This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 007620 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR NEA AND PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL KPAL KWBG JO
SUBJECT: JENIN CAMP REHOUSING PROJECT:  A PARABLE IN 
PALESTINIAN REFUGEE POLITICS 
 
¶1.  (U) ConGen Jerusalem cleared this message. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) During a donor briefing on rehousing projects 
(other issues reported septel), UNRWA officials shared 
stories from the prolonged and difficult negotiations 
surrounding UNRWA's ongoing USD 27 million project to rebuild 
the part of Jenin refugee camp that was razed during intense 
fighting in April 2002.  The negotiations revealed the 
truisms of Palestinian refugee politics:  a resounding "no" 
to transfer or anything that could even remotely be viewed as 
giving up the right of return and an unwillingness on the 
part of political leaders to give up perceived rights for the 
humanitarian benefit of the community.  Yet persistent 
discussions with ordinary camp residents led to a solution 
that addressed humanitarian, political and urban planning 
concerns, while saving face for all parties.  The 
implications for a negotiated political solution are 
interesting, as the Jenin rehousing experience implies that 
solutions are likely to fail without the intense cultivation 
of support among ordinary refugees.  The parable begins. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) As sole donor for the Jenin rehousing project, the 
UAE Red Crescent Society told UNRWA that it wished to 
reconstruct the center of Jenin camp "exactly as it was."  No 
expense was to be spared in rebuilding three- and four-story 
homes in their previous location, regardless of urban 
planning concerns, camp residents' income level or even 
verifiable evidence of the refugees' preexisting housing. 
The UAE and the refugees themselves viewed the rehousing 
project as compensation, pure and simple, for everything the 
refugees had lost during the April 2002 incursions. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Differences began to arise over the location for 
the new housing.  Some Palestinian political factions wanted 
the camp center, known locally as "ground zero," left vacant 
as a memorial to those who died there in April 2002.  Other 
Palestinian factions wanted the houses to be rebuilt exactly 
where they'd been in the densely populated center, largely, 
as UNRWA explained, to hinder future Israeli incursions into 
the camp.  The majority of the 400 displaced families also 
wanted new housing in the razed center of the camp, for a 
variety of political and personal reasons, including deeply 
held fear of change.  UNRWA, on the other hand, viewed the 
rehousing project as a rare opportunity to improve the 
infrastructure and reduce density of an overcrowded camp. 
(It also argued that UNRWA's long-standing agency-wide policy 
on new housing construction could not be ignored and refugees 
should only be entitled to the standard formula that results 
in an average shelter size of 65 square meters.)  UNRWA's 
arguments over location (but not square meterage) held sway 
in discussions with the donor, and the UAE selected a plot of 
land outside the boundary of the refugee camp to rebuild the 
destroyed homes. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Camp leaders of every political persuasion were 
outraged.  A move outside the boundaries of the camp 
constituted a "transfer" of Palestinians from their land and 
the elimination of their status as refugees.  Protests were 
held at UNRWA offices in the camp and camp leaders insisted 
that the project could not proceed as planned.  UNRWA then 
began intensive counseling efforts with the displaced 
families to sell them on the merits of a move outside the 
camp boundaries and also began a search for new land closer 
to the camp.  After several tense months, a new smaller plot 
of land was identified just on the boundary of the camp. 
UNRWA again worked closely with individual families to 
convince them that neither their status nor their benefits as 
Palestinian refugees would be affected by the move and their 
lives would be vastly improved by a less densely populated 
environment.  The deal was sealed when the PA agreed that the 
official camp boundary would be extended to include the new 
housing.  The majority of the displaced -- 198 families -- 
will be rehoused in the new plot, while others will be 
rehoused in a new, redesigned camp center that also will 
include a community center.  (The new land, purchased from 
private owners by the UAE Red Crescent Society, is registered 
in the name of the Awqaf.  Although the refugees will own the 
right to reside in the new houses, they will not own the 
houses, a standard practice in all Palestinian refugee camps. 
 Property rights may well prove more complicated to resolve 
than the right of return in the event of a political 
solution.) 
 
¶6.  (SBU) And so, political differences were resolved by 
negotiation not just among factions and political leadership, 
but also through intensive discussions with ordinary 
refugees.  UNRWA officials believe that compromise would not 
have been possible without a concerted effort to address 
individual refugees' concerns; they also believe that 
refugees would not have accepted the final deal without 
having been informed of every step along the process.  Their 
analysis echoes concerns raised in the wake of Camp David II 
and provides lessons to ponder in the event of progress 
toward a final solution. 
 
¶7.  (U)  Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/or access the site 
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. 
GNEHM