This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 001893 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, INR/NESA; NSC FOR 
¶E. MILLARD 
 
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC 
 
E.O. 12958:   DECL: 11-03-13 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS PREL CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT:  LTTE counterproposals on interim 
administration in north/east generate mixed reaction 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo-SA/INS 11/03/01 unclass e-mails 
 
-      (B) Colombo-SA/INS 11/01/01 unclass e-mail 
-      (C) Colombo 1878, and previous 
-      (D) Oslo 2153 (All Notal) 
 
(U) Classified by Charge' d'Affaires James F. Entwistle. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Norwegian facilitators provided 
the Tamil Tigers' long-awaited counterproposals on the 
modalities for an interim administration in the 
north/east to the GSL on October 31.  The Tiger plan, 
which was publicly released at a November 1 press 
conference, seeks wide-ranging powers for the group, 
including over law and order, finance, and sea access. 
The plan has generated a mixed reaction:  The GSL, for 
example, while noting that it has differences with the 
plan, underscored its interest in restarting direct 
talks.  Muslims and the radical JVP, however, came out 
against the Tiger plan, and indications are that 
President Kumaratunga and her party will too.  In our 
estimation, while some of what the Tigers have spelled 
out is extreme, the issuance of the counterproposals is 
a potentially vital step forward for the peace process. 
The test of real progress will be whether the LTTE shows 
flexibility in face-to-face talks.  END SUMMARY. 
 
============================ 
LTTE issues Counterproposals 
============================ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Per the schedule laid out in Refs C-D, the 
Norwegian facilitators provided the counterproposals 
developed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
regarding the setting up of an interim administration in 
the north/east to the GSL on October 31.  The LTTE plan 
was formulated in response to a July 2003 proposal made 
by the Sri Lankan government.  In a brief October 31 
trip to the LTTE-controlled Vanni region in north- 
central Sri Lanka, Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar 
received the counterproposal document from LTTE 
political leader S.P. Thamilchelvam and handed it over 
to the GSL that same day.  The government then 
transmitted copies of the LTTE document to President 
Kumaratunga and Rauf Hakeem, the leader of the Sri Lanka 
Muslim Congress (SLMC), who was in London. 
 
¶3.  (C) The LTTE made the counterproposals public at a 
November 1 press conference held in the town of 
Kilinochchi in the Vanni.  At the press conference, 
Thamilchelvam read a brief statement highlighting key 
elements of the counterproposals.  (Note:  A copy of the 
LTTE counterproposal document was e-mailed to SA/INS in 
Ref B.  The text of the proposal can also be found at 
www.TamilNet.com.  Highlights of the document are 
reviewed below.  A U.S. Embassy press statement issued 
on November 3 is contained in Ref A.  Septel reviews 
press reaction.  End Note.)  In his statement, 
Thamilchelvam said the formation of an "Interim Self- 
Governing Authority" was necessary in order to bring 
"dignity and equal rights to Sri Lanka's Tamil people" 
in the north/east.  While he said he recognized that the 
entire island had suffered due to the war, he asserted 
that only the south had benefited from the peace process 
to date, as opposed to the north and east.  In response 
to one of the few press questions that were allowed, 
Thamilchelvam replied that the LTTE would not be 
participating in the peace process if it still sought a 
Tamil Eelam (a separate state).  Tomas Stangeland, a 
Norwegian Embassy poloff who attended the press 
conference, told polchief on November 3 that 
Thamilchelvam's comments were basically "non-polemical 
in tone." 
 
¶4.  (C) For its part, the Sri Lankan government -- 
through G.L. Peiris, key minister and chief peace 
process negotiator -- issued a brief statement reacting 
to the Tigers' counterproposals on November 1.   Without 
providing specifics, the GSL statement noted that the 
LTTE's document "differs in fundamental respects" from 
the government's July proposal.  The statement went on 
to say, however, that "the government is convinced that 
the way forward lies through direct discussion of the 
issues arising from both sets of proposals." 
 
¶5.  (C) In both the GSL statement and Thamilchelvam's 
comments at the press conference, each side requested 
that the Norwegian facilitators arrange an initial face- 
to-face meeting between the two parties.  The aim of 
this meeting would be for the two sides to settle on the 
modalities for a resumption of the substantive 
negotiations which the Tigers pulled out of in April. 
As Mission has been told before (see Ref C), Stangeland 
told polchief that the GoN hoped that this meeting could 
take place by late November or early December, with 
substantive talks to follow by early 2004.  Stangeland 
also confirmed press reports that Deputy Foreign 
Minister Vidar Helgesen planned to visit Sri Lanka for 
talks with the GSL and the LTTE from November 10-13. 
According to Stangeland, Helgesen would use the visit to 
take the temperature of the process in the aftermath of 
the issuance of the Tigers' counterproposals, and to try 
to set dates for the recommencement of talks. 
 
=============================== 
Group seeks Wide-ranging Powers 
=============================== 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The LTTE document itself is awkwardly 
entitled, "The Proposal by the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam on behalf of the Tamil People for an 
Agreement to Establish an Interim Self-Governing 
Authority for the NorthEast of the Island of Sri Lanka." 
The document, which is relatively moderate and non- 
strident in tone for something issued by the Tigers (if 
extreme at times in substance), sets out a menu of wide- 
ranging powers for the group in the north/east.  The 
document is believed to be the first time the Tigers 
have put to paper their ideas for an interim governing 
structure in one comprehensive text.  The document, 
which is considerably more sweeping than the GSL's July 
proposal, is the culmination of months of meetings 
between LTTE officials and pro-LTTE elements living 
outside of Sri Lanka. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) With respect to the specifics of the plan, the 
Tigers have termed their governing structure the 
"Interim Self-Governing Authority" (ISGA).  The ISGA 
would have jurisdiction over eight districts in the 
north and east, including Amparai, Batticaloa, Jaffna, 
Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, and 
Vavuniya.  Key aspects of the Tigers' plan include: 
 
-- ISGA Composition:  The ISGA will include members 
appointed by the LTTE, the GSL (picking for the 
Sinhalese community), and the Muslim community in the 
north/east.  The LTTE appointees will have an absolute 
majority in the ISGA.  A chairperson, elected by 
majority vote in the ISGA, will serve as chief 
executive.  That chairperson will then appoint the chief 
administrator for the north/east and other officers. 
 
-- Operational Term:  The ISGA will be in operation for 
five years at which time elections for the north/east 
will be held if a permanent solution to the conflict has 
not yet been reached. 
 
-- Plenary Powers:  The ISGA will have plenary power for 
governance over the north/east for resettlement, 
rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of the 
region, as well as power over raising revenue, law and 
order, and land. 
 
-- Finance:  A Finance Commission, made up of ISGA- 
appointed members, will make recommendations on the 
amount of funding to be allocated in the north/east. 
The ISGA will control all expenditures for the 
north/east, including all allocations by international 
organizations or institutions earmarked for the 
north/east.  The ISGA will also have the authority to 
borrow money. 
 
-- Sea Access:  The ISGA will "have control over the 
marine and offshore resources of the adjacent seas and 
the power to regulate access thereto."  (Note:  If 
implemented, this provision would appear to allow the 
Tigers the unrestricted ability to import arms-related 
items.) 
 
-- Judiciary:  According to the document, "separate 
institutions for the administration of justice shall be 
established for the north/east."  Such institutions will 
have sole and exclusive power to resolve all disputes 
that arise in the north/east. 
 
-- Sri Lankan Military Forces:  The document asserts 
that the "occupation of land by the armed forces of the 
GSL, and the denial to the rightful civilian owners of 
unfettered access" is a "violation of the norms of 
international law."  The LTTE demands that "such land 
must be immediately vacated and restored to the previous 
owners."  (Note:  It is not clear whether this provision 
would require the Sri Lankan military to withdraw from 
all of its "high security zones," or just from some of 
them.) 
 
-- Human Rights:  The document says that "the people of 
the north/east shall be accorded all rights as are 
provided under international human rights law and all 
actions of the ISGA shall conform to internationally 
accepted standards of human rights protection."  To 
ensure this, there will be an ISGA-appointed 
"independent" human rights commission. 
 
-- Religion:  No religious faith shall be given the 
"foremost place" in the north/east.  (Note:  The Sri 
Lankan Constitution gives Buddhism the "foremost place 
in the country.") 
 
-- Constitutional Issue:  It is not clear whether the 
Tigers consider the ISGA to flow from the Sri Lankan 
Constitution or not.  It appears possible that the group 
believes that the ISGA could be encompassed by the 13th 
Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution which merged 
the north and east per the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. 
Because of the sharp political controversy over the 
Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, implementing legislation for the 
13th Amendment has never been passed and a national 
referendum has never taken place to approve it. 
 
================================ 
Proposals garner Mixed Reaction 
================================ 
 
¶8.  (C) Reaction to the Tigers' counterproposals has 
been mixed.  While President Kumaratunga has not yet 
issued a formal reaction, she indicated publicly on 
November 2 that she thought the Tiger document was too 
far-reaching, but she did not elaborate.  In the 
meantime, her party, the People's Alliance (PA), is 
reportedly studying the document, but -- as of mid-day 
November 3 -- has not issued a formal statement as of 
yet.  The PA is expected to hold a press conference late 
November 3 to discuss the LTTE counterproposals 
 
¶9.  (C) There has already been negative feedback from 
Muslims and the radical Marxist Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP): 
 
-- Muslims:  From London where he is visiting, SLMC 
leader Rauf Hakeem publicly rejected the Tigers' 
counterproposals, characterizing them as "unacceptable" 
and stating that they did not reflect the "aspirations" 
of the Muslim people.  Muslims, who "are concerned about 
living in a LTTE-dominated structure," need "firm and 
legal" protections in the north/east, Hakeem said. 
Hakeem has called for a meeting with fellow Muslim MPs 
to discuss next steps. 
 
-- JVP:  As could have been predicted, the radical JVP 
reacted swiftly and strongly against the 
counterproposals, with JVP Secretary General Tilvin 
Silva asserting to the press on November 2 that the 
proposals laid the foundation for a "separate state," 
and that the GSL should not even discuss them.  JVP MP 
Wimal Weerawansa characterized the counterproposals as a 
"stepping-stone to Tamil Eelam." 
 
¶10.  (C) Other interlocutors were considerably more 
balanced in their comments, expressing some concerns but 
noting that the way now seemed open for a return to 
negotiations: 
 
-- Buddhist Clergy:  Initial reaction by Buddhist clergy 
was moderate in tone, with the Mahanayake (leader) of 
the important Malwatte temple in Kandy stating publicly 
that "we should not disrupt the peace process at any 
cost" and calling for open discussion of the 
counterproposals.  Expanding on the Mahanayake's 
comments, another Malwatte temple official, Dehideniye 
Rathanasara, told Mission that it was a positive 
development that the GSL had been able to get the Tigers 
to formalize their ideas on power-sharing.  Rathanasara 
expressed concern, however, about the future of the Sri 
Lanka military in the north/east, feeling that the GSL's 
forces must not be withdrawn. 
 
-- Civil Society:  Local think-tank commentators were 
relatively upbeat in their remarks.  Kethesh Loganathan, 
an analyst at the Center for Policy Alternatives, told 
poloff that submission of the counterproposals was a 
constructive step.  Jehan Perera, media director for the 
National Peace Council, agreed, remarking that he saw 
the situation as a net positive as the LTTE and the GSL 
clearly wanted to move forward and restart negotiations. 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
¶11.  (C) In our estimation, the issuance of the 
counterproposals -- although they are extreme in some 
aspects -- is a potentially vital step forward for the 
peace process.  Since the Tigers pulled out of the talks 
in April, the process has basically been on ice, with 
Sri Lankans enjoying the considerable fruits of a "no 
war, no peace" situation, but without there being 
measurable movement toward an interim or final 
settlement.  Now, with the LTTE for the first time ever 
providing a set of comprehensive proposals, the two 
sides have something new and important to debate in 
face-to-face talks. 
 
¶12.  (C) That said, the test for real progress will be 
whether the LTTE shows flexibility in these talks, or 
whether it considers its counterproposals its 
irreducible bottom-line.  Based on Norwegian 
interactions with the group over the past several 
months, Tomas Stangeland told us that he thought the 
group would be willing to be flexible to some extent. 
Other observers, however, doubt that this is the case 
given the group's tendency to veer toward the hard line. 
If the Tigers are not willing to do some give-and-take, 
that could spark turbulence in the south.  Overall, as 
with much of the peace process dating back to its 
inception in December 2001, progress hinges to a large 
extent on the LTTE's realization that "all or nothing" 
will not do.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶13.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
ENTWISTLE