This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006923 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE ALSO FOR EUR/SE AND NEA/NGA 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2013 
TAGS: PREL KU SY IZ TU IR EG JO SA
SUBJECT: IRAQ: TURKISH READOUT OF DAMASCUS MEETING: SAUDIS, 
KUWAITIS AND JORDANIANS RESIST REFERENCE TO UNSCR 1511 
 
 
REF: A. STATE 305518 
     ¶B. ANKARA 6779 
     ¶C. KUWAIT 4988 
     ¶D. DAMASCUS 6511 
 
 
(U)  Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch.  Reasons:  1.5 (b) and 
(d). 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
 
¶1. (C) POLMILCOUNS called on MFA Deputy DG for Middle East 
Safak Gokturk Nov. 5 for a readout of the Nov. 1-2 Damascus 
meeting on Iraq.  Gokturk, who had been at the Damascus 
meeting, said Turkey worked hard to make the original Syrian 
draft communique moderate and balanced, and found the meeting 
useful for monitoring and influencing the views of Iraq's 
other neighbors.  Gokturk said the most surpising elements of 
the discussion included: resistance by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 
and Jordan, but not Syria or Iran, to a Turkish suggestion to 
refer in the communique to UNSCR 1511; Syrian opposition to 
and Saudi insistence on mentioning the October Israeli 
airstrike in Syria; and the desire of all but Turkey to focus 
on early withdrawal of foreign forces before addressing 
constitutional and election issues as spelled out in UNSCR 
¶1511.  He noted the next meeting in the series, to which the 
IGC would be invited, would be hosted by Kuwait at date TBD. 
Final text of Damascus Communique at para 8.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C) On November 5, POLMILCOUNS and POLMILOFF called on MFA 
Deputy Director General for the Middle East Safak Gokturk 
(protect throughout) for a readout of the Nov. 1-2 meeting of 
Iraq's neighbors in Damascus.  Gokturk had been part of the 
Turkish delegation to Damascus and provided the following 
information, requesting that we carefully protect the source. 
 Gokturk passed us a copy of the final Damascus communique 
(text at para 8) and explained that this fourth meeting of 
Iraq's neighbors had been a useful opportunity to compare 
positions among seven countries with significantly different 
viewpoints.  Turkey, he said, had found each of the four 
meetings useful for monitoring and influencing Iraq's other 
neighbors.  Gokturk said at the Damascus meeting, the Turks 
played an influential role in moving the original Syrian 
draft communique to a more moderate and balanced text, 
negotiating the language until 2 a.m. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Saudi/Kuwaiti/Jordanian Objection to 1511 Reference 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
¶3. (C) Gokturk said that Turkey asked to insert an operative 
paragraph in reference to UNSCR 1511 because the resolution 
makes an explicit statement on the role of neighboring states 
and Turkey wanted the meeting to play a role in line with the 
UNSCR.  To Turkey's surprise, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan 
objected while Syria and Iran did not.  In the end, all 
Turkey could get was a mention of UNSCR 1511 in the chapeau 
of the communique. 
 
 
¶4. (C) In the communique's operative language, Gokturk 
reported, the other participants wanted to lead with a call 
for the early departure of foreign forces from Iraq.  Turkey 
pointed out that UNSCR 1511 and the Iraqi people both were 
clear that the sequence should be the development of a 
constitution, followed by elections, and then the withdrawal 
of troops.  Gokturk also said the original Syrian draft 
stated that occupying powers should not blame their failures 
on Iraq's neighbors -- language that Turkey was able to have 
removed. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
Iran Raises Israeli Activity 
---------------------------- 
 
 
¶5. (C) According to Gokturk, Iran asked to insert text on 
Israeli activity in Iraq, but Turkey and Kuwait argued that 
this was not relevant to the substance of this kind of 
document.  The Iraians also proposed language on October's 
Israeli airstrike in Syria.  While Turkey had been clear in 
its public opposition to the Israeli strike, Turkey objected 
to including this in the Damascus communique on the grounds 
that it diluted the text and would help neither the situation 
in Iraq nor the Arab-Israeli process.  Surprisingly, even 
Syria said it did not want such language in an operative 
paragraph, though it thanked Iran for the gesture of 
proposing it.  Saudi Arabia then insisted on a reference to 
the strike and as a compromise, it was refered to in the 
closing paragraph. 
¶6. (C) Gokturk said that Turkey had offered the communique's 
opening paragraph for balance and to signal that the IGC 
would be welcome at the next meeting of the group.  That 
meeting will be hosted by Kuwait at a time to be determined. 
 
 
--------------- 
Iraq Invitation 
--------------- 
 
 
¶7. (C) The first subject ministers took up in a "ministers 
only" session was the question of Iraqi participation in the 
meeting.  The ministers agreed to extend an invitation to 
Iraqi FM Zebari via the Kuwaiti FM.  Despite early 
indications that Zebari would attend, the Turks, Gokturk 
said, had been disappointed by Zebari's public declining of 
the invitation, which, Gokturk said, Zebari called "too 
little, too late." 
 
 
¶8. (U) Begin Text of Damascus Communique: 
 
 
FINAL STATEMENT OF THE MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF 
IRAQ'S NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES 
 
 
Damascus-November 2, 2003 
 
 
In response to the invitation extended by the Syrian Arab 
Republic to hold a meeting for the neighboring countries of 
Iraq with the objective to discuss the current developments 
in Iraq and their repercussions at regional and international 
level, the Foreign Ministers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Republic of Turkey, the 
State of Kuwait and the Syrian Arab Republic held a meeting 
in Damascus on Ramadan 7 1424 A.H., corresponding to November 
2, 2003.  The Ministers extended an invitation to the interim 
Iraqi Foreign Minister to attend the meeting but they did not 
receive a response; however, they expressed their hope that a 
representative of Iraq could attend in their forthcoming 
meetings. 
 
 
The Ministers recalled their previous meetings held in 
Istanbul on January 23, 2003, in Riyadh on April 18, 2003, 
and in Tehran on May 28, 2003, and discussed the current 
situation in Iraq as a contribution to the objective of 
enhancing the unity and independence of Iraq and its 
sovereignty over its territories and natural resources as 
recognized by Security Council resolution 1511.  Pursuant to 
their deliberations, the Ministers agreed on: 
 
 
a)  Expressing their sympathy and full solidarity with the 
Iraqi people in regard to the ordeal they suffer due to the 
serious deterioration of the security, as well as, the 
economic and living conditions. 
 
 
b)  Rejecting any measure that may lead to the disintegration 
of Iraq, the Ministers reiterated their respect for 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political unity of 
Iraq, and their commitment to the principle of 
non-interference in its domestic affairs, and called upon all 
others to do the same. 
 
 
c)  Emphasizing the right of the Iraqi people to freely 
determine their political future, the importance to enhance 
the United Nations' vital role in Iraq, especially in regard 
to supervising the drafting of a constitution, carrying out 
elections and setting up a timetable to accelerate the 
transfer of authority to the Iraqis and end the occupation, 
so as to enable them to regain their rights and sovereignty 
over their territories. 
 
 
d)  Supporting the efforts of the Transitional Governing 
Council in carrying out its transitional responsibilities 
until the formation of an elected and fully representative 
Iraqi government that fulfills the aspirations and interests 
of the Iraqi people, and ensures equality for all citizens of 
a united Iraq. 
 
 
e)  Reiterating the responsibilities of the occupying 
authority in accordance with the relevant Security Council 
resolutions and international law, especially the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949 with regard to the responsibilities 
of the occupying forces in order to  maintain security and 
stability in Iraq, and rejecting any accusation against their 
countries of interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq. 
f)  Condemning the terrorist bombings that target civilians, 
humanitarian and religious institutions, embassies and 
international organizations working in Iraq, and stressing 
the necessity to identify their perpetrators and to hold them 
accountable for their crimes. 
 
 
g)  Expressing their concern about the existence of terrorist 
groups in Iraq and the threat that any other armed groups in 
Iraq represents, the Ministers called upon the responsible 
Iraqi authorities to cooperate with their countries to 
eliminate this danger against the neighboring countries and 
prevent any violation of the borders. 
 
 
h)  Bearing in mind the negative impact of instability and 
lack of well-being of the Iraqi people on their national 
interests, the Ministers decided to call on their 
representatives at the United Nations to collectively follow 
up their interaction with the UN role in Iraq. 
 
 
The Ministers expressed their thanks to the Syrian Arab 
Republic for holding this consultative meeting in Damascus, 
and their appreciation for meeting with H.E. President Bashar 
Al-Assad and for his views.  They expressed their solidarity 
with the Syrian Arab Republic regarding Israel exploiting the 
regional developments in its aggression against the Syrian 
territories.  They also agreed that the meetings, initiated 
by Iraq's neighboring countries, are worthy of support and 
continuation to strengthen those objectives in the future. 
The Ministers, therefore, decided to hold further meetings 
until Iraq completely restores its sovereignty, security, 
stability and ordinary life.  They also welcomed the 
invitation of the State of Kuwait to host the next meeting. 
 
 
End Text. 
 
 
¶9. (U)  Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN