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Viewing cable 03SANTODOMINGO5391, BLACKOUTS DARKEN DOMINICAN PROSPECTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03SANTODOMINGO5391 2003-10-02 21:42 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Santo Domingo
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SANTO DOMINGO 005391 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CAR, WHA/EPSC, EB/ESC/IEC AND 
EB/IFD/OMA; DEPT PASS DOE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: DR ECON EFIN ENRG PGOV
SUBJECT: BLACKOUTS DARKEN DOMINICAN PROSPECTS 
 
 
1. (SBU) IN THE FACE OF ELECTRICITY BLACKOUTS AND GROWING 
PUBLIC DISSATISFACTION, ON OCTOBER 1 THE GODR TOOK CONTROL OF 
TWO OF THE COUNTRY'S THREE ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION 
COMPANIES.  THE DEAL SIGNED SEPTEMBER 10 CALLS FOR THE GODR 
TO REPURCHASE SPANISH FIRM UNION FENOSA'S FIFTY PERCENT SHARE 
OF EDENORTE AND EDESUR ("THE EDES") FOR AN INITIAL PAYMENT OF 
ROUGHLY $15 MILLION, FOLLOWED BY PAYMENT OF ABOUT $360 
MILLION FINANCED OVER TWELVE YEARS.  THIS COULD BRING TO A 
CLOSE A TENSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GODR AND UNION FENOSA 
THAT REACHED A PEAK IN AUGUST. THE DEAL RAISES QUESTIONS 
ABOUT THE GODR'S ABILITY TO RESTORE FINANCIAL VIABILITY TO 
THE SECTOR OR TO MANAGE THE ACCRUING DEBT, ISSUES THAT COULD 
DELAY THE SECOND DISBURSEMENT OF THE GODR'S NEW STANDBY 
AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF AND COULD DELAY APPROVAL OF A WORLD 
BANK ENERGY SECTOR LOAN.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
2.  (U)  THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC HAS A LONG HISTORY OF ENERGY 
SECTOR-RELATED PROBLEMS, DATING BACK TO THE TRUJILLO ERA.  TO 
ADDRESS POWER SHORTAGES IN THE 1990S, THE BALAGUER GOVERNMENT 
INVITED INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS (IPPS) TO INVEST IN THE 
COUNTRY, SELLING THEIR POWER UNDER LONG-TERM CONTRACTS TO THE 
STATE-OWNED UTILITY (CDE), WHICH ALSO HAD GENERATION 
FACILITIES. 
 
3. (SBU) DURING THE 1990S, THE FERNANDEZ ADMINISTRATION 
LAUNCHED A PRIVATIZATION EFFORT, SELLING 50 PERCENT OF THE 
GENERATING COMPANIES (EXCEPT FOR HYDRO) AND 50 PERCENT OF THE 
DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS, SPANISH UNION 
FENOSA AND VIRGINIA-BASED AES.  THE INVESTORS ACQUIRED 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL OF THE DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES WITH THEIR 
SHARES.  UNION FENOSA REPORTEDLY ONLY RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO 
PARTNER WITH THE GODR IN EDENORTE IN RETURN FOR GETTING THE 
POTENTIALLY MORE PROFITABLE CONCESSION OF EDESUR.  IN THE 
PRIVATIZATION, THE STATE-OWNED CDE (RE-NAMED CDEEE) 
MAINTAINED CONTROL OF TRANSMISSION AND ITS CONTRACTUAL 
COMMITMENTS TO THE INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS.  THROUGHOUT THIS 
PERIOD, THE GODR MAINTAINED A GENERAL ELECTRICITY SUBSIDY. 
IN THE FACE OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN ARREARS THAT THE GODR 
OWED THE IPPS, LAST YEAR THE GODR DETERMINED THAT IT COULD NO 
LONGER AFFORD THE GENERAL SUBSIDY THAT HAD GROWN TO SEVERAL 
MILLION USD PER MONTH. 
 
4.  (U) IN SEPTEMBER 2002, PRESIDENT MEJIA ANNOUNCED THAT THE 
GODR HAD REACHED AGREEMENT WITH THE IPPS (EXCEPT FOR NORTH 
CAROLINA-BASED COGENTRIX) TO RENEGOTIATE THEIR CONTRACTS AND 
SELL POWER DIRECTLY TO THE DISTRIBUTORS IN THE SAME MANNER AS 
THE PARTIALLY-GOVERNMENT-OWNED GENERATING COMPANIES.  IN 
TURN, THE GODR WOULD COMPENSATE THE IPPS FOR GIVING UP THEIR 
CONTRACTS WITH CDE THROUGH NEGOTIATED PAYMENT OF "STRANDED 
COSTS," INTENDED TO COVER THE LOSS OF GUARANTEED PAYMENT FOR 
THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TERMS.  MEJIA ALSO ANNOUNCED PLANS TO 
ELIMINATE THE GENERAL SUBSIDY THAT HAD GROWN TO THE 
EQUIVALENT OF ABOUT US $15 MILLION PER MONTH (AT THE CURRENT 
RATE OF 19 PESOS TO THE DOLLAR; IT IS NOW 33 TO THE DOLLAR). 
MEJIA WANTED TO USE INSTEAD A TARGETED SUBSIDY FOR POOR 
NEIGHBORHOODS.  THE GODR PLANNED FOR AN ANTI-FRAUD UNIT TO 
ENFORCE COLLECTIONS. GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS WERE TO BE 
REQUIRED TO PAY FOR ENERGY CONSUMPTION, AND THE ELECTRICITY 
TARIFFS WERE TO BE ADJUSTED MONTHLY UNDER AN AGREED FORMULA. 
AS PART OF THE AGREEMENT, THE TARIFF THAT GENERATORS CHARGED 
THE DISTRIBUTORS WAS PEGGED TO THE DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE, AND 
THE DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES BILLED CUSTOMERS AT AN EXCHANGE 
RATE TWO MONTHS OLD. 
 
5.  (U) SINCE THEN, THE GODR HAS FINALIZED CONTRACTS WITH 
ONLY SOME OF THE IPPS.  MOREOVER, THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO 
SUBSIDIZE ALL CONSUMERS FOR THE FIRST 300 MW OF MONTHLY 
ELECTRICITY USAGE, THEREBY ABSORBING SOME OF THE TARIFF 
INCREASES RESULTING FROM FUEL PRICE HIKES AND/OR EXCHANGE 
RATE DEPRECIATION. THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED A 
"STABILIZATION FUND" FOR THAT PURPOSE, BUT EFFORTS TO RAISE 
REVENUE FOR THE FUND -- SUCH AS THE RECENTLY IMPOSED 
FIVE-PERCENT TAX ON EXPORTS -- HAVE NOT BEEN AS SUCCESSFUL AS 
HOPED. 
 
---------- 
THE CRISIS 
---------- 
 
6.  (SBU) IN JULY OF THIS YEAR, THE SECTOR COULD NO LONGER 
SUSTAIN THE RISING FUEL COSTS, CONSUMER NON-PAYMENT, AND THE 
RAPIDLY DEPRECIATING PESO.  ALL THREE DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES 
FACED SOLVENCY PROBLEMS AND HAD ACCUMULATED ARREARS IN 
PAYMENTS TO GENERATING COMPANIES.  EDENORTE AND EDESUR'S 
DEBTS TO GENERATING COMPANIES HAD REPORTEDLY REACHED OVER 
$100 MILLION, AND THEIR ACCUMULATED LOSSES WERE MORE THAN 
TWICE THAT AMOUNT.  PROBLEMS WITH EDENORTE WERE PARTICULARLY 
ACUTE, AND AS BLACKOUTS SPARKED PROTESTS IN THE NORTHERN PART 
OF THE COUNTRY, THE GOVERNMENT THREATENED TO INTERVENE. 
UNION FENOSA INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE WILLING FOR THE GODR 
TO TAKE OVER EDENORTE, BUT DID NOT WANT TO GIVE UP EDESUR, 
WHICH COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES SAID WAS STILL PROFITABLE.  THE 
GODR, ON THE OTHER HAND, DID NOT WANT TO SEPARATE THE TWO. 
MOREOVER, THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (IDB), HELD A 
REPORTED $180 MILLION-PLUS IN OUTSTANDING LOANS TO THE TWO 
DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES AND HAD CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS ON 
DETERMINING HOW TO ADDRESS THE INSOLVENCY.  THE 
SUPERINTENDENT OF ELECTRICITY SENT THE IDB A LETTER IN AUGUST 
ASKING THE BANK TO INTERVENE. THE IDB LOANS WERE GUARANTEED 
BY THE SPANISH PARENT OF UNION FENOSA.  WHEN THE IDB CHOSE 
NOT TO INTERVENE, MEJIA NEGOTIATED A DEAL DIRECTLY WITH UNION 
FENOSA TO REPURCHASE THE COMPANIES. THE GODR ANNOUNCED THE 
AGREEMENT ON SEPTEMBER 9, ONLY TWO DAYS BEFORE MEJIA LEFT ON 
A STATE VISIT TO SPAIN. 
 
-------- 
THE DEAL 
-------- 
 
7.  (SBU) ALTHOUGH THE DEAL REPORTEDLY INVOLVES 14 SEPARATE 
CONTRACTS, THE BASIC TERMS OF THE REPURCHASE HAVE BEEN WIDELY 
PUBLICIZED, AND THE GODR MADE THE INITIAL "BUY-SELL" CONTRACT 
AVAILABLE ON-LINE 
(HTTP://CDE.GOV.DO/CONT(UNDERLINE)COMPRA(UNDE RLINE)EDES.HTM). 
 ACCORDING TO THAT PORTION OF THE CONTRACT THE GODR AGREED TO 
PAY $15 MILLION AT CLOSING AND PAYMENTS TOTALING $680 MILLION 
OVER THE NEXT 144 MONTHS. THE PAYMENT SCHEDULE INCLUDES 
INTEREST AND UNSPECIFIED CREDITS. THE ESTIMATED $362 MILLION 
NET PRESENT VALUE OF THE AGREEMENT IS SAID TO BE NEARLY TWICE 
THE AMOUNT OF UNION FENOSA'S INITIAL INVESTMENT.  FURTHER 
DETAILS ARE NOT AVAILABLE. THE AGREEMENT APPARENTLY DOES NOT 
ADDRESS ARREARS OWED TO THE GENERATORS, WHICH EXCEED $100 
MILLION.  GODR OFFICIALS CLAIM THAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT 
INCUR ADDITIONAL DEBT, SINCE THE GODR WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR 
HALF OF THE EDE'S LIABILITIES ANYWAY, AND THE COMPANIES WERE 
ALREADY ACCUMULATING LOSSES EACH MONTH. 
 
--------- 
REACTION 
--------- 
 
8.  (SBU)  AS PROVIDERS SHUT DOWN THEIR OPERATIONS BECAUSE OF 
ARREARS DUE FROM THE EDES, POWER SHORTAGES BEGAN DURING THE 
MONTH OF AUGUST, WITH ROLLING BLACKOUTS ACROSS THE COUNTRY. 
BLACKOUTS HAVE BECOME MORE FREQUENT AND PROLONGED OVER THE 
PAST FEW DAYS, LEADING TO SCATTERED DEMONSTRATIONS, 
DISRUPTING TRAFFIC AND BUSINESSES (SEPTEL).  SANTO DOMINGO, 
PREVIOUSLY LESS AFFECTED, HAS BEGUN TO EXPERIENCE THE 
EFFECTS, ESPECIALLY IN THE PERIPHERAL NEIGHBORHOODS.  WITH 
TRAFFIC LIGHTS OUT OF COMMISSION, TRAFFIC IN THE CAPITAL HAS 
BECOME EVEN MORE SNARLED THAN USUAL.  ACCORDING TO 
REPRESENTATIVE OF U.S.-OWNED COMPANY ADS, WHOSE COMPANY HAS 
FIFTY-PERCENT OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL OF THE THIRD 
DISTRIBUTION COMPANY (EDE-ESTE), WORK CREWS HAVE HAD TO LEAVE 
NEIGHBORHOODS IN THE EAST OF THE COUNTRY AFTER CROWDS THREW 
ROCKS AT THEM. THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION IS PROBABLY 
ENCOURAGING THIS BEHAVIOR. 
 
9.  (SBU) MOST LOCAL CONTACTS ARE CRITICAL OF THE 
GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO REPURCHASE THE TWO DISTRIBUTION 
COMPANIES, BUT NO ONE HAS EXPRESSED REGRET ABOUT THE 
DEPARTURE OF UNION FENOSA.  DOMINICANS BLAME THE SPANISH FIRM 
FOR MANY ELECTRICAL SECTOR PROBLEMS AND FAULT THE GOVERNMENT 
FOR MISMANAGING THE PRIVATIZATION.  THE PRESS AND PRESIDENT 
MEJIA HIMSELF HAVE PUBLICLY STATED THAT UNION FENOSA'S 
INITIAL PURCHASE OF THE EDES WAS FACILITATED WITH PAY-OFFS. 
SOME INSIST THAT THE SPANISH FIRM SUBSEQUENTLY SKIMMED MONEY 
FROM THE COMPANIES, AT THE EXPENSE OF ITS GOVERNMENT PARTNER. 
 IN A PRIVATE MEETING WITH EMBOFF, A FORMER SUPERINTENDENT OF 
ELECTRICITY LISTED WAYS THAT UNION FENOSA "CHEATED" THE 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BY TRANSFERRING PROCEEDS TO UNION FENOSA 
SPAIN.  HE DESCRIBED INSIDER LOANS TO THE EDES FROM THE 
PARENT COMPANY AT TWICE THE MARKET INTEREST RATE; INFLATED 
SERVICES CONTRACTS WITH SPANISH COMPANIES RELATED TO UNION 
FENOSA EXECUTIVES; SOFTWARE THAT UNION FENOSA SOLD THE EDES 
FOR $20 MILLION BUT HAD PROVIDED TO ARGENTINA FOR JUST $1 
MILLION; AND IRREGULAR ACCOUNTING PRACTICES.  IN THAT 
OFFICIAL'S VIEW, WHICH SEEMS TO REFLECT PUBLIC SENTIMENT, THE 
GODR SHOULD HAVE OBLIGED UNION FENOSA TO LEAVE ON TERMS MUCH 
MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GODR -- IN RETURN FOR NOT PURSUING 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AGAINST THE COMPANY. 
 
10.  (SBU) THE PRESS REPORTS THAT TWO GENERATING COMPANIES 
HAVE FILED SUIT AGAINST THE SPANISH EDES AND CDEEE TO DECLARE 
THE AGREEMENT AS PREJUDICING THEIR OWN CLAIMS FOR PAYMENT AND 
SEEKING TO BLOCK THE TRANSFER OF SHARES TO CDEEE.   AN 
EXECUTIVE WITH INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCER COGENTRIX TOLD 
ECONOFF THAT HE BELIEVES THE AGREEMENT VIOLATES HIS COMPANY'S 
CONTRACT AND THE COUNTRY'S ELECTRICITY LAW.  U.S.-OWNED AES 
HAS PARTIAL OWNERSHIP OF EDE-ESTE, INVESTMENTS IN GENERATING 
FACILITIES AND A LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS TERMINAL IN THE 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC; AN AES OFFICIAL TOLD EMBOFFS THEY OPPOSED 
THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION.  AES COMMENTED THAT THEY WOULD 
HAVE PREFERRED A PRIVATE SECTOR SOLUTION, PERHAPS A BROKERED 
AGREEMENT FACILITATED BY AN INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT.  NEITHER 
THE DISTRIBUTOR NOR THE GENERATING COMPANIES EXPECT PAYMENT 
CONDITIONS WILL IMPROVE UNDER GODR MANAGEMENT. 
 
------------ 
IFI CONCERN 
------------ 
 
11.  (SBU) THE EFFECT OF THE UNION FENOSA DEAL ON THE FISCAL 
SITUATION IS SO UNCLEAR THAT AN IMF TEAM WHICH ARRIVED THIS 
WEEK DEPARTED AFTER A SINGLE DAY, REPORTEDLY UNABLE TO SECURE 
SUFFICIENT DATA EVEN TO BEGIN AN ANALYSIS. SINCE THE IMF MAY 
TAKE SOME TIME TO DETERMINE THE EFFECTS ON GODR PERFORMANCE 
UNDER TERMS FOR THE STANDBY, IT MAY WELL DELAY THE SECOND 
DISBURSEMENT OF US $61.7 MILLION DUE OCTOBER 15. THE WORLD 
BANK HASDELAYED APPROVAL OF AN ENERGY SECTOR LOAN MEANT TO 
HELP RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF GODR ARREARS TO THE SECTOR.  THE 
IDB HAS ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO EXPLORE WHAT HELP THE UNITED 
STATES MIGHT PROVIDE TO THE GODR. (NOTE: USAID HAS A TEAM OF 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR SPECIALISTS IN SANTO DOMINGO NOW, 
BEGINNING A FOLLOW-UP TO LAST YEAR'S USAID-SPONSORED ANALYSIS 
OF THE SECTOR; THEY EXPECT TO HAVE IN HAND BY NEXT WEEK SOME 
OF THE DATA NEEDED BY ALL CONCERNED.) 
 
------------------------------ 
REPRIVATIZATION IN THE OFFING? 
------------------------------ 
 
12.  (SBU) FEW BELIEVE THAT THE GODR'S DECISION TO REPURCHASE 
UNION FENOSA'S FIFTY PERCENT OF THE EDES WILL RESOLVE THE 
COUNTRY'S ENERGY CRISIS.  THE GOVERNMENT HAS SUGGESTED IT MAY 
TRY TO RE-SELL THE TWO DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES TO OTHER 
INVESTORS.  SECRETARY OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE SONIA GUZMAN 
TOLD THE CHARGE SEPTEMBER 30 THAT SHE IS MEETING IN EARLY 
OCTOBER WITH A GROUP OF INVESTORS, INCLUDING A U.S. COMPANY, 
WHO HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN BUYING THE COMPANIES.  SHE 
SAID THAT PRESIDENT MEJIA WANTS TO SELL ALL OF THE SHARES TO 
A NEW PRIVATE SECTOR ENTITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.  (NOTE: 
EARLIER, VICE PRESIDENT MILAGROS ORTIZ BOSCH HAD TOLD US THAT 
THE GODR WAS SEEKING ADVICE ON ORGANIZING A PUBLIC TENDER FOR 
THE SAME PURPOSE.) 
 
-------- 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
13. (SBU) PRESIDENT MEJIA HAS FAILED TO CONVINCE DOMINICANS 
THAT THE APPARENT RE-NATIONALIZATION OF ELEMENTS OF THE 
SECTOR, EVEN IF TEMPORARY, WILL GIVE THEM WHAT THEY WANT: A 
RELIABLE SUPPLY OF ELECTRICITY. THE ELECTRICITY ISSUES HAVE 
BECOME A LARGE OBSTACLE TO HIS AMBITION OF WINNING A SECOND 
TERM AND THEY THREATEN TO OVERSHADOW HIS ADMINISTRATION'S 
MANY ACCOMPLISHMENTS TO DATE. 
 
 
 
 
KUBISKE