This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 005113 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CCA KEVIN WHITAKER, EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2013 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV CU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU ON CUBA: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
 
REF: A. A) BRUSSELS 5073 
 
     ¶B. B) NIGRO-WHITAKER E-MAIL 10/24/03 
     ¶C. C) STATE 306443 
     ¶D. D) BRUSSELS 4451 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary:  On November 5, Poloff discussed EU Cuba 
policy with Karl Buck, Latin America Division Chief in the EU 
Council Secretariat.  He said the EU Latin America Working 
Group (COLAT) had affirmed unanimously on November 4 the 
punitive measures the EU had announced in June in response to 
Cuba's March crackdown.  Buck said the EU was unsure of how 
to react to Cuba's current restriction of EU diplomats' 
access to Cuban officials.  Buck said the U.S. ideas of (1) 
common U.S.-EU approaches to third countries on Cuba; and (2) 
restricting Cuban officials' visits to Europe found little 
resonance in the EU.  Buck reported that a European 
Parliament committee had invited Cuban dissident Oswaldo Paya 
to Brussels.  This conversation and the November 4 EU 
Explanation of Vote on the Cuban anti-embargo resolution at 
the UNGA strengthen our impression that we must keep pressure 
on the EU to remain firm in its condemnation of the Cuban 
human rights situation.  End Summary. 
 
EU: DISSIDENTS TO NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Poloff asked Buck how EU members had reacted to the 
decision of the Austrian embassy in Havana not to celebrate 
Austria's national day so as not to have to act upon the 
agreed EU policy of inviting Cuban dissidents to such 
occasions (ref B).  Buck reported that the EU Latin America 
Working Group (COLAT) had affirmed unanimously on November 4 
the punitive measures the EU had announced in June in 
response to Cuba's March crackdown, including the policy of 
inviting dissidents to national day celebrations of EU 
embassies in Havana.  Buck said the COLAT agreed that the 
measures needed to be implemented by all EU member states so 
as not to allow Cuba to render EU policy ineffectual. 
 
EU STYMIED BY CUBAN FREEZE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Continuing his report of the November 4 COLAT 
discussion, Buck said the EU was unsure of how to react to 
Cuba's restriction of EU diplomats' access to Cuban 
officials.  He said some member states' Havana embassies were 
being granted almost no access at all to Cuban authorities, 
and the EU was worried that that would weaken its influence 
in Cuba.  Here, Buck stressed that EU policy was to work 
toward a democratic transition through dialogue not only with 
civil society, but also with the Cuban government.  Buck said 
the COLAT was considering possible "legal or political" 
measures in response to the Cuban access restrictions, but 
did not specify further.  He said there was some disagreement 
on this among member states, with some advocating an 
escalation of EU measures against Cuba and others 
recommending a cautious approach.  Buck offered his own view 
that the June punitive measures had been announced without 
thinking carefully enough about the possible consequences. 
Now, he said, the EU found itself between the rock of needing 
to react to the Cuban freeze and the hard place of not 
wanting to provoke even harsher Cuban measures. 
 
EU WOBBLY ON U.S. SUGGESTIONS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) On possible common U.S.-EU measures discussed at the 
U.S.-EU Latin America consultations September 19 (ref A), 
Buck said the ideas of common U.S.-EU approaches to third 
countries on Cuba and of restricting Cuban officials' visits 
to Europe found little resonance in the EU.  He said that 
COLAT members found "no plusses" for the EU in common 
approaches to third countries, especially in reference to 
Latin American countries.  He implied that the EU was worried 
that such common approaches would blur the line of 
demarcation between the U.S. and the EU that the EU wanted to 
maintain in its interaction with Latin American countries. 
He added the comment, "And if the Latin Americans say no, 
what then?" 
 
¶5. (C) On restricting Cuban officials' visits to Europe, Buck 
said that the COLAT feared such a policy would only lessen 
Europe's influence over Cuba and possibly strengthen the 
Cuban resolve to freeze access of EU diplomats to GOC 
contacts in Havana. 
 
BUCK: GREEKS WON'T KEEP CASTRO FROM OLYMPICS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) In the context of Cuban visits to Europe, Buck 
volunteered his view on whether Greece was likely to refuse 
to invite Castro to visit the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens 
(ref C).  He said the Greeks saw the spirit of the Games as 
being a "global truce," and opined that they, in that spirit, 
would not refuse to welcome Castro to Athens. 
 
PARLIAMENT INVITES PAYA 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Buck reported that the Chairman of the European 
Parliament (EP) Foreign Affairs Committee, Elmar Brok, had 
invited Cuban dissident Oswaldo Paya Sardinas to attend a 
Foreign Affairs Committee meeting in Brussels on December 1. 
Buck said that Brok had done this, as far as he knew, without 
consulting anyone outside of the EP.  Buck went on to say 
that helping dissidents, which per se remains a good 
possibility for U.S.-EU cooperation, had been rendered more 
difficult since the GOC had managed to sew doubt as to 
whether those who purported to be dissidents were actually 
agents of the GOC (ref D). 
 
BLAND EU EOV ON CUBAN ANTI-EMBARGO RESOLUTION 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Buck supplied Poloff a copy of the November 4 EU 
Explanation of Vote (EOV) on the Cuban anti-embargo 
resolution at the UNGA, saying that all member states had 
agreed that the EOV should strongly condemn the human rights 
situation in Cuba.  (EU member states voted unanimously in 
favor of the resolution condemning the U.S. embargo.)  The 
EOV concentrates its criticism of the Cuban human rights 
record in two paragraphs out of the ten-paragraph EOV:  "The 
European Union strongly condemns the serious deterioration of 
the human rights situation in Cuba.  The increase in 
violations of human rights has raised an international wave 
of protests and condemnations and has increased the concern 
of the European Union about the political situation in 
Cuba....The European Union urges the Cuban authorities to 
bring about speedy, lasting and substantial improvements in 
the situation, in particular with a view to ensure the full 
respect for all human rights.  In that connection, the 
European Union calls for the immediate release and full 
re-integration into society of all prisoners of conscience. 
We appeal to the Cuban authorities to cooperate fully with 
international human rights bodies and mechanisms.  The 
European Union reaffirms its declaration made by the 
Presidency on 5 June 2003."  One paragraph also addresses the 
need for economic reform in Cuba, another outlines the 
objectives of the EU Common Position on Cuba, and another 
paragraph criticizes the GOC restrictions imposed on EU 
embassies. 
 
COMMENT:  EU WAVERING, WE SHOULD WEIGH IN 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) It is clear to us that EU Cuba policy is still captive 
to differences among member states and somewhat immobilized 
by uncertainty about how to react to Cuban measures against 
EU diplomats.  The EU's natural discomfort about getting 
tough with Cuba has been exacerbated by the Cubans' harsh 
response to the EU punitive measures announced in June. 
Although the injunction to invite dissidents remains in 
place, the Austrian decision in Havana not to celebrate its 
national day is an indication that EU embassies on the ground 
may have different views.  It appears also that the EU has 
rejected the idea of adding to the punitive measures by, for 
example, restricting Cuban official visits to Europe.  That 
said, the EU has reaffirmed publicly and privately its 
intention to continue its retaliatory response to the March 
crackdown.  We should (1) work with sympathetic member states 
such as Spain and Italy to consolidate the little bit of 
progress made by the EU since June; and (2) take advantage of 
the EU's current uncertainty by offering them specific ideas 
on working with us to help dissidents while also continuing 
to push them -- carefully -- to increase incrementally their 
pressure on Cuba.  END COMMENT. 
 
FOSTER