This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002578 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR CHUPA 
WINPAC FOR FOLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL EIND ETTC CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC):  SAMPLING AND 
ANALYSIS BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS 
 
REF: STATE 220996 
 
 This is CWC-103-03. 
 
¶1. Washington experts and the U.S. Permanent Delegation held 
bilateral consultations with the OPCW Technical Secretariat 
(TS) on September 30, 2003 in The Hague on technical 
considerations associated with sampling and analysis (S&A) 
during CWC inspections at U.S. declared industry facilities. 
Director of Verification Horst Reeps, Head of Verification's 
Policy Review Branch (PRB) Per Runn, Head of Verification's 
Industry Verification Don Clagett, Faiza Patel King (PRB), 
Laboratory Chief Stefan Mogl, and staffer Alex Savercenko 
participated.  Richard D'Andrea (State/AC/CB), Larry Denyer 
(Commerce/BIS/TCD), Gary Mallard (Commerce/NIST), and Brandon 
Williams (Del) participated for the U.S. side. 
 
¶2. The U.S. team began the discussions by noting the S&A 
progress made since the previous consultations in November 
¶2002.  Specifically mentioned were the TS exercise of 
off-site analysis conducted in February 2003, the TS paper on 
preparedness for S&A dated 15 May 2003, refinement of U.S. 
internal S&A procedures, and the U.S. exercise of on-site 
analysis using the mobile lab conducted in August 2003.  The 
team also noted some S&A gaps.  Specifically mentioned were 
the lack of S&A activities during routine industry 
inspections, incomplete procedures for off-site analysis, and 
policy issues concerning the basis for taking a sample, and 
what substances could be looked for in the analysis.  The 
team thanked the TS for their excellent written response to 
the U.S. S&A non-paper (REFTEL) which has been given to the 
American Chemistry Council (ACC).  The team expressed 
interest in discussing lessons learned from the recent U.S. 
exercise, TS plans for conducting S&A in other countries, and 
further thoughts on dealing with condition 18 (no samples 
taken during CWC inspections in the United States may be 
analyzed outside of the United States).  The team emphasized 
the technical nature of these consultations and that S&A 
policy issues would be discussed tomorrow as part of the 
Article VI consultations. 
 
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U.S. Exercise 
------------- 
 
¶3. Larry Denyer described the U.S. exercise as a follow-up to 
the S&A exercise conducted in June 2002.  The exercise 
consisted of a S&A seminar and the analysis of a sample taken 
from raw material feed stock.  The Army's mobile lab set up 
on-site and performed the analysis with no support from the 
site.  The analysis part of the exercise took about four 
hours.  Mr. Denyer noted that the exercise was "under 
attended" by industry, however, the companies that did attend 
gained valuable insights.  The U.S. has offered to repeat the 
S&A seminar for ACC and ACC has scheduled it for November 18, 
¶2003.  Mr. Reeps asked if the TS could attend.  Mr. D'Andrea 
said yes, and outlined the nature of the seminar 
presentations.  Mr. Reeps concluded that the TS would 
probably not benefit from attending and withdrew his request. 
 The TS team expressed interest in conducting an exercise 
with the U.S. to see what sort of support would be required 
for the TS analytical equipment and also see what 
modifications site analytical equipment would be needed for 
use during an inspection.  Mr. D'Andrea said that the 
previous two U.S. exercises were Commerce initiatives, and 
that a new exercise would likely also be a Commerce 
initiative, but nothing is currently on the drawing board. 
 
----------------------------------- 
TS Plans for S&A in Other Countries 
 
SIPDIS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4. The U.S. team asked what plans the TS had for conducting 
S&A in other countries noting that it would be easier to 
manage the S&A logistical burden in countries closer to The 
Hague.  The TS pointed out that they could not single out 
countries for S&A based on ease or difficulty of the 
logistics.  When the S&A function is needed it must be 
deployable anywhere.  The TS continues to refine its S&A 
plans and capabilities and displayed a new prototype kit for 
sample taking and preparation.  The new kit is smaller and 
lighter than the old one and is contained in three small 
suitcase sized containers.  The U.S. team was given copies of 
the kit's inventory. 
¶5. The S&A planning discussion naturally lead to a discussion 
about costs.  The TS team stated that the average cost of an 
industry inspection is approximately 16,000 Euros and that 
S&A adds 3-16 thousand Euros and adds another team member. 
The costs associated with taking S&A equipment on every 
inspection would be prohibitive.  Mr. D'Andrea suggested that 
in order for S&A to occur during a routine industry 
inspection the inspection team would have to know in advance 
that sampling was necessary, and that could only happen if 
there was an uncertainty from a previous inspection.  Mr. 
Clagett stated that there have been 17 uncertainties and only 
three of those could have been avoided or resolved by S&A. 
He also stated that all of the uncertainties have been 
resolved. 
 
------------ 
Condition 18 
------------ 
 
¶6.  Mr. D'Andrea outlined recent U.S. efforts to have a 
nongovernmental laboratory receive OPCW designation.  He 
outlined the legislative requirement and the events leading 
up to the current participation of three nongovernmental 
laboratories in the current proficiency test.  Mr. D'Andrea 
then asked if that had any impact on TS thinking about 
condition 18 and whether the TS had any new ideas.  The TS 
team noted that the condition 18 language refers to samples 
leaving the U.S. "for analysis" and that perhaps samples 
could leave the U.S. only for repackaging.  Mr. D'Andrea 
stated that the U.S. had considered and rejected that literal 
approach because condition 18 is aimed at protecting the 
custody of the sample such that no information unrelated to 
the Convention could be extracted from the sample.  The TS 
asked whether the U.S. could accept a procedure in which the 
samples were packaged with controls and blanks in The Hague 
without loss of U.S. custody.  This could be accomplished 
using optical seals and U.S. observers.  Mr. D'Andrea said 
that he would take that concept back to Washington for review. 
 
¶7. Mr. D'Andrea stated that the U.S. has identified possible 
laboratory facilities proximal to Dulles that could be used 
for sample packaging in lieu of The Hague laboratory and 
asked if the TS had further considered this option.  The TS 
appears set on doing the sample packaging exclusively in The 
Hague in order to protect sample anonymity.  The U.S. team 
pointed out that no matter where the samples were packaged 
the Host Team would know the sample's seal number that is 
applied on-site during the inspection.  The TS countered that 
the designated labs worldwide do not know the origin of the 
sample and host teams would not know which designated labs 
would be used for the analysis.  The TS is considering 
requiring designated labs to execute a confidentiality 
agreement to protect analysis results.  Ms. King asked if the 
U.S. would accept such an agreement for its designated labs. 
Mr. D'Andrea replied that if the agreement were required as 
part of the OPCW designation, then it would be acceptable. 
 
---------- 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶8. The TS asked about next steps and the U.S. team replied 
that further S&A exercises would be beneficial.  The TS is 
planning S&A talks with France in November and made no 
mention of further talks with other countries.  Clearly the 
U.S.  owes the TS a response concerning their idea of 
packaging the samples in The Hague with retention of U.S. 
custody.  Additionally, the TS would welcome any offer for a 
joint S&A exercise in the U.S.  Neither side brought up the 
subject of further S&A consultations. 
 
¶9.  Javits sends. 
SOBEL