This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001916 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/IP/NEA/SA 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  11-05-13 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL ASEC SOCI CASC CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT:  President's moves place spotlight on deep 
cohabitation divisions, raising worries re peace process 
 
Refs:  Colombo 1902, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Charge' d'Affaires James F. Entwistle. 
Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  President Kumaratunga's dramatic 
November 4-5 moves against the UNP government have 
placed the spotlight on Sri Lanka's deep cohabitation 
divisions.  The Constitution gives her office 
overwhelming executive powers.  Without access to 
Parliament, which has been suspended, the Prime Minister 
has few tools at his disposal and he is on the defensive 
as the President tries to lure UNP MPs to her side.  The 
government has leverage due to its popularity, however. 
In the meantime, the volatile situation in the south is 
clearly of great concern to the highly unpredictable 
Tigers.  It seems that elections may be a way out of the 
current morass, but, while the situation in the south 
plays out, peace track moves seem set to be delayed even 
as the Tigers grow more restless.  END SUMMARY. 
 
============================= 
Constitution Favors President 
============================= 
 
¶2.  (C) President Kumaratunga's November 4-5 bombshell 
moves of firing ministers, suspending Parliament, and 
declaring an emergency have placed the spotlight on Sri 
Lanka's deep cohabitation divisions.  (Note:  Septel 
reviews the President's latest actions and reaction 
locally.  Reftels review her November 4 actions.) 
Although Prime Minister Wickremesinghe has been the most 
dynamic political leader in the country since his United 
National Party (UNP) was elected to power in December 
2001, it is the case that the Constitution gives the 
President's office overwhelming executive powers. 
According to the terms of the 1978 Constitution, the 
presidency holds the following powers: 
 
-- The president is head of state, head of the 
government, and commander-in-chief. 
 
-- The president has the power to nominate the prime 
minister and the cabinet. 
 
-- The president also has the power to make definitive 
statements of governmental policy without consulting the 
prime minister or the cabinet of ministers. 
 
-- The president can suspend (or "prorogue") Parliament 
for up to two months at a time. 
 
-- The president can dissolve Parliament (after it sits 
for one year) and call for new elections. 
 
-- The president has the power to declare a state of 
emergency. 
 
¶3.  (C) Moreover, if there are any questions about her 
powers under the Constitution, most observers believe 
the President can rely on the Supreme Court to bail her 
out.  Most justices on the eleven member Supreme Court 
were chosen by the President and are considered her 
allies.  In particular, Chief Justice Sarath Silva is 
considered to be very close to the president and to 
support a "maximalist" reading of her powers under the 
Constitution.  For example, the President would seem to 
be able to rely on the Supreme Court to render an 
interpretation of the Constitution that allows her to 
suspend Parliament indefinitely, as long as she does so 
regularly in up to two month increments. 
 
¶4.  (C) The question of why the President did not use 
these powers until now is a complex one.  Earlier in 
2003, the President tried to take over the government- 
controlled National Lotteries Board, but was 
unsuccessful because the PM and his party pushed back. 
The President -- apparently not wanting to press the 
matter -- let it slide.  Observers believe that she may 
have been waiting for what she considered the "right 
moment" to spring again into action against the PM. 
This moment may have appeared, in her eyes, with the PM 
being out of the country (he is in Washington) and right 
after the Tamil Tigers came out with their controversial 
power-sharing proposals (See Reftels).  The President 
may have also felt that recent recrudescence of UNP 
threats to impeach her and the Chief Justice were going 
too far and she had to react aggressively. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) (((Note:  As background on how the confusing 
cohabitation situation first developed:  Sri Lanka's 
1978 Constitution was structured by the UNP, which was 
then in power, with the idea that the president and the 
PM would be from the same party.  Except for a brief 
spell in 1994, it has worked out that way -- until 
recently.  Due the following confluence of events, the 
situation changed: 
 
-- Kumaratunga had been elected President in 1994, re- 
elected in late 1999, and is scheduled to leave office 
due to term limits in late 2005. 
 
-- In December 2001, PM Wickremesinghe's UNP party won 
the parliamentary election, defeating President 
Kumaratunga's party. 
 
-- With the UNP-controlled Parliament scheduled to be in 
place until 2006, the PM and the President are scheduled 
to serve concurrently from late 2001-late 2004.  END 
NOTE.))) 
 
======================= 
PM lacks ready Tools... 
======================= 
 
¶6.  (C) In the face of the President's high-level of 
authority under the Constitution, Prime Minister 
Wickremesinghe has very few tools at his disposal.  One 
of the tools he might have had -- the majority he 
maintains in Parliament -- was effectively taken away 
from him when the President on November 4 suspended 
Parliament until mid-November.  Without Parliament being 
in session, the PM does not have the ability to proceed 
with long-prepared plans to try to impeach the President 
and the Chief Justice on abuse of power charges.  In 
addition, the PM may also have been able to rely on the 
popular support his government generally maintains to 
take matters to the streets to make Kumaratunga feel the 
heat.  With the President's imposition of a state of 
emergency on November 5, however, no demonstrations or 
rallies or other political work can take place without 
the approval of the Interior Ministry, which is now 
under her control.  Finally, while he maintains a slim 
majority in Parliament (though he probably can also rely 
on the 16 Tamil National Alliance MPs), the PM is on the 
defensive as the President tries to lure his MPs to her 
side by offering them various favors.  Although the PM 
is considered popular in his party and is not abrasive, 
he is not known for being a hands-on manager and it is 
possible that some UNP MPs could be induced to cross- 
over because they feel he was not attentive enough to 
their needs. 
 
================ 
But has Leverage 
================ 
 
¶7.  (C) Despite being hamstrung in so many ways, the PM 
and his UNP government still have leverage.  As touched 
on, the government is generally quite popular due to its 
peace process and economic intiatives.  It is believed 
to maintain very strong support not only in the business 
community, a traditional stronghold, but also among the 
public at large.  Its strength in the Western Province, 
the most urbanized section of the country and where 
Colombo is located, seems to be overwhelming, as is its 
support in the Tamil community, which forms just under 
20 percent of the total population.  Christians, roughly 
8 percent of the populace, are also believed to support 
Wickremesinghe's government quite strongly.  Moreover, 
if the crisis drags on, the PM can probably count on his 
support from the public steadily increasing, with many 
Sri Lankans feeling that the President's actions of 
continuing to suspend Parliament and maintaining a state 
of emergency to be unreasonable in a democratic country. 
With all of this pressure falling on the President, she 
may be forced to either allow Parliament to go back in 
session or to call fresh elections.  If she does not 
take either of these two routes, she could be courting 
widespread anger among the general public.  This could 
result, sooner or later, in a confrontation between the 
President-led security forces in charge of implementing 
the emergency regulations and "people power" led by the 
PM. 
 
===================== 
Peace Process at Risk 
===================== 
 
¶8.  (C) In the meantime, the confusing situation in the 
south forms a risk to the peace process.  As reported in 
Septel, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
organization has already underscored its concern about 
the situation in the south, noting that the February 
2002 ceasefire may be at risk.  The group also appears 
to be pulling its political cadre from their offices in 
government-controlled areas of the north and east, and 
bringing them back to LTTE-controlled areas. 
 
¶9.  (C) These signals are serious ones, indicating that 
the LTTE is worried about what is going on in the south. 
They are also explainable by the fact that the LTTE is 
known to distrust President Kumaratunga in a bitter 
fashion -- the group went so far as to attempt to kill 
her in December 1999 (she lost an eye in the bomb 
attack).  Any sign that she is increasing her strength 
in the south will set off alarm bells in LTTE circles. 
The LTTE, for its own reasons, has long associated 
Kumaratunga with Sinhalese Buddhist extremism, a force 
that the LTTE sees itself as waging a long war against. 
The President's declaration of a state of emergency on 
November 5 probably will only alarm the LTTE even more 
because it may well see that act as preparing the south 
for action against the LTTE (however unreasonable a view 
that may be).  The fact that the President and her 
advisers have issued assurances that they intend to 
respect the ceasefire and support negotiations may not 
cut much ice with the LTTE. 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
¶10.  (C) It appears that elections may be a way out of 
the current morass.  There is speculation that the 
President aims eventually to call new parliamentary 
elections, perhaps thinking that her party would win. 
If that happens, the President and the PM would be from 
the same party, which would almost certainly put an end 
to cohabitation bickering (though it would raise the 
LTTE's level of concerns).  Most observers do not 
believe that her party would win, however, but believe 
the UNP would come out on top and, in the process, quite 
possibly increase its majority.  In short, Sri Lanka 
would be left in much the same cohabitation position as 
before the crisis began.  At the same time, if the 
President managed to convince enough UNP MPs to defect 
so that she could form the government, the anger in the 
UNP would be severe and such an act might spark a 
backlash among the public over perceived crooked 
politics.  In any case, while the situation in the south 
plays out, peace track moves seem set to be delayed even 
as the Tigers grow more restless.  In sum, there does 
not seem an easy way out of the crisis triggered by the 
President's brazen moves.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶11.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
ENTWISTLE