? 
 
T-IA-F-03-0060 
 
  ¶1.   (SBU) Summary:  The European Commission's November 6 
     launch of measures to extend the Lamfalussy procedures 
     beyond securities to banking and insurance means all 
     financial services governed at the EU level will be covered 
     by a combination of policy and supervisory committees.  The 
     Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), 
     established just over two years ago, will expand its 
     coverage under the Commission's decision.  New accounting 
     committees have been created and others are proposed for the 
     auditing area.  Growing like topsy. 
 
  ¶2.   (SBU) The Lamfalussy procedures were to streamline and 
     facilitate rule-making, thereby being responsive to changes 
     in dynamic financial markets.  To date, experience in the 
     securities area generally has been positive, but not 
     uniformly so.  Too much detail in directives and 
     implementing measures detracts from flexibility, according 
     to the Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group that reviewed 
     the operation of the procedures to date.  Market 
     participants shared that view and then some, criticizing (a) 
     rushed consultations as political agendas triumphed 
     technical considerations; and (b) lack of transparency in 
     the activities of the European Securities Committee.  Some 
     of these criticisms will be overcome as committees work 
     through their start-up problems.  Others will, no doubt, 
     arise. 
 
  ¶3.   (SBU) Longer-term, however, some observers believe the 
     multitude of committees, cumbersome procedures and inter- 
     relationship of banking, securities and insurance issues may 
     give rise to a European Financial Services Authority (EFSA). 
     To make this long-term goal a reality, its proponents would 
     like the Constitutional Treaty for Europe to contain an 
     enabling clause to allow for the creation of an EFSA - 
     whenever the time is right.  End Summary. 
 
  Expanding Lamfalussy: Banking, Insurance and CESR Plus 
  --------------------------------------------- ------------ 
  ----------- 
 
  ¶4.   (SBU) On November 6 the European Commission  launched a 
     package of measures to extend the Lamfalussy procedures to 
     banking and insurance activities.  Four Commission decisions 
     would create two policy-level committees, the European 
     Banking Committee (EBC) and the European Insurance and 
     Occupational Pensions Committee (EIOPC), and two regulatory 
     committees, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
     (CEBS) and the Committee of European Insurance and 
     Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS).  In addition, 
     two other Commission decisions would extend the purview of 
     the European Securities Committee (ESC) and the Committee of 
     European Securities Regulators (CESR) to include asset 
     management and investment funds. 
 
  ¶5.   (SBU) The Lamfalussy procedures, recommended by a group 
     of wise men chaired by Baron Lamfalussy, were adopted just 
     over two years ago for the securities sector.  CESR was 
     established to provide the EC advice on legislation and 
     implementing measures as well as to coordinate 
     implementation and enforcement of EU securities legislation. 
     The ESC, composed of member state Finance Ministry 
     representatives, was created to approve implementing 
     measures proposed by the EC.  In this way, the Commission 
     could adopt regulations (with immediate binding effect in 
     member states) or directives (required to be transposed into 
     member state law) without going back to the Parliament.  The 
     Commission is about to adopt implementing measures, one 
     regulation and two directives, for the market abuse 
     directive.  This marks the first time Lamfalussy procedures 
     have produced implementing measures. 
 
  ¶6.   (SBU) Two problems have arisen with the new expansion. 
     First, location.  While Finance Ministers agreed on the need 
     for the new committees, they are having more difficulty 
     settling on the location.  The UK wants the banking 
     regulatory committee (CEBS) to be in London, Germany wants 
     it to be in Frankfurt.  One solution would be to have all 
     committees based in Paris.  However, CESR is based in Paris 
     and the French have given no signs of yielding this morsel. 
     To date, stalemate. 
 
  ¶7.   (SBU) The other problem is the Parliament.  The 
     Commission will suspend the decisions on the creation of EBC 
     and EIOPC and expanding the ESC and CESR's area of 
     competence until the Parliament passes a directive which 
     substitutes these new committee names for those of existing 
     committees, such as the Bank Advisory Committee.  The 
     legislation would need to move quickly, before the 
     Parliament adjourns in April.  The Commission's goal is to 
     have the new committees in operation by the beginning of 
     ¶2004.  The EBC would be tasked with a new proposed capital 
     adequacy directive and the EIOPC would similarly take up new 
     insurance legislation.  The Parliament, however, is likely 
     to play hard to get. 
 
  Parliament:  Conditional Blessing 
  ---------------------------------------- 
 
  ¶8.   (SBU) Parliament has not been comfortable with the 
     Lamfalussy procedures, fearing that the Commission and 
     Member States could adopt implementing measures beyond their 
     authority as defined by directives.  Not having the "right 
     to call back" such legislation, Parliament has inserted 
     "sunset" provisions in securities legislation specifying 
     that the Commission's authority to adopt implementing 
     measures will expire unless renewed by the Parliament. 
     Parliament is angling for a call back right in the Treaty 
     via the proposed draft Constitutional Treaty for Europe 
     currently under consideration by the Inter Government 
     Conference.  The recent draft gives them satisfaction.  But 
     it is still a draft. 
 
  ¶9.   (SBU) The Chairman of Parliament's Economic and 
     Monetary Affairs Committee (EMAC), Christa Randzio-Plath 
     greeted the Commission's decision to expand the Lamfalussy 
     procedures with two conditions: (1) Finance Ministers to 
     declare publicly that the procedures foreseen in the draft 
     Constitutional Treaty for Europe will apply to the adoption 
     of implementing measures and enter into an agreement with 
     Parliament to that end pending entry into force of the 
     Constitutional Treaty; and (2) that the new committees have 
     "real functional and operational independence," and not act 
     as "mouth pieces for the Commission or the Council."  The 
     former may be hard for Finance Ministers to swallow, but 
     within their power to do so.  The second is so vague as to 
     be either no problem or an impossibility. 
 
  CESR et. al. 
  --------------- 
 
  ¶10.  (SBU) Since its creation in June 2001, CESR has been 
     growing and busy.  The Secretariat has grown to 15 and moved 
     into new quarters.  Eight of the ten candidate countries 
     joined CESR in 2003 as observers. 
 
  ¶11.  (SBU) CESR Fin, a standing committee on financial 
     issues, has issued a standard on financial information to 
     develop a common approach to the enforcement of 
     International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 
     Europe.  CESR Fin has also issued two drafts for public 
     comment, one for a recommendation on guidance regarding the 
     transition to IFRS (all EU listed companies must have their 
     accounts prepared according to IFRS for financial year 2005) 
     and the other for the coordination of standards enforcement 
     activity. 
 
  ¶12.  (SBU) CESR has two Expert Groups on implementing 
     measures, one on market abuse the other on the prospectus 
     directive.  Both expert groups have issued consultation 
     papers, held public hearings, and delivered advice to the 
     Commission.  Another Expert Group is being established on 
     the Investment Services Directive composed of three 
     subgroups (market regulation, rules of conduct of 
     intermediaries, and enforcement).   CESR has worked with the 
     European Central Bank (ECB) to produce draft standards on 
     clearing and settlement.  Getting a jump on the Commission's 
     decisions, on October 30 CESR issued a consultation paper on 
     how it sees its new role in the regulation of asset 
     management and investment funds. 
 
  ¶13.  (SBU) The Lamfalussy procedures, or at least the 
     committee structures, are being adopted in other areas 
     covered by the EU's Financial Services Action Plan. To 
     implement the International Accounting Standards Regulation 
     there is a policy level European Accounting Committee and a 
     technical committee called EFRAG, the European Financial 
     Reporting Advisory Group.  On auditing, the Commission has 
     proposed to create an Auditing Regulatory Committee and to 
     rename the EU Committee on Auditing to the Audit Advisory 
     Committee, a forum of regulators.  A new Financial Services 
     Committee, a re-worked version of the Financial Services 
     Policy Group but chaired by a member state representative, 
     is to give overall strategic guidance and set medium-term 
     objectives. 
 
  ¶14.  (SBU) With Lamfalussy procedures spreading hither and 
       yon, it would seem like the procedures are really great. 
       Maybe in theory, but not yet in practice. 
 
  IIM and the Market:  Good and Better, but A Long Way from 
  Best Practices 
  --------------------------------------------- ------------ 
  ----------------- 
 
  ¶15.  (SBU) To shed light on whether Lamfalussy procedures 
     have been working well in the securities area an Inter- 
     Institutional Monitoring Group of independent experts made 
     an assessment and published an interim report in May. 
     Broadly speaking, the evidence they collected has been 
     "strongly supportive" of the procedures, though admitting 
     that there is a "learning by doing" experience underway 
     suggests room for improvement.  The IIM highlighted some 
     important issues, including the possible sacrifice of 
     quality to meet self-imposed deadlines of the FSAP and too 
     much detail in directives that would impede flexibility in 
     implementation to respond to changing market conditions. 
 
  ¶16.  (SBU) Others, responding to an invitation of the IIM to 
     comment on its interim report, were less generous.  A group 
     composed of the Federation of European Securities Exchanges, 
     the International Primary Dealers Association, the 
     International Securities Market Association, the London 
     Investment Bankers Association and the European Banking 
     Federation submitted joint comments.  They asserted that the 
     process has yielded "far too much detail" in directives and 
     implementing measures that has resulted in decisions taken 
     by "politicians on matters that require detailed technical 
     knowledge" leading to political deadlock.  Too much detail, 
     in the group's view, is incompatible with the diversity of 
     the European market and will present difficulties when the 
     time comes to update the measures. 
 
  ¶17.  (SBU) CESR consultations procedures look good on paper, 
     according to the group, but have been rushed in practice. 
     Time limits have "prevented satisfactory second rounds of 
     consultation and consultation documents are too long given 
     the time to respond to them."  The European Securities 
     Committee, composed of member states, "has perhaps the 
     farthest progress to make to become sufficiently 
     transparent."  This is in contrast to CESR, in the group's 
     view, which has adopted a charter with principles for 
     consultation and used both open public consultation and 
     expert groups to consult on its work. 
 
  ¶18.  (SBU) Finally, the group seconded the IIM's assessment 
     that CESR, the Commission and market participants all have 
     resource constraints in developing and enforcing legislation 
     and regulation.  A possible way out, according to this 
     group, would be to reduce the level of detail in legislation 
     and implementing measures and "give greater weight to the 
     less politically-driven" implementation level of the 
     Lamfalussy procedures where national authorities coordinate 
     national implementation measures via CESR. 
 
  Enter an EFSA:  A Matter of Time? 
  ----------------------------------- 
 
  ¶19.  (SBU) The latter comment raises the question of whether 
     the EU would be better served by having a European Financial 
     Services Authority (EFSA).  Such an organization, operating 
     under broad legislation proposed by the Commission and 
     adopted by the Parliament and the Council, might be just 
     want that group is looking for - at least on paper. 
 
  ¶20.  (SBU) Deutsche Bank's research staff has praised the 
     Lamfalussy procedures but considers them an intermediate 
     step to a single regulatory and supervisory authority. 
     Lamfalussy would probably agree.  Reportedly he once quipped 
     that not following his recommendations would lead to the 
     creation of a EU supervisory authority and following them 
     would lead to the same result. 
 
  ¶21.  (SBU) The European Economic Advisory Group (EEAG) 
     composed of European academics working through Munich's Ifo 
     Institute arrived at a similar conclusion, but with a view 
     to promote market integration and financial stability.  With 
     respect to integration, EEAF reasons that an EFSA might 
     better resist local pressure to assist particular 
     institutions.  On financial stability, EEAG argues that 
     cross-border financial activities within the EU has made 
     "mere coordination" of financial supervision as likely to be 
     insufficient.  Thus, the need for a more centralized 
     supervision mechanism. 
 
  ¶22.  (SBU) EEAG believes that the ECB could assume 
     responsibility for more centralized banking supervision and 
     a European Securities and Exchange Commission could 
     supervise securities markets.  However, they note that a 
     strong case for an EFSA that covers banking, securities and 
     insurance is based on the trend toward integration of 
     intermediaries and market operations as well as avoiding any 
     potential conflict between conduct of monetary policy and 
     supervision of the financial system. 
 
  ¶23.  (SBU) EEAG states that supervision need not be 
     completely centralized but rely on national authorities. 
     Deutsche Bank has argued for a similar approach, modeled on 
     the ECB structure, with the central authority (like the 
     ECB's Governing Council and Executive Board) developing 
     principles and guidelines and coordinating their 
     implementation, but relying on national authorities (like 
     the national central banks in the euro system) to perform 
     the actual supervision and enforcement.  To put an EFSA into 
     place would require a change in the treaty.  Deutsche Bank 
     and others have called for the Inter Governmental Conference 
     to insert an enabling clause into the Constitutional Treaty 
     for Europe, for use if and when appropriate. 
 
  ¶24.  (SBU) In October the Initiative for Finanzstandort 
     Deutschland, a group of German banks promoting Germany as a 
     financial center, endorsed the idea of a European Financial 
     Supervisory Authority.  A Bundesbank Board member 
     immediately criticized the initiative as "illusionary," 
     claiming that such an EFSA would need to have a European 
     political union before it could work.  That's the same thing 
     critics said about European Monetary Union and the ECB. 
 
  Comment: Against the Wind 
  --------------------------- 
 
  ¶25.  (SBU) Creation of EU committees is hardly news.  The 
     Lamfalussy procedures themselves are a form of the EU 
     "comitology," well established in some other areas.  What is 
     new is that the securities committees are now an integral 
     part of implementing, enforcing and amending EU directives 
     and implementing measures.  Spreading this to banking and 
     insurance would give these groups more influence than their 
     predecessors.  The other side of the coin is that all of 
     these groups will have more significant responsibilities 
     under the directives and regulations being adopted under the 
     FSAP. 
 
  ¶26.  (SBU) Working through the new procedures is cumbersome. 
     Although it would be ironic to concede that the once closed 
     EU rule making process in financial services now offers too 
     much consultation, some market participants admit to 
     "consultation fatigue."  Consultations with the Commission 
     when it is working on a proposal, with the Parliament and 
     Council when they are considering the proposal, with CESR 
     Expert Groups in developing advice to the Commission, and 
     again with the Commission and possibly the ESC, when 
     considering adopting implementing measures based on CESR's 
     advice does seem excessive.  Collapsing these procedures 
     into a EFSA could help eliminate a step or two, but, would 
     still involve more consultations than has been the case to 
     date for EU level legislation on financial services. 
 
  ¶27.  (SBU) Added to such practical advantages are those 
     pointed out by EEAG - a potentially easier path to 
     integration and better coordination for implementation and 
     enforcement.  Taken together, the arguments for a single 
     entity become stronger.  The senior Bundesbank official that 
     has downplayed the probability of an EFSA was the same one 
     who had fought for the Bundesbank and the ECB to have a 
     greater role in banking supervision.  He lost that debate. 
     Once more, he may be leaning against the wind. 
 
  ¶28.  (U) This cable coordinated with Embassy Berlin. 
 
  ¶29.  (U) POC: James G. Wallar, U.S. Treasury Representative 
     for European Affairs, e-mail  wallarjg2@state.gov; tel. 49- 
     (69)-7535-2459, fax 49-(69)-7535-2238. 
 
BODDE