This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002550 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2013 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL ADCO ADPM YM
SUBJECT: YEMEN-DPRK: SCUD REPAIRS, NO FUTURE MILITARY 
COOPERATION 
 
REF: A. SANAA 4024 
     ¶B. SANAA 3853 
     ¶C. SANAA 1990 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for Reasons 1.5 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Defense Minister Aliwa informed Ambassador on 
10/20 that an August visit of North Korea's Deputy Minister 
of Industry had yielded agreement for DPRK experts to install 
replacement parts needed to restore defective SCUDs to 
operational status.  In response to precise questioning by 
Ambassador, Aliwa stressed that the missiles would be 
repaired, not enhanced, and that the repairs would mark the 
end of Yemeni military cooperation with the DPRK.  He noted 
that the ROYG had cancelled plans for North Korean 
construction of a naval facility at Hodeida, and was seeking 
an alternative contractor: perhaps China or Japan.  Aliwa 
said he was briefing the Ambassador in accordance with 
Saleh's decision -- following the visits of U/S Bolton and 
NEA A/S Burns -- to end military cooperation with North 
Korea.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and OMC Chief, called 
on Defense Minister BG Abdullah Ali Aliwa on 10/20 at the 
latter's request.  Aliwa was joined by senior military staff 
and Dirham Saidi of the MFA's Americas Desk.  Aliwa explained 
that the virtually unprecedented attendance of an MFA 
representative at a MoD meeting reflected the ROYG's desire 
to maintain internal coordination of DPRK-related contacts 
with the U.S. Embassy. 
 
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SCUD Repairs 
------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Aliwa said he had requested the meeting at the behest 
of President Saleh to "keep the USG in the picture" on ROYG 
contacts with North Korea.  He noted that the briefing was 
consistent with Saleh's commitment -- following the 6/03 
visit of U/S Bolton, as reviewed in the early October visit 
of NEA A/S Burns -- to end contacts with North Korea 
(reftels). 
 
¶4. (C) The Minister briefly recounted Yemen's "problem": some 
of the SCUDs received in 12/02 were non-functional because 
certain components were old and defective.  At Yemen's 
request, a senior DPRK official -- the Deputy Minister of 
Industry -- had visited during August to discuss the matter. 
(Note: The visit was not/not publicized in Yemen.  End Note) 
Yemen's demand for a monetary refund was not accepted, but 
after 10 days of negotiation a "solution" was agreed.  North 
Korea is to send a team of experts with the spare parts 
necessary to restore the defective missiles to working order. 
 They will come "soon," and remain as long as necessary to 
complete the job. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
No Missile Upgrade; No Future Cooperation 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador questioned Aliwa closely for further 
details.  The Minister appeared unable to address technical 
aspects -- e.g. what parts are defective: propulsion? 
guidance? -- but gave repeated and emphatic assurance that 
the process would involve merely repair.  There will be no 
upgrade, no extension of range, and no enhancement of missile 
capabilities in any respect.  In response to further 
questioning, BG Aliwa stressed that there would be no further 
payment by Yemen, as the repairs were within the scope of the 
old agreement under which the missiles were delivered. 
Moreover, the presence of the North Korean technical team 
would not be prolonged or evolve into some new technical 
cooperation.  They would depart once the work was complete, 
and Yemeni technicians were prepared to assume comprehensive 
responsibility for the SCUDs in Yemen's arsenal. 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador reminded Aliwa that the USG had repeatedly 
made clear its view that Yemen should cease all contact with 
the DPRK, and that this was the outcome Washington wanted to 
see. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Hodeida Port: Seeking Alternative Contractors 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) In response to follow-on questioning by Ambassador, 
Aliwa affirmed that Yemen had dropped plans for DPRK 
construction of a military port facility in Hodeida.  He said 
the ROYG was seeking an alternative, perhaps China or Japan. 
 
¶7. (C) Embassy Sanaa coordinates with Japanese Embassy on 
DPRK-related issues, and on 10/21 DCM briefed Japanese DCM on 
Aliwa's message.  He said Japanese were unaware of the North 
Korean deputy minister's August visit to Yemen.  He confirmed 
that Saleh had asked the recently arrived Japanese Ambassador 
for Tokyo to support Hodeida port construction.  Japanese 
Ambassador declined, however, because of domestic legal 
constraints on aid projects with military applications. 
 
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Comment 
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¶8. (C) Aliwa's briefing seems to confirm the course the ROYG 
has steered on North Korea since U/S Bolton's 6/03 visit: 
visible action to curtail bilateral cooperation, but also a 
desire to get and keep the existing stock of SCUDs 
operational.  The fact that the ROYG briefed the Embassy 
(albeit two months after the DPRK official's visit) is 
positive. 
HULL