This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ZAGREB 002200 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE - NARDI/KABUMOTO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHSA PBTS HR NATO
SUBJECT: CROATIAN ELECTIONS PUT OUR BILATERAL ISSUES ON HOLD 
 
REF: ZAGREB 2033 
 
Classified By: Poloff Justin Friedman, reasons 1.5 (b) & (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) With the parliamentary campaign heating up, some 
bilateral issues have been put on hold until they can be 
addressed without political interference.  In separate 
meetings, Presidential Foreign Policy Affairs Advisor Ivica 
Mastruko and MFA Asstant Minister for Non-European Affairs 
Drazen Margeta told the DCM that plans to discuss an ICC 
non-surrender agreement and a deployment of Croatian troops 
to Iraq will have to wait for the next government.  Mastruko 
criticized the Sabor's declaration of an economic and fishing 
zone in the Adriatic as a purely political move aimed at 
swaying voters in the upcoming elections.  Margeta said 
movement on IPR issues would also have to wait until after 
the new parliament settles in.  End Summary. 
 
Article 98 
---------- 
 
¶2. (C) In separate meetings to discuss ongoing U.S. concerns 
about doing business with Libya (septel), DCM express 
continued U.S. interest in pursuing an Article 98 agreement 
with Croatia with Presidential Foreign Policy Affairs Advisor 
Ivica Mastruko on October 6 and MFA Asstant Minister for 
Non-European Affairs Drazen Margeta on October 7.  Mastruko, 
who attended the meeting between President Mesic and A/S 
Rademaker on September 23 in NY, said that President Mesic 
felt Croatia could not sign an Article 98 agreement until 
ICTY indictments of Croatian citizens had been satisfactorily 
resolved.  Mastruko believed that this could be achieved by 
the end of this year, although he noted that the ICTY 
gameplan cited the end of 2004 as the deadline for issuing 
all indictments.   When the DCM noted that the Croatian 
Government had also cited EU restrictions as preventing the 
conclusion of an Article 98 agreement, Mastruko said that the 
president,s position on this issue was &autonomous8 from 
that of the Government.  He suggested that Mesic did not have 
a position regarding EU restrictions. 
 
¶3. (C) Assistant Minister Margeta reiterated the GoC's 
interest in finding a mutually agreeable formulation on 
extradition that would include Article 98-like provisions. 
DCM welcomed Croatian engagement on the issue, but said that 
the proposed framework would not satisfy U.S. needs.  He 
noted that 66 countries had signed Article 98 agreements, 
including Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania and Romania.  Margeta 
responded that Croatia was different from its neighbors, and 
the GoC felt itself under considerable public pressure due to 
the extradition requirements of the ICTY.  Nevertheless, 
Margeta said the GoC would continue to pursue the matter to 
find a solution acceptable to both sides. 
 
¶4. (C) DCM said that the standard NATO Status of Forces 
Agreement addendum that Post had given the GoC in September 
for review contained language similar to Article 98 without 
mentioning the Article specifically.  GoC agreement to this 
standard language would be welcomed as another positive step. 
 Margeta said the GoC wanted to get military-to-military 
cooperation back on track and asked if this SOFA agreement 
would be enough to secure a waiver of current sanctions under 
the American Serviceman's Protection Act (ASPA).  DCM 
responded that while no decisions had been made, Croatia 
would have to build a stronger case for possible waiver.  The 
GoC had taken some positive steps including its contribution 
of troops for Afghanistan and its assistance on the 
successful U.S. Navy ship visit to the BiH port of Neum.  The 
GoC's backing away from an Iraq troop contribution was a 
negative that would need to be overcome. 
 
Troops to Iraq 
-------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In pointing to President Mesic,s statements that 
Croatia should not send a military contingent to Iraq without 
a new UNSCR, DCM pointed out to both interlocutors that a new 
draft resolution was being negotiated in NY and should be 
available soon.  In any event, the government in its June 12 
&determination8 that it would commit troops to Iraq had 
cited in a diplomatic note to the U.S. Embassy cited UNSCR 
1483 as sufficient grounds.  Presidential Advisor Mastruko 
was obviously unaware of the diplomatic note, but made clear 
that the government,s position had changed (reftel). 
Mastruko and Margeta both confirmed that once a new UNSCR had 
been approved, the government would move ahead to gain Sabor 
approval for the deployment. 
¶6. (C) Assistant Minister Margeta agreed with DCM's point 
that the Iraq mission would not be a typical UN peacekeeping 
operation, but more like SFOR or KFOR.  Margeta said that 
 
Croatian forces were continuing to train for this mission and 
were ready to go once a decision had been made.  He commented 
that the GoC wanted to improve bilateral relations, and hoped 
that a UN resolution would facilitate the positive step of a 
GoC troop contribution for Iraq. 
 
Declaration of Fish and Ecology Zone 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Mastruko lamented the Sabor,s decision last Friday to 
declare a fishing and ecology zone in the Adriatic over the 
expressed reservations of the EU, Slovenia and Italy.  He 
predicted that this decision, which was taken solely to 
please the public in advance of the November elections, would 
cause Croatia substantial problems with the EU, 
"perhaps bigger than Govotina."  Mastruko (HNS) sharply 
criticized Sabor leader and HSS party leader Tomcic for 
pushing this proposal through the Sabor.  Mastruko said it 
was the wrong decision taken for the wrong reasons. 
 
¶7. (C) Margeta observed that the reactions of the EC, Italy 
and Slovenia to the declaration were not as hard as had been 
expected.  He emphasized that Croatia had a legal right to 
make this move, which was motivated primarily over concerns 
for the environment and the fishing economy in the Adriatic. 
He expected that the next important signal would come when 
Prime Minister Racan delivered Croatia's answers to the EU 
questionnaire the following Thursday (10/9) in Brussels.  He 
said the GoC would focus diplomatic efforts for the next year 
on explaining the need for this move, emphasizing in 
bilateral discussions with Italy and Slovenia the possibility 
of "polishing" the declaration. 
 
ICTY 
---- 
 
¶8. (C)  Mastruko, who left the meeting with the DCM to join 
President Mesic for his meeting with ICTY Prosecutor Carla 
del Ponte, said he believe that del Ponte already written her 
report to the UN Security Council and was &only going 
through the motions8 in her visit to Zagreb.   Mastruko was 
pleased to hear of the visit by Ambassador Prosper on October 
¶7.  He noted that the meeting with State Attorney Bajic would 
be very useful but that the meeting with Minister of Justice 
Anticevic-Marinovic would be a waste of time since &she will 
not be in the next government.8   Margeta also welcomed 
Ambassador Prosper's visit and asked about what del Ponte 
would be saying to the UN.  DCM responded that del Ponte had 
told the diplomatic community what she had told the GoC; 
namely, that while cooperation on documentary requests was 
improving, the Gotovina issue remained a major problem. 
 
IPR MOU 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU)  DCM also briefed Mastruko and Margeta on the IPR 
MOU issue since it has the potential to escalate into a 
significant bilateral irritant.  Croatia was on the watch 
list and could be elevated to the priority watch list. 
Margeta noted this issue was very complex and movement would 
be difficult until after elections and new parliament has 
settled in.  DCM noted that the EU required action on this 
issue by the end of 2004 as a condition of EU membership and 
this issue should be dealt with sooner, rather than later. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) As the parliamentary election campaign heats up, many 
of our core bilateral issues are being put on hold.  Approval 
for sending troops to Iraq, if the next government supports 
it, will certainly have to wait until the necessary 
parliamentary committees are stood up to approve such a 
decision. 
 
¶11. (C) On Article 98, Since Mesic has consistently supported 
actions to burnish Croatia,s credentials for EU membership, 
we tend to believe that Mesic would in the end acquiesce to 
the government position to follow the EU lead.  In addition, 
the Mesic position to wait until ICTY indictments are 
resolved will put off until next year ) perhaps well into 
next year ) any willingness to sign an Article 98 agreement. 
 Having said that, ultimately the Government and not Mesic 
will decide under what conditions it will sign an Article 98 
agreement.  End Comment. 
FRANK 
 
 
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