This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SANAA 002534 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2013 
TAGS: ASEC PTER COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: AUGUST 29, 2003, SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE 
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 249843 
     ¶B. SANAA 01945 
 
Classified By: DCM Alan G. Misenheimer for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
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POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
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¶1.  (S/NF)  Demonstrations 
 
¶A. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country 
that are capable of carrying out significant anti-American 
demonstrations? 
 
Yes, Muslim Yemeni pro-Palestinian/pro-Iraqi/anti-American 
demonstrators. 
 
¶B. Have there been anti-American demonstrations in the 
country within the last 12 months? 
 
On March 21, 2003, a march of 5-7,000 people protesting the 
war in Iraq was stopped by police approximately 1/4 mile from 
the U.S. Embassy; violent confrontations resulted in the 
death of several police and protesters. 
 
In Winter 2002 - 2003, Yemeni women held demonstrations in 
front of the German Embassy protesting the arrest of Sheikh 
Moayed in Frankfurt, Germany, on terrorism charges. 
 
In March, 2003, Yemenis held several anti-war demonstrations, 
most near the UN headquarters complex in Sanaa, Tahrir Square 
and Old Airport Road, all several miles from the Embassy. 
 
¶C. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of 
U.S. diplomatic facilities? 
 
The usual sites for anti-American gatherings are in areas of 
Sanaa away from the Embassy, however, the above-mentioned 
March 21, 2003 event took place nearby. 
 
¶D. What is the average size of an anti-American demonstration? 
 
Depending on the location, up to several hundred people.  In 
our experience, demonstrations in front of the Embassy are 
usually less than 100 people.  Peaceful demonstrations 
protesting the war in Iraq have ranged from approximately 
1,000 to 100,000, by some media accounts.  Local press 
routinely carry inflated estimates ranging from half a 
million to one million-plus. 
 
¶E. Are these anti-American demonstrations usually triggered 
by U.S. foreign policy initiatives, military actions, or by 
domestic issues? 
 
U.S. foreign policy initiatives and military/law enforcement 
counter-terrorism endeavors, in addition to ROYG cooperation 
with the USG. 
 
¶F. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? 
 
Generally peaceful.  Demonstrations must be coordinated and 
approved by ROYG in advance, consequently, the vast majority 
are peaceful.  If not approved in advance, ROYG forces will 
disband a demonstration. 
 
¶G. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to 
USG property or injuries to USG employees? 
 
No, however, Yemeni police and protester fatalities in March 
2003 were due in large part to the intervention of host 
government security protecting the U.S. Embassy. 
 
¶H. If violent, have any demonstrations ever penetrated our 
perimeter security line? 
 
No. 
 
¶I. Have there been anti-government demonstrations in the 
country within the last 12 months? 
 
Yes, directed at specific policies, including child labor, 
education and bringing mosques under government control. 
Several anti-government demonstrations occurred in Sanaa and 
Aden. 
 
¶J. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of 
U.S. diplomatic facilities? 
 
No. 
 
¶K. What is the average size of an anti-government 
demonstration? 
Fairly small, approximately 50 to 200 individuals, similar to 
anti-U.S. protests. 
 
¶L. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? 
 
Generally peaceful. 
 
¶M. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to 
USG property? 
 
No. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF)  Macro Conflict Conditions 
¶A. Is the host country currently engaged in an interstate or 
intrastate conflict? 
 
Host country is cooperating with U.S. efforts to identify and 
stop/attack terrorist targets within Yemen.  In this regard, 
the ROYG in recent months has demonstrated willingness to 
engage in fairly large-scale hostile operations against an 
identified terrorist force -- e.g. in Abyan in July 2003. 
 
¶B. If an intrastate conflict, is it an insurgency that is 
limited to a specific region or a country-wide civil war? 
 
Host government counter-terrorism operations tend to occur in 
areas where terrorists strike first.  ROYG's actions are 
usually reactive, following attacks perpetrated by the 
terrorists.  However, when ROYG believes taking the 
initiative is in its interests, it has struck first. 
 
¶C. If limited to a specific region, are any U.S. diplomatic 
facilities located in this region? 
 
Yes.  In Sanaa: the U.S. Embassy; Yemen America Language 
Institute (YALI), which is part of the Embassy; and the Sanaa 
International School (SIS), which employs American teachers. 
 
¶D. Have any of the factions involved in these intrastate 
conflicts signaled or demonstrated an anti-American 
orientation? 
 
Yes, al-Qaeda members and tribesmen sympathetic to al-Qaeda's 
ideology or beholden to an al-Qaeda element for past support. 
 
 
¶3.  (S/NF)  Host Country Capabilities 
 
¶A. Are law enforcement agencies professional and well-trained? 
 
They are often corrupt, poorly trained and underpaid.  For 
example, an average officer earns 60 USD per month.  A 
captain with 20 years experience earns only 120 per month.  A 
Brigadier General earns 300 USD per month.  This economic 
condition -- reflecting Yemen's widespread poverty (average 
per capita income is less than USD 400 countrywide) -- 
fosters widespread corruption that possibly could be 
diminished with increased remuneration.  Further, law 
enforcement agencies face numerous challenges regarding 
planning, coordination and execution of complex 
counter-terrorism operations.  Reliance on manpower is 
emphasized over the use of technology.  Agencies have 
difficulty maintaining operations security and have 
difficulty operating in a nighttime environment.  As 
evidenced by observation at the August 9, 2002, blast site, 
Yemeni law enforcement's ability to conduct a complex 
criminal investigation resulting in a successful resolution 
is limited, despite relevant training and equipment provided 
in the past by European donors. 
 
In July - August 2003, 24 host government police 
investigators from across the country participated in a 
two-week DS/ATA Terrorist Crime Scene investigation course 
taught by Evidence Response Team FBI special agents. 
 
 
¶B. Have they been trained by U.S. agencies? 
 
Some officers have received DS/ATA training, however, the 
full impact of this training will be manifest only over the 
long term.  The Regional Security Office does maintain 
high-level contacts within the Ministry of Interior who 
received ATA training. 
 
The Central Security Forces (CSF) is the counter-terrorism 
(CT) arm of the Central Security Organization (CSO).  The CSF 
has been trained by U.K./U.S. personnel for the past year and 
will continue into the next fiscal year.  This unit is being 
equipped and trained.  They are ROYG's primary CT force. 
 
¶C. Are law enforcement agencies confronted with serious, 
widespread corruption inside their agencies? 
 
Yes, see question 3A. 
¶D. Are the intelligence services professional and capable of 
deterring terrorist actions? 
 
The intelligence services are moderately professional but in 
no way can deter a determined terrorist group. 
¶E. Have the intelligence services been cooperative with U.S. 
Embassy requests or information and support? 
Yes, but often begrudgingly.  Intelligence services rarely 
volunteer information.  Yet on some occasions the ROYG takes 
the initiative to inform the USG of CT developments -- e.g. 
in the case of ROYG success in September 2003 in disrupting a 
Sanaa-based al-Qaeda cell. 
 
¶F. Assuming there have been significant terrorist threats in 
recent years, have host country security services been able 
to score any major anti-terrorism successes? 
 
Yes. 
 
¶G. Has host country been responsive (re: timeliness and 
allocation of resources) to Embassy requests for protective 
security? 
 
Yes. 
 
¶H. How does the Embassy assess the overall security at major 
airports in the country? 
 
Poor, but the ROYG is quite receptive to additional 
U.S.-funded equipment and security training.  This view is 
corroborated by a recent visit to Sanaa by a two-person 
Transportation Security Administration assessment team. 
 
¶I. How effective are customs and immigration controls 
agencies? 
 
Ineffective but improving.  Since February 2002, Somali and 
Ethiopian refugees have been entering Yemen at a reported 
rate of approximately 1,500 per month, adding to the 60,000 
refugees previously registered.  They are settling on the 
southern and western coasts, forming criminal and 
prostitution rings along clan lines.  Criminal related 
violence is on the rise.  With USG assistance, the customs 
and immigration services are attempting to standardize and 
modernize equipment and coverage. 
 
¶J. How effective are border patrol forces? 
 
In the recent past ineffective; however, a current surge of 
more than 7,000 troops from MOI/MOD resources and increased 
cooperation by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (to include 
collaboration on intelligence and smuggling information) has 
generally improved the effectiveness of border patrol forces. 
 
 
-------------------- 
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (S/NF)  Anti-American Terrorist Groups 
 
¶A. Are there indigenous, anti-American terrorist groups in 
country? 
 
Yes. 
 
¶B. If yes, how many? 
 
Four are known: Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA); Yemen Islamic 
Jihad; al-Qaeda Sympathizers; Yemen Hizballah. 
 
¶C. Have these groups carried out an anti-American attacks 
within the last 12 months? 
 
No, however potential attacks may have been foiled due to 
pre-emptive U.S. strikes and joint U.S.-Yemeni operations. 
 
¶D. Were any of these lethal attacks? 
 
N/A. 
 
¶E. Have these groups attacked U.S. diplomatic facilities? 
N/A. 
¶F. Have these groups attacked U.S. business, U.S. military, 
or related targets? 
 
N/A. 
 
¶G. Have these groups limited their attacks to specific 
regions or do they operate country-wide? 
 
N/A, but these groups do possess the capability to operate 
country-wide. 
 
¶H. If their attacks are limited to regions, are there any 
U.S. diplomatic facilities located in these regions? 
 
See 4G. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF)  Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups 
 
¶A. Are there other indigenous terrorist groups (not 
anti-American) in country? 
 
Yes. 
 
¶B. If yes, how many? 
 
Two: National Liberation Front (MAWJ) and the Right to 
Self-Determination Movement (HATM). 
 
¶C. Have these groups carried out attacks in the capital or in 
areas where U.S. diplomatic facilities are located? 
 
No known incidents of this type. 
 
¶D. Were these attacks lethal and/or indiscriminate? 
 
None known. 
 
¶E. Have any Americans ever been killed or injured in these 
attacks? 
 
No. 
 
 
----------------------- 
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (S/NF)  Transnational Terrorist Indicators 
 
¶A. Are there any foreign terrorist groups that have a 
presence in country? 
 
Yes.  Al-Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), al-Gama'a 
al-Islamiyya (AKA: The Islamic Group), Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group (LIFG), Algerian Islamic Group GIA), Salafi 
Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), Hamas, Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad, PFLP, Hizballah.  The Iraqi Intelligence 
Service formerly maintained a presence in Yemen, but is no 
longer visible in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
 
¶B. How does the EAC assess this presence? Is it an 
operational cell?  Financial cell?  Support cell?  Propaganda 
cell? 
 
Al-Qaeda: all of the above.  Many, but not all, of these 
other groups maintain close links or cooperate directly with 
al-Qaeda, thus bolstering their operational capabilities. 
 
¶C. Is the host government sympathetic to these groups? 
 
ROYG officially supports Palestinian groups, including Hamas 
and Hizballah, but support is mainly rhetorical and does not 
extend to operational activities inside Yemen. 
 
¶D. Are there suspect non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
the country that have a relationship with any of these groups? 
 
Per reftel B: 
 
Organization, Nationality. 
-- Al-Haramain al-Sharifain Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Al-Ihsan Association, Saudi Arabia 
-- World Assembly for Muslim Youth, Saudi Arabia 
-- Dar al-Arqam Stationary for Printing and Publication, 
Saudi Arabia 
-- Islamic Relief Organization, Saudi Arabia 
-- Dubai Charitable Association, Saudi Arabia 
-- Abu-Baker Salem Al-Sa'ari Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Supreme Authority for Muslims of Bosnia, Saudi Arabia 
-- Tibah Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Saeed Qahtan Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- International Islamic Relief Organization, Saudi Arabia 
-- League of the Islamic World, Saudi Arabia 
-- Charitable Association in Fujaira, Saudi Arabia 
-- Al-Bir Islamic Committee, Saudi Arabia 
-- Zahra Al-Khalidiah Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Salem Omar Ba'ashem and Omar Badahda, Saudi Arabia 
-- Mecca Association, Saudi Arabia 
-- Al-Emir al-Khairiyah Committee (Al Haramain), Saudi Arabia 
-- Islamic Union (Quebec), Saudi Arabia 
-- Hamoud al-Hayyawi Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Al-Noor Charitable Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Bin Saynoon Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Bin Mahdi Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Bayelghoum Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Al-Fittrah Foundation, UAE 
-- Al-Islah And Tawhid Social Association, UAE 
-- Kuwait Joint Committee for Relief of the Global Islamic 
Charitable Organization, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
-- United Arab Emirates Association, UAE 
-- Bayt al-Shariqa al-Khairi (Sharja Charitable House), UAE 
-- Omar Bin Yousuf, UAE 
-- Qatar Charitable Association, Qatari 
-- Islamic Relief, UK 
-- Dubai Charitable Association, UAE 
-- Al-Fikrah Center, UAE 
-- Al-Islah Association, Kuwait 
 
¶E. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country 
that are sympathetic to these groups? 
 
Many Yemenis in rural/tribal areas are deemed sympathetic to 
the ideology of al-Qaeda.  Public sympathy for 
pro-Palestinian/anti-Israeli groups is widespread. 
 
¶F. How does the EAC assess the level, intent, and scope of 
hostile intelligence services (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Serbia, 
Sudan, et. al.) in country relative to potential 
anti-American terrorist acts? 
 
Foreign hostile intelligence services, e.g. Syria, are 
primarily focused on information gathering for their own 
countries' interests, not to assist anti-American groups in 
country with terrorist activity.  However, the notion that a 
country such as Iran maintains connections with terrorist 
groups in Yemen is highly likely. 
 
¶G. How does the EAC assess the availability of weapons and 
explosives in country or from nearby countries for hostile 
terrorist elements? 
 
Yemen likely has among the highest number of weapons per 
capita in the world, with easy access to varieties of 
explosives.  Weapons and explosives are easily attainable and 
quite inexpensive.  Tribal-owned gun markets are large, and 
in some cases may be better stocked than host country 
military and law enforcement arsenals. 
 
Though Yemen is awash in numerous types of weapons, the 
Yemeni cabinet approved a series of amendments to a 1992 gun 
control law intended to bolster regulation of weapons 
possession and trafficking.  These amendments must gain 
approval by the Yemeni Parliament before becoming law. 
Parliamentary opposition to the amendments remains 
significant; more than 150 MPs have reportedly signed a 
petition to quash the gun control law that is still under 
discussion.  Accordingly, Speaker of the Parliament Sheikh 
Abdullah al-Ahmar has publicly equated possession of weapons 
as a Yemeni symbol of manhood. 
 
In a separate effort, the ROYG has initiated a weapons 
buy-back program, at a reported cost of 38 million USD, 
intended to acquire Man Portable Air Defense Systems 
(MANPADS), rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and a variety of 
other heavy weapons from civilian weapons markets.  Citing 
the acquisition of over 1,400 MANPADS from January to June 
2003, ROYG says the program is a success.  There are 
problems, however, such as: 1) cataloguing weapons; 2) ROYG 
paying over market value; and 3) the sustainability of the 
weapons buy-back program. 
HULL