This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TEGUCIGALPA 002530 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM/CPP, WHA/CEN, AND WHA/PPC 
OASD/SOLIC (HPANITZ) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KSPR MARR MCAP MOPS PINS HO
SUBJECT: FY 2004 EIPC NOMINATION FOR HONDURAS 
 
REF: STATE 280521 
 
¶1. Per reftel, Embassy Tegucigalpa hereby submits its FY 2004 
Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) 
initiative request. 
 
¶2. SUMMARY:  Honduras is fresh and fertile ground for a new 
peacekeeping program.  As a member of the Coalition of the 
Willing, Honduras has deployed 370 troops (task force 
Xatruch) to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The 
Government of Honduras (GOH) has also indicated a keen 
interest in further developing its ability to deploy troops 
in support of internationally sanctioned peacekeeping 
operations.  This is new for Honduras, which historically has 
not participated in peace operations to any significant 
extent.  For several years, Honduras has provided a small 
peacekeeping team of 12 Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF) 
observers in the Western Sahara.  While the HOAF still 
participates in this mission, and will provide another 370 
troops in February 2004 to relieve its troops currently in 
Iraq, the GOH lacks the resources to develop an ongoing 
training operation that would support training for meaningful 
participation in future peacekeeping operations (PKOs).  END 
SUMMARY 
 
¶3. Honduras transitioned to civilian control of the military 
in 1996 and the HOAF is now firmly under civilian control.  A 
1999 constitutional amendment established direct civilian 
control over the armed forces through a civilian Minister of 
Defense.  The amendment also replaced the position of the 
Armed Forces Commander in Chief, who had standing equal to 
that of the country's President, with that of Chief of the 
Joint Staff.  In April 2002, Congress passed the Organic Law 
of the Armed Forces to solidify civilian control over the 
military.  Moreover, the Honduran Constitution expressly 
encourages the HOAF to undertake broader missions such as 
disaster assistance, humanitarian assistance and other 
"social mandates." 
 
¶4. In recent years, the HOAF responded quickly and 
effectively to assist its regional neighbors in the wake of 
various disasters and crises.  Both its strong civilian 
control and track record of assisting other nations in crisis 
situations are evidence of an emerging professional 
institution, which in Post's opinion strongly supports the 
HOAF as a good candidate to undertake international missions 
for peacekeeping purposes.  The primary hindrance for the 
HOAF is lack of appropriate training and training instructors. 
 
¶5. Honduras is a strong regional ally and was the first 
nation in the Western Hemisphere to sign and ratify an 
Article 98 Agreement with the United States.  The GOH has 
demonstrated a willingness to host a vast array of U.S. 
military training and operational opportunities, and in 
September 2004 Honduras will host SOUTHCOM's regional 
peacekeeping exercise PKO North.  Senior HOAF officers have 
expressed a strong desire to assume regional and 
international roles in peacekeeping missions.  The Honduran 
military is currently involved in several initiatives to 
expand their knowledge and capabilities in the PKO arena. 
The HOAF is willing to dedicate time, manpower, and scarce 
resources in order to become more involved in the 
international peacekeeping effort. 
 
 ---------------------------------------- 
 MISSION GOALS RELATED TO EIPC OBJECTIVES 
 ---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. Given the opportunity to increase its participation in 
peacekeeping missions, Honduras could contribute to regional 
stability.  EIPC funding would provide the GOH with the means 
to expand its involvement in international PKOs, increase its 
professionalization, and foster its contribution to the 
general stability of the region. 
 
¶7. Specifically, EIPC funding for Honduras would support 
Performance Goal four of Post's FY 2005 Mission Performance 
Plan (MPP)--Stable, Secure Regional Partners.  The Tactics 
delineated under both Strategies one and two relate to EIPC 
objectives.  Strategy one focuses on expanding the HOAF's 
ability to achieve its constitutionally mandated missions by 
transforming it into a modern 21st century military force 
able to contribute to a variety of regional efforts. 
Strategy one also includes as a tactic the provision of EIPC 
funding to develop and train peacekeeping units. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
U.S. INTERESTS SERVED BY HOAF PARTICIPATION 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. U.S. interests are directly advanced by the establishment 
of enhanced peacekeeping capability in Honduras.  The 
addition of Honduran troops to the international pool of 
countries available for peace operations will free up U.S. 
military forces for other worldwide missions--notably, the 
war against terrorism.  Honduras is a proven ally in Latin 
America as well as a valuable partner in dealing with the 
international community, and can be counted upon to support 
U.S. national security objectives. 
 
¶9. The genesis of a peacekeeping unit in Honduras will result 
in better training and readiness for the HOAF, and will 
contribute to the worldwide effort in peace operations. 
Moreover, the establishment of such a unit would expand the 
role of Honduras in regional efforts, and could potentially 
lead to the creation of a unified Central American 
peacekeeping organization.  Such regional military 
integration is a top U.S. policy priority for Central America. 
 
¶10. Regional integration in Central America is important to 
resolving pervasive problems that exist in all countries of 
the region, such as the stagnant economic situation, 
long-standing border disputes, international organized crime 
and illegal drug trafficking.  Additionally, regional 
stability and integration are cornerstones for improved 
regional counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts--both 
high priorities of the U.S. in the region. 
 
¶11. Honduras is a participant in Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
currently has 370 troops stationed in Iraq directly involved 
in PKO efforts.  The GOH also participates, on a limited 
basis, in international operations related to peacekeeping 
and is willing to provide forces to other international 
missions. 
 
------------------ 
REGIONAL INFLUENCE 
------------------ 
 
¶12. The Central American countries are all relatively small 
(Honduras is roughly the size of Tennessee) and poor.  For 
this reason, regional economic integration is a mutual 
strategy pursued by all Central American countries, and 
Honduras has demonstrated its ability to cooperate and 
function as a team player.  Though one of the poorer nations 
in Central America, Honduras has established itself as a 
leader in regional issues, and stands to gain greater 
regional importance from accepting a regional responsibility 
for PKO. 
 
¶13. Honduras is centrally located, possesses vast training 
areas, and maintains easy access for both U.S. and third 
nation training opportunities.  A recent example is Honduras' 
hosting of the multi-national disaster exercise, FUERZAS 
ALIADAS 2002 (in March 2002), in which 24 other nations, 
multiple international organizations and non-governmental 
organizations trained in Tegucigalpa for two weeks in a 
regional disaster scenario. 
 
¶14. EIPC funds would give Honduras the ability to begin 
laying the groundwork for the establishment of a Central 
American Peace Support Operations (PSO) Center, capable of 
training Honduran individuals and units, as well as other 
Central American participants--perhaps with an eye toward 
future expansion, making it possible to offer training to 
other Latin American countries. 
 
¶15. Honduras should first develop its own dedicated PKO 
unit--starting at the platoon level and expanding to at least 
the company level.  Once Honduras develops and implements its 
own unit, it may ultimately be feasible to establish a 
Central American PKO unit--along the lines of regional 
multi-national units recently created in other theaters. 
With Honduras providing the site for training, each 
participating nation could supply forces with a fixed 
rotation of key leadership positions.  The eventual goal 
would be the establishment of a Central American 
battalion-level force, capable of deployment within the 
region, hemisphere, or on worldwide missions under United 
Nations mandate--potentially relieving the necessity for U.S. 
forces to perform those missions. 
¶16. Honduran leaders (including military leaders) have made 
great strides in working together on regional economic 
integration, counternarcotics efforts, etc.  Post believes 
that Honduras, along with its Central American neighbors, has 
the requisite leadership ability and spirit of regional 
cooperation to work on a regional plan for peacekeeping 
operations.  In fact, this is a concept that HOAF officials 
have already advanced at the Conference of Central American 
Armed Forces. 
 
¶17. The geographic location of Honduras, along with the 
presence of Joint Task Force-Bravo (Soto Cano Air Base) (the 
only forward deployed U.S. military base in Latin America), 
makes it a logical Latin American country in which to invest 
EIPC funds to develop a viable regional peacekeeping force. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR PEACE OPERATIONS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶18. Currently, because the HOAF has not yet begun a formal 
peacekeeping program, peacekeeping is not a part of defense 
military financing in Honduras.  The HOAF operates under 
severe financial constraints, and only minimal funding is 
allocated for peacekeeping.  The HOAF does not have a 
dedicated PKO unit or training program.  Nevertheless, the 
Honduran military has a keen interest in developing and 
implementing a PKO unit, and seeks to build a unit gradually. 
 The Hondurans have identified as one of their goals the 
establishment of a PKO unit and a training program over the 
course of the next 2 to 3 years.  The GOH will be looking to 
veterans from Iraq to initially staff this unit. 
 
¶19. The Maduro Administration and the HOAF leadership are 
committed to the underlying tenets of international 
peacekeeping, and have a genuine interest in developing PKO 
capacity.  Financial constraints will be an issue with which 
the GOH must contend, but the political will to develop and 
implement a peacekeeping force exists.  The current Honduran 
deployment to Iraq makes this a propitious moment to engage 
Honduras with a peacekeeping initiative. 
 
---------------------------- 
MILITARY TRAINING OBJECTIVES 
---------------------------- 
 
¶20. Peace Support Operations (PSO) Center:  The project would 
be a five-year project, extending from FY 04 through FY 08. 
The long-term objective would be to sponsor a Central 
American Regional PSO Training Center--eventually responsible 
for training PKO units from any of the Central American 
nations, as well as "train-the-trainer" courses, and 
expanding as suitable to other Latin American nations. 
 
¶21. The first three years would involve the establishment of 
the center and the development of the curriculum.  Depending 
on the progress with respect to the center,s capacity to 
train units, the goal would be to commence training the first 
pilot classes by the end of FY 05.  During FY 06-07, course 
development and sustainment would continue, and the first 
regular courses and unit training exercise would commence. 
The overall objective would be to complete the five-year 
project by having a self-sustaining center, capable of 
continued instruction and development, uninhibited by reduced 
budget support from the USG. 
 
¶22. In order to achieve its own sustainable PKO unit over the 
next 3 to 5 years, Honduras will need to start out at the 
lowest levels--initially establishing one dedicated PKO 
platoon, which will eventually serve as the cadre for the 
establishment of a company-size unit.  The objective is to 
have a fully equipped PKO company in place by FY 07, which 
could deploy independently, as part of a Central American 
battalion within the region, or as part of a global United 
Nations mission. 
 
¶23. The ultimate objective of the PSO would be to develop a 
Central American Regional PSO Training Center, eventually 
responsible for training PKO units from all of the Central 
American nations. 
 
------------------------------------- 
PROPOSED PROJECTS AND FUNDS REQUESTED 
------------------------------------- 
¶24. In order to effectively implement and sustain a 
developing program, we request USD $500,000.  Per reftel, 
Post outlines below how this money would be dedicated to 
enhance Honduras' peacekeeping training capabilities: 
 
(1) Phase I Visit by CCMR and NAWC-TSD to assess current 
Honduran efforts in PSO education and training.  The intent 
is to exchange information and identify counterparts.  Cost 
approximately $20,000 for the training case, and $20,000 for 
equipment. 
 
(2) Phase II Instructors' Course.   15 to 20 officer 
instructors attend the course in Monterey.  Cost 
approximately $40,000, including travel/per diem. 
 
(3) Initial Phase III Mobile Education Team(MET) (3 to 4 
personnel) visit to Honduras to develop curriculum and expand 
on to-be-determined PSO topics resulting from Phases I and 
II.  Cost - approximately $90,000. 
 
(4) Initial equipment purchase, to include electronic 
classrooms, communications equipment, staff training software 
and modules, and multi-source audio-visual equipment.  Cost - 
approximately $100,000. 
 
(5) Language lab/language lab books and publications.  Cost - 
$50,000. 
 
(6) In country Phase IV conducted jointly by CCMR and the 
Honduran PSO Center (or its education equivalent based upon 
the Honduran progress in program development). Cost will vary 
according to length - approximately $100,000. 
 
(7) Follow-on equipment purchases.  Cost - $80,000. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE HOAF 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶25. Literacy - The single point of entry for Honduran 
officers is through their academy system.  Accordingly, all 
officers are completely literate in Spanish.  A small 
percentage of those officers are bilingual in English, and 
regularly attend U.S. military courses through IMET.  The 
average enlisted soldier (in today's military, a volunteer) 
is far less educated.  For those who receive some formal 
education, it is rarely above the sixth grade level.  The 
exception is the Air Force, where airmen with a high school 
level education fill some of the more technical positions, 
and many attend IMET courses in the U.S.  It is noteworthy to 
mention that the Army feels a need to further educate its 
enlisted soldiers, and employs teachers to provide elementary 
education during some duty hours. 
 
¶26. Level of Training/Readiness - Within the Army, all 
battalions are approximately one-third of their strength of 
15 years ago, and equipment (primarily U.S. FMS case) is in 
poor condition.  The fundamental problem for all branches of 
the HOAF is a serious lack of funding for both training of 
personnel and maintenance of equipment. 
 
¶27. The Army trains well with the limited funds they receive. 
 Moreover, during the course of the last year the Army has 
benefited from a significant amount of training with U.S. 
Special Operations Forces (SOF).  These bilateral training 
opportunities have substantially improved the tactical 
capabilities of the troops.  This improvement is particularly 
noteworthy amongst the Honduran units that hosted multiple 
SOF deployments. 
 
¶28. The Air Force continues to make progress in the 
maintenance of their aircraft, and manages to keep 
approximately half of the fleet flyable at any given time. 
 
¶29. The Honduran Navy is experiencing more serious 
difficulties, with an old fleet that shows the effects of age 
and limited maintenance funds.  The Navy has benefited 
recently, however, from deploying seized go-fast boats once 
used by narcotraffickers. 
 
¶30. Discipline - As a rule, the Honduran military is fairly 
well disciplined, and failure to follow orders and 
insubordination are not tolerated. 
 
¶31. Leadership - Shortly after he took office in January 
2002, President Maduro appointed a new Minister of Defense, 
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Staff, and commanders 
of the Army and Navy.  Overall, the Joint Staff and the 
service Chiefs are competent leaders, and have a firm grasp 
of the strengths and limitations of the HOAF.  The magnitude 
of this transfer of leadership underscores the strong 
civilian control of the military. 
 
¶32. Loyalty to Government/Constitution - In January of 1999, 
the constitution was amended to abolish the position of 
military commander in chief of the HOAF, thus codifying 
civilian authority over the military.  Honduras now has a 
civilian Minister of Defense (MOD) and a Chief of the Joint 
Staff who heads the HOAF.  Civilian control is well accepted 
by the HOAF, and the transition to civilian control has 
resulted in greater transparency and fiscal accountability. 
The current MOD, Federico Breve, enjoys an excellent 
relationship with the HOAF military leadership.  The military 
has embraced its new roles and missions as provided by the 
President and Congress with little or no disruption. 
 
¶33. Morale - HOAF morale is good.  The HOAF reports that 
soldiers' morale has increased, because they feel they have a 
useful role.  The PKO opportunity would allow the HOAF to 
maintain high morale in peacetime by making soldiers feel 
like they are contributing to their society and participating 
in an international security role. 
 
¶34. Indicators of Corruption, Past or Present - Over the 
course of the last several years, human rights vetting has 
shown no involvement in atrocities.  While in general, 
corruption continues to be a problem in Honduras, Post has no 
credible evidence of recent cases of corruption amongst the 
current military top brass or HOAF officials. 
Palmer