This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 007114 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS TU IZ AF CY ASEC OVIP
SUBJECT: TGS D/CHOD BASBUG'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON - AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP RELATIONS 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 7006 
     ¶B. ANKARA 6992 
     ¶C. ANKARA 6734 
 
 
(u) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman.  Reasons:  1.5 
(B and D). 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
 
¶1. (C) Turkish General Staff Deputy Chief Basbug will visit 
Washington November 16-21 to lead the Turkish delegation to 
the US-Turkey High-Level Defense Group (HLDG).  He has 
requested meetings with National Security Advisor Rice, 
DepSecDef Wolfowitz, CJCS Myers and VCJCS Pace.  Basbug may 
also seek meetings at State with the Deputy Secretary and/or 
the Undersecretary for Political Affairs.  This is Basbug's 
first visit to the US as D/CHOD.  Post strongly supports 
these meeting requests as a key opportunity to re-build a 
relationship with the Turkish military.  Basbug's visit is 
also an excellent opportunity to discuss with a credible and 
important Turkish official issues besides Iraq, including 
Afghanistan, Cyprus, Armenia, and Turkey's aspirations for EU 
accession, and to help the new TGS leadership establish 
relations with civilian USG counterparts as well as top US 
military officials.  Basbug is a thoughtful, direct man with 
excellent control of factual information.  He has always been 
top of his class and is likely to be the TGS Chief someday. 
He has excellent credentials with both the Turkish Army in 
the field and with defense policy makers in Ankara.  In 
short, his visit to Washington is an opportunity we should 
not miss.  End summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C) The Turkish General Staff, with the pressure of EU 
democracy reforms under CHOD General Ozkok's leadership, has 
seen its role in Turkish politics and policy-making reduced. 
Nonetheless, there are a number of influential officers who 
are uncomfortable with these developments, who are very 
suspicious of EU and US intentions and who want to slow or 
prevent change in the Turkish system.  The military is 
broadly opposed to the AK Party, currently in power, because 
it comes out of a religious-oriented background and its 
ultimate direction is suspect.  Basbug was moved into his 
current position last August as General Ozkok brought allies 
into a number of senior positions.  His reputation as a 
strategic thinker makes him a key player in the effort to 
make Turkey a more modern country.  However, the TGS 
continues to seek political alternatives to AK that will 
garner public cupport and be more clearly committed to 
Turkey's political traditions. 
 
 
---- 
Iraq 
---- 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) Iraq and resolution of the PKK/KADEK question remain 
a current focus of the US-Turkish security relationship. 
Having settled for now the question of potential Turkish 
troop deployment for a stabilization force in Iraq (and all 
Washington interlocutors could usefully thank Basbug and TGS 
for supporting the idea and helping get Parliamentary 
approval) Turks are seized with two other Iraq-related 
issues: Whether the U.S. will move against PKK/KADEK 
terrorists in northern Iraq; and Turkey's perception of US 
preferential treatment of Iraqi Kurds.  Senior GOT officials 
including PM Erdogan, as well as our contacts with ordinary 
citizens, have indicated that concrete action by the U.S. to 
eliminate the PKK/KADEK threat will ease Turkish suspicions 
that the U.S. favors the Kurds in northern Iraq over our 
relations with Turkey in ways that will eventually harm 
Turkey's interests.  It will also be the key to securing the 
eventual withdrawal of some 1,500 Turkish Special Forces 
currently in northern Iraq and to disbanding the Turkish-led 
Peace Monitoring Force. 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Turkish Parliament recently passed a 
"re-integration" law allowing non-leadership members of the 
PKK/KADEK to return voluntarily to Turkey.  Owing to the 
restrictive nature of the language and efforts by PKK/KADEK 
leaders to prevent those in the camps from gaining access to 
accurate information about the law, results have been 
disappointing so far.  The Turks are looking to the USG to 
implement our commitment to eliminate the PKK/KADEK threat 
from Iraq.  State's Counter Terrorism Chief Amb. Black was in 
Ankara October 2 to discuss PKK/KADEK and agreed with the 
Turks on a plan of action using the full range of statecraft 
tools to eliminate the PKK/KADEK threat. The Turks also 
remain disturbed by what they consider to be Kurdish (vice 
U.S. or Iraqi central authority) control of the Iraqi side of 
the Turkish-Iraq border.  The U.S and GOT are attempting to 
put behind us hard feelings from a July 4 incident, in which 
U.S. forces arrested Turkish troops believed to be working to 
foment instability.  That event and the Turks' perception 
that we mishandled it (although Chief of the General Staff 
Ozkok subsequently transferred the two Turkish generals 
responsible for Turkish special forces in Iraq short of tour) 
are likely to linger in the background of the relationship. 
Basbug will raise the PKK/KADEK threat with his interlocutors. 
 
 
¶5. (U) There has been a concerted effort on the part of the 
GOT to shift its Iraq policy away from one centered on 
ethnicity (Turkmen and Kurd) and northern Iraq towards a more 
central, Baghdad-oriented policy based primarily on 
contributing to stability through trade, humanitarian 
assistance and commercial opportunities for Turkish 
businesses.  However, GOT efforts have not found much 
traction with the military, the press or the public, which 
remain focused on northern Iraq, and suffered when the Turks 
withdrew their offer of troops.  The Turks have taken a 
number of concrete steps in humanitarian assistance and 
reconstruction since Secretary Powell's April visit to 
Turkey.  The World Food Program (WFP) continues to ship 
considerable quantities of food through Turkey, and Turkey is 
also the world's biggest supplier (in value terms) to WFP. 
The GOT also has supported the U.S. military's efforts to 
establish a ground line of communications (GLOC) here to 
re-supply U.S. forces in Iraq. Turkey recently facilitated a 
Turkish company's export of electricity to Iraq, continues to 
support fuel barter deals to supply essential energy supplies 
to the Iraqi people, and has offered some commercial/aid 
deals that Washington and CPA are considering.  Ankara 7006 
describes Turkey's experience with training that could be 
relevant and beneficial in the Iraq context. 
 
 
----------- 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
 
¶6. (C) Turkish support for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 
and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan has been 
a bright spot in US-Turkish relations since September 11, 
2001, and likely could be a possible area for future 
cooperation as we look to broaden our cooperation outside of 
Iraq.  Up until now, the Turkish military has been almost 
exclusively focused on preparations for a possible deployment 
to Iraq, and therefore has declined requests from NATO, 
CENTCOM and others to contribute additional military forces 
to ISAF or the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).  That 
said, we do not rule out the possibility that the GOT would 
be prepared to contribute forces at a later date and 
therefore recommend that Washington share our current 
assessment of the situation in Afghanistan.  Specifically, we 
recommend that Washington provide Basbug a detailed briefing 
on our accomplishments, what we are doing now, and where we 
are heading in the future -- while stopping short of 
soliciting formal contributions from Turkey for either ISAF 
or the PRTs. 
 
 
------ 
CYPRUS 
------ 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) P.M. Erdogan appears committed to finding a 
comprehensive solution on Cyprus, but faces continued 
resistance from the TGS and other elements of Turkish 
society.  Erdogan has reaffirmed his intention to use the 
Annan III Plan as the basis for finding a solution, both for 
domestic political reasons and his interest in promoting 
Turkey's EU candidacy.  However, the Turkish establishment's 
long support for Denktash, his rejection of the Annan plan, 
and Denktash supporters in Ankara leave the GOT without an 
approach to achieve a comprehensive solution.  Much will 
depend on the government's willingness to take on this issue 
between now and spring 2004, when Cyprus' EU membership 
becomes effective.  AK owes nothing politically to "TRNC" 
leader Denktash and is thus interested in promoting 
transparent and fair parliamentary elections in the North in 
December.  No matter what the outcome, the elections, which 
have become a de facto referendum on a comprehensive 
solution, will profoundly affect the likelihood of a 
settlement before May.  Basbug's boss, General Ozkok, 
recently went public with a not completely coherent 
explanation of why Turkey has a strategic interest in Cyprus 
that is not met by EU membership or the UN plan.  NSC and 
State interlocutors should share the contrary US view. 
 
 
-------- 
CAUCASUS 
-------- 
 
 
¶8. (C) GOT remains open in principle to improving relations 
with Armenia, and has inaugurated additional Istanbul-Yerevan 
commercial charter flights (twice weekly) but refuses to open 
its border with Armenia before Yerevan recognizes the border. 
However, continued GOT linkage of normalization of relations 
with Armenia to improvements in Nagorno-Karabakh has thwarted 
an official breakthrough.  MFA Caucasus Deputy DirGen Tezgor 
continues to express MFA's concern to us that the U.S. has no 
strategic plan for dealing with Russian and Iranian pressure. 
 Tezgor has hinted that Turkey would be forced to make its 
own peace with Russian and Iranian interests absent any 
coherent U.S. political strategy beyond completion of BTC and 
standard expressions of support for democracy and resolution 
of N-K.  Erdogan's government is much less wedded than its 
predecessors to Azerbaijan's ruling Aliyev family.  GOT and 
AK party officials tell us they recognize the potential trade 
and development benefits to Turkey from opening the border. 
The Caucasus Working Group will address specific mil-mil 
cooperation in the Caucasus countries, but senior Washington 
officials could usefully reaffirm the USG's desire to work 
with Turkey in the region and to balance growing Russian and 
Iranian influence.  We could also commend the Turks for their 
cooperation with us in Georgia's security assistance 
programs.  It will be important for Basbug to come away with 
a clear view that the US has a policy and is relevant in this 
region. 
 
 
------------ 
EU ACCESSION 
------------ 
 
 
¶9. (C) The Turkish Parliament has adopted seven EU-related 
human rights reform packages over the past two years.  The 
legal amendments are designed to improve Turkish democracy, 
increase individual freedoms, improve the rule of law, crack 
down on torture, loosen restrictions on speech and assembly, 
reduce the political influence of the National Security 
Council, and expand religious freedom.  The EU and other 
outside observers have praised the reforms, while criticizing 
the slow pace of implementation.   Questions remain whether 
the AK government will be able to implement these reforms 
rapidly, particularly given the resistance from an openly 
partisan President Sezer and those in the judiciary, military 
and other areas of the state apparatus who are content with 
the status quo.  Nationalistic and status quo elements of the 
military, police, judiciary, and bureaucracy have criticized 
some of the reforms as threats to national security, and have 
resisted implementation.  In some cases, bureaucratic offices 
have drafted highly restrictive implementing legislation. 
For example, Parliament lifted restrictions on Kurdish 
language broadcasting, but the subsequent Radio and 
Television Board regulation set strict time limits and 
restricted such broadcasts to state-owned media outlets. 
Despite GOT progress on human rights, EU officials have 
repeatedly told the GOT that it will be difficult for the EU 
at the December 2004 Summit to offer Turkey a date to begin 
accession talks without better implementation or if there is 
no settlement on Cyprus.  We should leave Basbug without any 
doubt about our commitment to Turkey's EU accession and to a 
Cyprus settlement based on the Annan Plan. 
 
 
------------------ 
MIDDLE EAST ROADMAP 
------------------- 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) Turkey supports the Middle East Roadmap and has 
exchanged a number of ministerial visits with Israel 
recently; Erdogan and FonMin Gul have deferred visits owing 
to disagreement over inclusion of a call on Arafat, who 
remains the symbol of Palestine among Turks. Turkey prides 
itself on its good relations with both Israelis and 
Palestinians.  While Turkey has close military, intel, and 
commercial ties with Israel, the GOT is leery of getting too 
far ahead of a Turkish populace that sympathizes with the 
plight of the Palestinians. 
 
 
-------------- 
SYRIA AND IRAN 
-------------- 
 
 
¶11. (C) Turkey cautiously supports USG policy objectives in 
Syria and Iran but worries that we will press for pre-emptive 
action against both countries.  Both the GOT and core 
elements of the State argue that Turkey: 1) lives in a rough 
neighborhood and has an interest in minimizing friction with 
its neighbors; and 2) shares the same values and goals in the 
Middle East as the U.S. (stability, democracy and 
prosperity).  In the latter regard, FonMin Gul delivered a 
call for democracy and reform in the Islamic world at the 
June OIC Summit in Tehran and has asserted to us that Turkey 
is constantly delivering a message to the Syrians to 
cooperate more with the U.S.  Gul, heavily influenced by 
foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoglu (who has a deeply 
Islamist background), sees Syria as engaged in gradual 
democratization, and the GOT thinks this process needs 
encouragement.  Turkey and Syria appear to be increasing 
CBMs, with the GOT announcing in early November that it will 
demine its border strip with Syria to increase trade and 
human contact.  The GOT has no enthusiasm for a policy of 
overt pressure against Syria, although Turks remind us of the 
value of engaging the Syrians constantly on issues of 
concern.  Washington officials might want to review our 
concerns about Syrian behavior with Basbug. 
 
 
¶12. (C) Turkey's relations with Iran bear the weight of 
centuries of mutual suspicion, indeed antipathy, but the 
current GOT appears intent on maintaining open dialogue with 
Tehran.  The GOT has declared it shares U.S. concerns about 
reported Iranian WMD programs and has expressed support for 
the U.S. initiative to bring Iran into conformity with IAEA 
safeguards.  However, officials also assert that too much 
pressure (e.g. referring a finding of NPT non-compliance to 
the UNSC) would undermine moderates in Tehran and strengthen 
the position of Iranian hardliners, who believe that the West 
will not be appeased and therefore should not be 
accommodated.  Turkish officials argue that Turkey has an 
interest in minimizing friction with its neighbor.  Intent on 
maintaining at least cordial relations and loathe to upset 
economic ties, despite Tehran's past record of support and 
safe harbor to PKK terrorists, officials have continually 
cautioned U.S. interlocutors that Iran is not easily changed 
from outside; that the Azeris are well entrenched in Iranian 
society, with considerable economic and political influence; 
and that attempts to wreak regime change from abroad are 
doomed to failure.  Basbug should hear about our concerns 
regarding Iran's WMD ambitions and support for terrorism. 
EDELMAN