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Diana T Fritz  03/20/2007 03:45:46 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
UNCLASSIFIED

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                        November 29, 2003


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 5095 - UNKNOWN)         

TAGS:     PTER, PREL, PGOV, ASEC                                 

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  UAE: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT                      

Ref:      None                                                   
_________________________________________________________________
UNCLAS        ABU DHABI 05095

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL 
    INFO:   RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:RAALBRIGHT
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: P/M:SY; RSO:JR; ECON:OJ LEGATT:BM; CG:JD

VZCZCADI120
OO RUEHC RUEHZM
DE RUEHAD #5095/01 3331222
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291222Z NOV 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2513
INFO RUEHZM/GCC COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 005095 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT  EAP, INR/AN/NESA, DS/DSS/ATA, NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV ASEC TC
SUBJECT:  UAE: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: STATE 301352 
 
¶1.  The following information is keyed to reftel 
section two.  (A separate complementary classified 
cable will follow with additional information.) 
 
A) In 2003 the UAE continued to provide outstanding 
assistance and cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism. 
The UAE played a critical role in assisting the continuing 
investigation into the 9/11 attacks.  The UAE Central Bank 
continued to aggressively enforce UAE anti-money laundering 
regulations pursuant to the 2002 comprehensive law 
criminalizing money laundering, including terrorist money 
laundering.  Together with tightened oversight and 
reporting requirements for the domestic financial markets, 
there is now a stronger legal and regulatory framework to 
deter abuse of UAE financial markets.  Cooperation across 
the board -- from the financial realm through to security 
and intelligence -- has been strong and sustained.  The 
Central Bank has provided training programs to banks and 
financial institutions on money laundering and terrorist 
financing, investigated financial transactions, and frozen 
accounts in response to relevant UN resolutions and 
internal investigations.  Although we do not have a 
breakout of information for 2003 specifically, the UAE 
Central Bank has provided the following information on its 
efforts to combat money laundering over the last two years. 
Between August 2001 and May 2003, the Anti Money Laundering 
and Suspicious Cases Unit (AMLSCU) of the Central Bank 
analyzed 429 suspicious transactions reports received from 
banks and other financial institutions.  In approximately 
11 percent of the cases, the Central Bank froze the assets 
and referred the cases to the public prosecutor's office. 
The AMLSCU has also responded to requests for information 
on about 164 cases from other Financial Intelligence Units. 
As a result of these requests, the AMLSCU investigated and 
froze 23 accounts.  In addition, the UAE has frozen 18 
accounts totaling more than $3 million in response to UNSC 
anti-terrorist financing resolutions.  The Central Bank has 
also conducted 58 workshops on money laundering and 
terrorist financing for banks and other financial 
institutions.  In September 2003, Dubai police and UAE 
armed forces cooperated at the annual IMF/World Bank 
meeting to successfully prevent terrorist incidents. 
 
B)  The UAE judicial system did not conduct any 
trials related to terrorist acts in 2003.  There 
were no acts of terrorism against or affecting 
U.S. citizens or facilities in the UAE during 
¶2003. 
 
C)  The Embassy did consult on matters of mutual interest 
with the UAEG regarding extradition during 2003.  The 
Embassy did not make any official requests to extradite 
terrorist suspects wanted by the U.S. 
 
D)  The lack of a formal extradition treaty between the 
U.S. and UAE is the major impediment to the host 
government's extradition of suspected terrorists.  We are 
actively engaged in negotiations with UAEG on a Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty.  The UAE has demonstrated 
repeatedly that it will not allow the absence of an 
extradition treaty or an MLAT to impede cooperation with 
friendly countries, including the United States, in the 
international effort to bring terrorists to justice. 
 
E)  The UAE government has spoken out repeatedly and 
consistently, both publicly and privately, against acts of 
terrorism.  In August 2003, Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayed Al-Nahyan publicly 
criticized a suicide attack against the United Nations 
headquarters in Baghdad.  Also, in August, the Foreign 
Ministry denounced the terrorist attack at the Mosque of 
Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib in Najaf.  In November 2003, UAE 
President Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan publicly 
condemned as "criminal and cowardly attacks" a suicide car 
bombing believed carried out by Al Qaida against Arab 
expatriates and Saudis in a Riyadh residential compound. 
The UAE Cabinet issued its own denunciation, calling the 
attack a "heinous crime" and supporting any actions the 
Saudi government may take to put an end to terrorism.  The 
UAE has provided outstanding assistance with a number of 
ongoing terrorist investigations. 
 
F)  The UAE has a framework for cooperation on terrorist 
financing issues pursuant to a comprehensive anti-money- 
laundering law passed in 2002.  In addition to promptly 
freezing the accounts of terrorist entities designated 
under the relevant U.N. procedures, the UAE has received 
anti-terrorist training from the State Department's ATA 
program, in addition to anti-money-laundering training and 
technical assistance from the USG for bankers, prosecutors, 
judges, and police. 
 
G)  The UAE extended no support for international 
terrorism, terrorists, or terror groups in 2003. 
 
H)  The UAE made no public statements in support of a 
terrorist-supporting country on a terrorism issue in 2003. 
 
I)  The UAE's strong opposition to terrorism continued 
unabated in 2003.  Bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
in the global war on terrorism improved this year, largely 
owing to a broadening and deepening of counter-terrorism 
relationships. 
 
ALBRIGHT