This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SANTO DOMINGO 006124 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA:DESHAZO, WHA/CAR, WHA/EPSC,EB/IFD; TREASURY 
FOR INTERNATIONAL - NLEE,LLAMONICA; NSC FOR SHANNON; WHITE 
HOUSE FOR USTR: GASH-DURKIN. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2005 
TAGS: EFIN PREL PGOV DR
SUBJECT: EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF DOMINICAN ECONOMIC SITUATION 
AND GODR POLICY 
 
REF: A) SANTO DOMINGO 5998 B) E-MAIL ESMITH WHA/CAR - 
     KUBISKE 10-24 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Hans Hertell.  Reason: 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  The Dominican Republic is moving into very 
dangerous and uncharted waters. Facing an unstable financial 
situation with the prospect of a downward economic spiral, 
President Mejia and his senior advisors have publicly 
stressed the need to meet IMF standby conditions.  They moved 
on October 23 to raise flagging GODR revenues by imposing a 
5.25 percent increase in the levy on imports and then by 
pushing key business sectors to sign voluntary commitments 
equivalent at current rates to about USD 10 million per 
month. The work-up by IMF consultants shows the GODR meeting 
public sector expenditure targets; our scorecard indicates 
that various requirements for structural reform are 
incomplete.  Price rises, the steady erosion of the peso, and 
sporadic demonstrations worry the GODR.  Presidential 
Technical Secretary Carlos Despradel visits Washington this 
week to ask for a previously approved 100m IDB disbursement 
for the social sector. The USG response to Dominican concerns 
provides an opportunity to fortify Mejia and his officials 
against those in his PPH political faction who prefer to 
ignore IMF discipline for the presidential election season. 
See paras 12-14 for assessment.  End summary. 
 
DILEMMA: GOOD OF THE NATION VS. PRIVATE ADVANTAGE 
 
¶2.  (C) In response to request ref b for its assessment of 
current economic conditions and their implications, Embassy 
Santo Domingo considers that the Mejia administration 
understands the medium- and long-term benefits to the economy 
of prompt and strict compliance with IMF prescriptions but is 
struggling with strong resistance from political and economic 
interests that focus strictly on short term advantage. 
 
IMF COOPERATION 
 
¶3.  (C) Dominican financial officials have repeatedly 
stressed in private to emboffs over the last ten days that 
the delayed IMF standby arrangement is the only solution to 
the steadily eroding macroeconomic situation.  They tell us 
that they continue to work closely with IMF staffers here on 
an unofficial basis. Their fiscal worksheet (faxed to WHA/CAR 
and Treasury) shows the GODR in compliance with the IMF 
target on spending.  Their shortfall on revenue targets is 
estimated at RD pesos 1.07 billion per month (about USD 28.5 
million). 
 
REVENUE EFFORTS: A PATCHWORK 
 
¶4. (C) The President is leading the effort to raise 
collections, stymied by his inability to date to convince his 
majority in Congress to apply the desired 5 percent tax on 
exports. (His attempt to impose the tax by decree was voided 
by the Supreme Court.)  The Senate has just postponed its 
consideration of the bill for another week.  On October 23 
the GODR secured passage by the Monetary Board of an increase 
in the levy on foreign exchange used for imports from 4.75 
percent to 10.0 percent, avoiding the need to resort to the 
Congress.  Presidential Technical Secretary Carlos Despradel 
estimates that this measure will bring in between 450 and 500 
million pesos. (We do not know whether his staff has taken 
into account the probable drop in import volumes due to 
sharply higher costs of foreign goods due to inflation and 
steady devaluation.)  The government had previously 
implemented a temporary two percent import tax that remains 
in effect. 
 
¶5. (C) To bridge the remaining 500-600 million peso gap, on 
October 24 and 27 the President resorted to confrontational 
jawboning of 35 influential business leaders. He has 
convinced  tourism operators, exporters and free trade zone 
companies that it is in their own interest to help meet the 
IMF's requirments.  Each has signed or will sign a formal 
agreement this week specifying contributions which, all told, 
will raise RD pesos 375 million/month. Costs will be passed 
along almost entirely to consumers, except by the untaxed 
free zone (FZ) exporters. (FZ companies, earning foreign 
currency, have benefited directly from devaluation; they will 
make a "contribution" indexed to the exchange rate).  CONEP, 
an umbrella business organization, has promised to present a 
proposal to President Mejia on October 29 on further means of 
raising the needed funds. 
 
STRUCTURAL CRITERIA - IN PROGRESS, NOT THERE YET 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Progress on structural performance criteria has 
been slower than the IMF had initially prescribed.  According 
to Central Bank staff: 
 
- - Exchange-rate changes are vitually complete; the by-law 
implementing the Lombard and overnight windows has been 
approved except for one aspect that the Central Bank expects 
to resolve the first week of November. 
 
- -  The GODR is on track with disposing of the assets of 
failed BANINTER and with selling Banco Mercantil. The 
discovery of shady practices at Bancredito may require 
judicial prosecutions but should not slow down liquidation of 
the bank. 
 
- - Authorities are reviewing comments from the banking 
community on proposed regulations for implementing the 
Monetary and Financial Law. 
 
- - The Law for Bank Resolution is with Congress, and the 
Central Bank's Monetary Board will meet the congressional 
leadership during the first week of November. 
 
- - The Government is still consulting with the Fund 
concerning a Financial Crime Bill. 
 
- - On October 28 Mejia issued a decree setting up a 
commission to report back within 90 days on procedures and 
legal changes required in order to reprivatize the 
electricity distribution companies run by Union Fenosa.  He 
named a widely respected businessman to direct this work. 
 
¶7.  (C) Posing a question mark to these steps is last week's 
Congressional approval of bonds to refinance about 5 million 
pesos (USD 140 million) of the debt of government-owned Banco 
de Reservas and the agricultural bank. Though the transaction 
is presented as a "wash" -- new Central Bank debt retiring 
claims on Reservas and the agricultural lender -- we are 
seeking to identify the intended uses and beneficiaries of 
this money. 
 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PRESSURES 
 
¶8.  (C) Dominicans are suffering from accelerating inflation, 
the steadily eroding peso exchange rate, and persistent 
electricity blackouts.  To date, commentators have blamed 
Mejia and his administration and no one has publicly 
questioned the need for IMF assistance. Bad news is the 
staple of the day and no one is expecting things to get 
better.  The prospect of social unrest disquiets many (for 
example, leading newspaper "Hoy" displayed a full color 
front-page photo of street demonstrators attempting to set 
off a homemade bazooka.) 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Among points to note: 
 
- - Inflation is up from 8 percent in CY 2002 to near 40 
percent predicted for CY 2003. Households face 50-100 percent 
increases in staples such as milk, cooking oil, meats, rice, 
beans and cereals. Medicines are up 30 percent. Regular 
gasoline has gone up about 40 percent since January. 
 
- - Record numbers of Dominicans are attempting the hazardous 
journey by boat to Puerto Rico.  Prospective illegal 
immigrants to the United States now include some from the 
middle class. 
 
- - The press regularly reports reduced services or closures 
of public health facilities. 
 
- - Government social spending is at a standstill and even 
salary checks are delayed. 
- - Electricity blackouts will get much worse before they get 
better. Available supply nationwide is 1463 megawatts, for 
estimated peak demand of 1855 megawatts.  Plants are running 
out of fuel.  Next week capacity will fall 250 megawatts and 
by mid-November two additional plants will probably shut down 
for lack of GODR payment, bringing capacity down to about 750 
megawatts.  The South (including the traffic-choked capital, 
Santo Domingo) will begin to experience the persistent 
failures like those which provoked street protests in the 
North. 
 
 
IMF-BASHERS 
 
¶10.  (C) Our GODR interlocutors have told us that some parts 
of the government and political parties want to take an 
aggressive approach to the IMF. President Mejia emphatically 
rejected such a course when speaking to the Ambassador on 
October 28, but he acknowledged that these sentiments exist. 
 
¶11.  (C)  The armed forces have not shown any desire to blame 
the IMF, even though their institution is largely immobilized 
by budget shortfalls.  The military leadership is loyal to 
the PRD. 
 
¶12.  (C)  We believe that the President's own "PPH" faction, 
chaired by Agriculture Secretary Eligio Jacquez, is the most 
restive.  They face the dilemma of a virtually certain 
renomination of Mejia in late November without any clear 
prospect at this time for a winning electoral strategy.  They 
are probably tempted to push Mejia to ignore Fund constraints 
and to borrow and spend to bolster his campaign against 
Leonel Fernandez of the PLD.  The PRD-dominated legislature 
is probably uneasy, as well, as constituents feel the 
economic plight. 
 
ASSESSMENT 
 
¶13.  (C)  Technical Secretary Carlos Despradel told us on 
October 24 that the Government can "get along" through the 
end of the year, but would be able to do nothing more than 
pay salaries.  (In fact, we understand that paychecks have 
been delayed; the Government is in arrears to civil 
servants.)  Despradel was visibly unhappy and tense when he 
visited the Ambassador on October 27 to ask for USG sympathy 
in obtaining release of the USD 100 million disbursement 
pending at the InterAmerican Development Bank to complete a 
Social Sector loan. 
 
¶14.  (C)  There is a difference between "getting along" and 
the more important consideration of keeping the GODR 
committed to structural adjustment. We need the Mejia 
administration to stay on board.  We are sailing into a storm 
right now; financial indicators, already unstable, are likely 
to take a vigorous kick when the public begins to react to 
further deterioration in their daily living conditions. 
September protests and riots in the North were prompted 
largely by mischief-making local opposition politicians. 
Unless the President can convince the Dominican public that 
relief, though distant, is in sight, we see a possibility of 
real conflict in the streets, across the country. 
 
¶15.  (C)  President Mejia vows that he will not beg; he says 
that he would prefer to resign rather than to order 
repression.  Some of this is characteristic Hipolito 
exuberance, but he pointedly cited to the Ambassador, several 
times, the example of Bolivia's Sanchez Losada.  Mejia wants 
to deliver on his promises to the barrios and his list of 
small-scale uncompleted projects, both to do good and to do 
well in the elections. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 
 
¶16.  (C) Embassy recommends that the USG keep the pressure up 
on the GODR to continue needed economic and financial 
measures, including by withholding the bulk of the delayed 
IFI disbursements, but that the USG support a one-time 
lifeline in the form of the $100 million disbursement by the 
IDB for highly visible and widely spread social sector 
projects. Otherwise, given the increasingly turbulent 
situation, we run the risk, as is said here, of "finding that 
when the hats are finally ready, there will be no heads to 
receive them." 
 
 
HERTELL