This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 007319 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
FOR VCJCS GEN PACE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPT: 1.6 X5, X6 
TAGS: MARR PREL PTER OVIP PGOV TU
SUBJECT: ANOTHER STEP TOWARD A "SOFT LANDING": VCJCS GEN 
PACE'S DECEMBER 2-7 VISIT 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, reasons 1.5b/d. 
 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) You arrive in Turkey at a time when our focus is on 
increasing Turkish cooperation on Iraq reconstruction and 
minimizing the fallout from the decision to forego Turkey,s 
offer to contribute forces to the stabilization efforts in 
Iraq.  The Turkish General Staff (TGS) saw deploying forces 
to Iraq as a tangible way to strengthen our mil-mil 
relationship, and many military officers were disappointed by 
the decision to not send forces.  The Nov 17-20 visit to the 
US by DCHOD Gen Basbug was part of our effort to achieve the 
&soft landing8 we seek; your visit, by emphasizing close 
and continuing mil-mil cooperation, is another step toward 
that objective.  Iraq and resolution of the PKK/KADEK 
question remain the focus of the US-Turkish relationship 
which nonetheless is much broader.  After Basbug,s 
Washington visit, expectations are high that you will be 
addressing concrete plans visa vis KADEK with TGS.  The GOT 
is looking at trade, humanitarian assistance and commercial 
opportunities for Turkish businesses as part of an Iraqi 
policy aimed at helping achieve stability in a unified Iraq. 
The governing Justice and Development (Turkish acronym: AK) 
Party, which came to power with an overwhelming Parliamentary 
majority, remains highly popular in the heartland, with polls 
showing the party five to ten points ahead of the 34.5% vote 
it got in November 2002 general elections.  The TGS remains 
suspicious of AK's Islamic roots.  The government has pursued 
a comprehensive reform program geared toward gaining EU 
accession and continues to assert that it wants close ties to 
the U.S.  It tells us it is committed to finding a solution 
for Cyprus and is open to improving relations with Armenia, 
but we have yet to see significant concrete steps in either 
area.  Despite its policy of good neighborliness, Turkey has 
supported USG policy objectives in Syria and Iran. Two years 
of sound fiscal/monetary policy and structural reforms, the 
rapid and successful conclusion of the Iraq war, expected 
U.S. financial assistance, and unprecedented IMF support have 
combined to bring down inflation and interest rates, restore 
modest growth, and create some hope that Turkey can work its 
way out from under an incredibly high public debt burden. 
End summary. 
 
 
-------------------- 
Global War on Terror 
-------------------- 
 
 
¶2. (S) Turkey has a vested interest in rooting out terrorism 
given its long-standing campaign against the PKK/KADEK and 
the leftist DHKP-C.  The recent bombings in Istanbul will 
certainly strengthen Turkish anti-terrorism resolve.  As a 
new front in the global war on terrorism, the Turkish 
security services are having to adapt to countering al 
Qaida-type threats in a new way.  International cooperation 
in these investigations is improving, although slow and 
incomplete.  It will take some time before the Turks fully 
understand the dimensions of the threat they face and how 
best to deal with it.  Some of the issues get caught up in 
domestic politics and bureaucratic rivalries.  Turkey has 
lent substantial support to the Global War on Terror. 
Shortly after September 11, 2001 Turkey responded to the NATO 
Article 5 invocation by offering blanket overflight and 
landing clearance for transport aircraft, and blanket 
overflight clearance in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  After the Taliban had been removed from power, 
Turkey provided troops to the International Stabilization 
Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) and commanded ISAF II from Jun 02 
to Feb 03.  We are now seeking additional Turkish support 
again.  Ankara has also been a proactive partner in 
intelligence gathering and information sharing, and through 
its diplomatic efforts with Middle Eastern governments. 
 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
 
¶3. (S) In Iraq, Turkey,s support to the U.S., despite its 
disappointing position at the beginning of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, is making a positive contribution to our efforts 
there.  The March 1 denial of the use of Turkish territory 
for an OIF northern front strained the American-Turkish 
relationship.  The July 4 arrest and interrogation of 11 
Turkish special forces personnel in northern Iraq put further 
strain on the relationship.  A subsequent parliamentary vote 
on Oct 7 that, despite significant public opposition and 
before the passage of UN Security Council resolution 1511, 
authorized a Turkish troop contribution to the stabilization 
force effort was seen by many as an attempt to make up for 
the Mar 1 vote.  The USG has publicly thanked the GOT for 
this offer.   Additionally, despite disappointment that 
Turkish troops would not be part of the stabilization force 
in the near term, TGS DCHOD Gen Basbug reiterated their 
interest in providing training (police, border guard, etc. to 
the Iraqi government during his Nov 17-20, 2003 visit to the 
United States.  We understand CPA has agreed to accept 
Turkish police trainers in Iraq, but the details need to be 
worked out. 
 
 
¶4. (U) There has been a concerted effort on the part of the 
GOT to shift its Iraq policy away from one centered on 
ethnicity (Turkmen and Kurd) and northern Iraq towards a more 
central, Baghdad-oriented policy based primarily on 
contributing to stability through trade, humanitarian 
assistance and commercial opportunities for Turkish 
businesses.  However, GOT efforts have not found much 
traction with the military, the press or the public, which 
remain focused on the north.  The Turks have taken a number 
of concrete steps in humanitarian assistance and 
reconstruction since Secretary Powell's April visit to 
Turkey.  The World Food Program (WFP) shipped considerable 
quantities of food through Turkey, and Turkey was the world's 
biggest supplier (in value terms) to WFP.  The GOT also has 
supported the U.S. military's efforts to establish a ground 
line of communications (GLOC) here to re-supply U.S. forces 
in Iraq (value over $350M to date). 
 
 
¶5. (S) USEUCOM currently uses Habur Gate as the only 
entry/exit point for all logistical sustainment moving 
through Turkey to northern Iraq.  This support includes 
diesel, JP8, benzene, LPG, bottled water, fresh fruits and 
vegetables, construction material, humanitarian support, 
AAFES, and DLA items.  Approximately 1,400 trucks cross in 
each direction daily (total of 2,800 trucks clearing the 
gate).  Current backlog of trucks heading east into Iraq from 
Turkey is 3km (about a 23-hour delay).  We are concerned that 
we will not be able to get enough traffic through the gate as 
fuel needs ramp up for winter.  The backlog of trucks heading 
west from Iraq into Turkey is about two days, with 1,500 in 
the holding area and another 4km waiting on the road.  The 
GOT wants to renovate Habur Gate soon and, in order to ease 
operations there, has proposed a second crossing 10 km west 
of Habur.  Turkish closure/reduced manning of Habur 
operations for up to 5 hours per day contributes to 
significant inefficiencies at the crossing.  We have  pushed 
the Turks  to operate Habur 24/7.  IGC President Talabani 
agreed Nov 19 to open discussions with the Turks in January 
on additional border crossings, but we need to press for 
operational efficiency within the context of these talks. 
 
 
¶6. (S) PKK/KADEK: The Turks remain very focused on the 
presence of PKK/KADEK terrorists in northern Iraq, and this 
is perhaps the most significant issue on the plate of the 
Turkish military at present.  State Counter Terrorism Chief 
Cofer Black's meetings with Turkish officials on Oct. 2 
established agreement to work on a plan of action to 
eliminate the PKK/KADEK threat to Turkey from northern Iraq. 
A Turkish Reintegration Law, allowing non-leadership members 
of the PKK/KADEK to return voluntarily to Turkey expires Feb 
6, 2004.   Owing to the restrictive nature of the law and 
efforts by PKK/KADEK to misinform its own members about the 
law, results have been disappointing so far.  The Turks are 
looking to the USG to make good on our commitment to 
eliminate the PKK/KADEK threat from Iraq.  CJTF 7 has 
concluded that the best strategy to pursue versus the 
PKK/KADEK is one of &progressive engagement8 which will 
likely be much slower than the GOT desires.  The Turks also 
remain disturbed by what they consider to be Kurdish (vice 
U.S. or Iraqi central authority) control of the Iraqi side of 
the Turkish-Iraq border and a perceived U.S. favoritism of 
Kurds.  There are very real Turkish sensitivities on the 
PKK/KADEK, its activities in Iraq (including the recent 
congress), and the threat that resurgent Kurdish nationalism 
(wherever it manifests itself) as serious threats to Turkey's 
security and national integrity. 
------ 
CYPRUS 
------ 
¶7. (SBU) Prime Minister Erdogan has reaffirmed his intention 
to use the Annan III Plan as the basis for finding a solution 
on Cyprus, both for domestic political reasons and his 
interest in promoting Turkey's EU candidacy.  However, 
Denktash, who the Turkish military has long supported, has 
rejected the Annan plan, and he and his supporters in Ankara 
retard progress towards a comprehensive solution.  Basbug was 
extremely negative about prospects for a Cyprus settlement in 
his discussions with Deputy Secretary Armitage.  His view 
seemed to correspond with Denktash's position.  Much will 
depend on the government's willingness to take on this issue 
between now and spring 2004, when Cyprus' EU membership 
becomes effective. 
 
 
-------- 
CAUCASUS 
-------- 
 
 
¶8. (C) The GOT continues to express concern to us that the 
U.S. has no strategic plan for dealing with Russian and 
Iranian pressure in the region.  It has hinted that Turkey 
would be forced to make its own peace with Russian and 
Iranian interests absent any coherent U.S. political strategy 
beyond completion of Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline and standard 
expressions of support for democracy and resolution of 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  Turkish concern about the region has 
heightened with recent developments in Georgia.  Turkey can 
have a positive impact on the transition in Georgia by 
supporting a peaceful process leading to free elections and 
national unity.  Both TGS and EUCOM have worked hard to 
develop a professional, NATO-compatible brigade in Georgia. 
These and other US and Turkish efforts may at least partially 
explain why the military chose not to intervene in the 
current crisis.  The Nov 17 meeting of the bilateral Caucasus 
Working Group (CWG) reaffirmed the commitment of both Turkey 
and the US to work with Georgia,s and Azerbaijan,s 
militaries in joint and complementary projects to further 
promote Western values, professionalism and regional 
stability. 
 
 
¶9.  (C) The establishment of de facto relations with Armenia 
proceeds step by step; Ankara has allowed a second charter 
airline to start twice-weekly scheduled Istanbul-Yerevan 
service.  However, continued GOT linkage of normalization of 
relations with Armenia to improvements in Nagorno-Karabakh 
has thwarted an official breakthrough.  The GOT also 
maintains that it cannot establish normal relations until 
Armenia recognizes its border with Turkey.  GOT and AK party 
officials tell us they recognize the potential trade and 
development benefits to Turkey from opening the border. 
However, passage of any Armenian genocide language, even by 
only one chamber of Congress, will set progress back 
significantly.  The genocide issue is a very sensitive 
subject within the Turkish military. 
 
 
------------------- 
MIDDLE EAST ROADMAP 
------------------- 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) Turkey prides itself on its good relations with 
both Israelis and Palestinians.  While Turkey supports the 
U.S.-sponsored Road Map and has close military, intel, and 
commercial ties with Israel, the GOT is leery of getting too 
far ahead of a Turkish populace that sympathizes with the 
plight of the Palestinians.  Erdogan and FonMin Gul have 
deferred a visit until they can figure out how to finesse the 
expectations of the Turkish public that such a visit would 
include a call on Arafat.  A proposed visit to Ankara by 
Israeli PM Sharon was also recently shelved due to TU PM 
Erdogan,s purportedly busy schedule.  However, the mid-Oct 
03 visit to Israel by TUAF Chief General Ibrahim Firtina, and 
participation by Israel in Nov 03 Anatolian Eagle air 
exercise, reaffirm the close ties between the two militaries. 
 
 
-------------- 
SYRIA AND IRAN 
-------------- 
 
 
¶11. (C) Both the GOT and core elements of the State argue 
that Turkey: 1) lives in a rough neighborhood and has an 
interest in minimizing friction with its neighbors; and 2) 
shares the same values and goals in the Middle East as the 
U.S. (stability, democracy and prosperity).  In the latter 
regard, the GOT has asserted that Turkey is constantly 
delivering a message to the Syrians to cooperate more with 
the U.S. and sees Syria as engaged in gradual 
democratization, a process the GOT thinks needs 
encouragement.  Turkey and Syria appear to be increasing 
confidence building measures, with the GOT announcing that it 
will de-mine its border strip with Syria to increase trade 
and human contact as well as increase cultivable land for the 
impoverished southeast.  The GOT has no enthusiasm for a 
policy of pressure against Syria.  There is no 
military-to-military relationship between Syria and Turkey. 
 
 
¶12. (C) Relations with Iran bear the weight of centuries of 
mutual suspicion, indeed antipathy, but the current GOT 
appears intent on maintaining open dialogue with Tehran.  The 
GOT shares U.S. concerns about reported Iranian WMD programs 
and has expressed support for the U.S. initiative to bring 
Iran into conformity with IAEA safeguards.  However, 
officials also assert that too much pressure (e.g. referring 
a finding of NPT non-compliance to the UNSC) would undermine 
moderates in Tehran and strengthen the position of Iranian 
hard-liners, who believe that the West will not be appeased 
and therefore should not be accommodated.  Turkish officials 
argue that Turkey has an interest in minimizing friction with 
its neighbor.  Intent on maintaining at least cordial 
relations and loathe to upset economic ties, despite Tehran's 
past record of support and safe harbor to PKK terrorists, 
officials have continually cautioned U.S. interlocutors that 
Iran is not easily changed from outside; that the Azeris are 
well entrenched in Iranian society, with considerable 
economic and political influence; and that attempts to effect 
regime change from abroad are doomed to failure. 
 
 
------------ 
EU ACCESSION 
------------ 
 
 
¶13.  (C) The issue of EU accession is one of high importance 
for Turkey, and one of the very few virtually all Turks can 
agree on.  The Turkish Parliament has adopted seven 
EU-related human rights reform packages over the past two 
years.  The legal amendments are designed to crack down on 
torture, loosen restrictions on speech and assembly, reduce 
the political influence of the National Security Council, and 
expand religious freedom.  The EU and other outside observers 
have praised the reforms, while criticizing the slow pace of 
implementation; the EU's latest progress report on Turkey 
highlights the need for implementation.   Questions remain 
whether the AK government will be able to implement these 
reforms rapidly, particularly given the resistance from an 
openly partisan President Sezer and those in the judiciary, 
military and other areas of the state apparatus who are 
content with the status quo and suspicious of AK, the EU and 
the U.S.  Nationalistic and status quo elements of the 
military, police, judiciary, and bureaucracy have criticized 
some of the reforms as threats to national security, and have 
resisted implementation.  Despite GOT progress on human 
rights, EU officials have repeatedly told the GOT that it 
will be difficult for the EU at the December 2004 Summit to 
offer Turkey a date to begin accession talks if there is no 
settlement on Cyprus. 
 
 
------------------------ 
DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶14.  (C) The governing AK Party, which came to power with an 
overwhelming Parliamentary majority in November 2002, 
continues to pursue democratic and political reform. 
Meanwhile, AK's principle challengers -- the opposition CHP 
and xenophobic Genc Party -- have lost momentum.  AK insists 
its substantial and path-breaking democratic reform packages 
demonstrate it is wedded to democracy and strong relations 
with the EU and U.S.  However, many in the Turkish 
establishment question AK's sincerity and express suspicion 
about AK's agenda, concerned that the party intends to change 
the role of religion in Turkey.  Turkey's generals are keen 
to protect their status as Guardians of the (Kemalist) 
Republic and the version of "secularism" that has prevailed 
in Turkey since the mid-1920s.  They, and much of the status 
quo forces in the State, assert AK is a challenge to the 
founding ideology of Ataturk's Turkey; AK in turn says that 
its "secular" opponents have hijacked Ataturk's intentions 
and are responsible for the stagnation in Turkey's political, 
economic, and social development. 
 
 
----------- 
THE ECONOMY 
----------- 
 
 
¶15. (SBU) Two years of sound fiscal/monetary policy and 
structural reforms, the rapid and successful conclusion of 
the Iraq war, expected U.S. financial assistance, and 
unprecedented IMF support have combined to bring down 
inflation and interest rates, restore modest growth, and 
create some hope that Turkey can work its way out from under 
a high public debt burden.  The GOT is attempting to build on 
this momentum and thus push the economy away from the 
financial precipice on which it has been perched for the past 
three years.  This will require the government, which at 
first implemented the IMF recovery program with muted 
enthusiasm, to obtain quarterly IMF reviews on time, proceed 
with scheduled privatizations, keep moving forward on EU 
pre-accession requirements, and improve the environment for 
foreign direct investment. Failure to take advantage of this 
opportunity will not necessarily mean another crisis, but 
will leave the economy extremely vulnerable to external or 
internal shocks and undermine the potential for prosperity. 
In late September, the U.S. and Turkey signed an agreement 
under which the USG will provide $8.5 billion on low-interest 
loans to support Turkey's economic reform efforts.  Money 
under the agreement could begin flowing once the GOT cabinet 
and President have approved the package, however the 
agreement has become politically controversial. 
 
 
---- 
HLDG 
---- 
 
 
¶16.  (SBU) The US hosted a High-Level Defense Group in 
Williamsburg, VA from Nov 17-19, 2003.  Deputy TGS Chief 
Basbug led the Turkish delegation; Ms. Mira Ricardel 
(Overseeing Assistant Secretary of Defense-International 
Security Policy) led the US delegation.  Discussions focused 
on a number of key political-military and security 
cooperation issues vital to the US-TU relationship, including 
GWOT, cooperation in Iraq, Defense Industrial cooperation, 
and Turkish modernization projects such as Joint Strike 
Fighter, Turkish AEW&C PEACE EAGLE, SPEWS II electronic suite 
for their Block 50 F-16s, and the US-TU Space Cooperation 
MOU.  Working groups related to the HLDG addressed, inter 
alia, continued efforts to identify areas of potential 
cooperation in Iraq reconstruction and training opportunities 
(police, border guard, etc), the importance of Caucasus 
region and Caucasus Working Group initiatives, and the 
continuing efforts to develop Space Cooperation (working on 
MOU) as a new dimension to the relationship.  Basbug, who 
professed that TGS wanted to focus on the future and not the 
past, was very pleased with the outcome of his visit, noting 
in particular that he appreciated the US response with regard 
to combating PKK terrorism in northern Iraq that he received 
during his meetings in Washington, including with you.  In 
this regard we expect that the PKK issue will be a topic of 
high interest during your visit. 
 
 
--------------- 
Missile Defense 
--------------- 
 
 
¶17.  (C) The Missile Defense Technical Experts Group (TGS and 
MDA) last met in May in Colorado Springs.  At that meeting 
Phase III of the joint architectural study was approved and 
new areas of research and cooperation were discussed, such as 
a sensor study, post attack damage scenarios, and the NATO 
study.  MFA tells us the GOT is eager to hear how the US 
plans to coordinate its own missile defense, its efforts to 
have other countries buy in to a joint system, and the NATO 
study.  Because of the high cost of a missile defense system, 
Turkey is waiting to see how it can reap the benefits of a 
joint system before it commits to providing its own MD 
system.  The TGS told us during the recent HLDG meeting that 
the option to buy used German Patriot missile systems is 
still being evaluated by the Turkish Air Force. 
 
 
-------------------- 
NATO Istanbul Summit 
-------------------- 
 
 
¶18.  (C) The GOT is determined to make the Summit a success. 
The dates have been confirmed for June 28-29, 2004.  Turkey 
is waiting to hear what Washington has in mind for themes and 
is supportive of the US desire to use the Summit to expand 
NATO activity in the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
Security Cooperation Issues 
--------------------------- 
 
 
¶19.  (C) Incirlik operations: US Air Force operations out of 
Incirlik Air Base have operated smoothly, generally without 
Turkish Air Force interference as was so often the case 
during ONW.  The recent surge in Tanker numbers was 
accommodated without incident.  There is current discussion 
at AMC to raise optempo at Incirlik by bringing in C-17 
aircraft and support personnel as part of a hub and spoke 
operation for sustainment of US forces in Iraq.  This concept 
(still in initial US planning phase) has not yet been 
broached with the TGS, and may require Parliamentary 
approval.  There is also a plan to use Incirlik for the swap 
of forces in Iraq.  We expect TGS approval once we formally 
submit our request.  The plan calls for moving 60K troops (up 
to 1000 troops per day) through Incirlik during the 90-day 
period from Jan to Mar 04 (this plan could be approved under 
an existing government decree). We are expecting State,s 
Under Secretary Grossman to visit in mid December to consult 
with Turkey about the base,s future as part of the European 
force posture exercise. 
 
 
¶20.  (U) Anatolian Eagle: The Anatolian Eagle exercise in 
Konya concluded Nov 13, 2003.  This was very successful 
exercise that included participation by Israel, Germany, the 
US, and Turkey.  USAFE was very pleased with the spirit of 
cooperation from the Turks, and is looking to use the 
agreement framework from this exercise as a springboard to 
resume Weapons Training Detachments and other bilateral 
exercises. 
 
 
¶21.  (U) Space Agreement: OSD C3I (Mr. Art Baer) and the 
Turkish Air Forces Command (TAFC) recently completed initial 
negotiations of a Space Agreement that will support the new 
Turkish Space Program, for which the TUAF is the executive 
agent.   The Turks have committed to responding to the draft 
text of the agreement by early December.  This was also a 
subject of discussion at the recent HLDG.  The two sides 
recommitted themselves to the goal of signing the Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) umbrella/framework 
agreement for defense space cooperation at the 
American-Turkish Council annual meeting in March 2004.  Also, 
the US agreed to approach NASA regarding Turkish interest in 
placing an astronaut in space, and to continue to identify 
and prioritize appropriate space-related training courses for 
the Turkish Air Force. 
 
 
¶22.  (U) SPEWS II:  BAE and TAFC recently signed a direct 
commercial contract to upgrade the electronic warfare 
capability of Turkey,s Block 50 F-16s. 
 
 
¶23.  (U) Airsouth and the School in Izmir: It is likely that 
military leadership you meet with will ask about the 
possibility of bringing a DoDDS school back to Izmir 
coincident with the AIRSOUTH move.  US position to date is 
that this remains a GOT responsibility.  DoDDS has no 
interest in pursuing this based on fiscal constraints, but 
could possibly be approached to provide expertise in the 
establishment of an international school there.  This issue 
remains key in the successful transition of AIRSOUTH. 
EDELMAN