This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002463 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2013 
TAGS: PREL PTER AMGT EAID PARM MCAP KPAL SA IZ YM ICC DPRK COUNTER TERRORISM ECON COM
SUBJECT: NEA A/S BURNS OCTOBER 4 MEETING WITH SALEH: CT 
COOPERATION; ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE; YEMENI-SAUDI CT EFFORTS; 
ARTICLE 98; DIPLOMATIC POUCH 
 
REF: A. SANAA 2440 
     ¶B. SANAA 2410 
     ¶C. SANAA 1990 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for reasons 1.5 (b and d) 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In a 10/4 meeting with President Saleh, 
NEA A/S Burns welcomed U.S.-Yemeni CT cooperation and 
supported U.S. assistance for Yemen's security and 
development.  Saleh briefed on expanding Saudi-Yemeni CT 
cooperation, which he characterized as better than ever 
before, despite (according to him) occasional Saudi 
foot-dragging and a continuing flow of terrorist financing 
flowing coming from the KSA.  Burns stressed the need for an 
Article 98 agreement.  Saleh asked for a Powell-Qirbi letter 
on the subject to help the ROYG reach a positive response. 
In a discussion of long-running problems with the diplomatic 
pouch and diplomatic support flights for Embassy Sanaa, Saleh 
expressed lingering concerns over the volume and 
non-transparency of shipments.  A/S Burns underscored the 
need for cooperation to ensure that the 10/5 support flight 
would succeed and set a positive model for the future.  In a 
private exchange at the meeting's end, Burns reiterated the 
U.S. call for Yemen to sever cooperation with North Korea. 
Saleh agreed in principle, but  cited ongoing talks on the 
"defective" SCUDs Yemen received from the DPRK last winter. 
Saleh and Burns also exchanged views on Iraq and Palestine. 
Septel reports A/S Burns' earlier meeting with FM Qirbi.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) NEA A/S Burns, accompanied by Ambassador, DCM and 
Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker) called on President Saleh 10/4/03 
during Burns' 1 1/2-day stay in Yemen.  Saleh received the 
U.S. delegation in a recently restored old Turkish military 
garrison known locally as "the new Pentagon."  MFA staffers 
confirmed afterward that Saleh intends to use the site as an 
alternate venue for high-level meetings, and that the meeting 
with A/S Burns marked the first time he had done so. 
 
SALEH: IMPROVEMENT IN COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION WARRANTS 
INCREASED ECONOMIC AID 
 
¶3. (C) Noting that the August visit to Washington DC by 
Presidential Advisor Abdelkarim al-Iryani was fruitful, Saleh 
quickly shifted to the progress that Yemen has made in 
combating terrorism.  Pointing to the ROYG's recent success 
in disrupting an al-Qaida cell in Sanaa (ref a), Saleh 
expressed dissatisfaction with the U.S. media and urged the 
USG to be cautious about sharing information with the media 
while Yemen is still trying to track down all parts of the 
cell.  He maintained that the leaking of information has had 
a negative impact on the flow of European tourism and 
investment to Yemen. 
 
¶4. (C) Saleh criticized the USG for not providing economic 
assistance commensurate with Yemen's contribution to 
counter-terrorism efforts.  A/S Burns pointed out that Saleh 
had voiced a similar concern about CT assistance a year or 
two earlier, but that the CT relationship was now well 
established.  He said a similar positive trend was underway 
with respect to economic assistance, and would grow and 
become increasingly visible over time as Yemen made progress 
on its own economic reforms.  Saleh re-emphasized the need 
for economic assistance, commenting that the U.S. is a 
superpower and should overlook small mistakes and concentrate 
on the fact that it needs allies in the region.  He recalled 
that he was the first Arab leader to visit Washington after 
9/11, and suggested that the U.S. convince Saudi Arabia to 
exempt Yemen from its debts as a further economic assistance 
measure. 
 
¶5. (C) A/S Burns noted that he had headed the U.S. del at the 
10/02 World Bank-sponsored Coordinating Group meeting in 
Paris.  Saleh interjected that Burns' "excellent" speech had 
been the best at the event and positively influenced the 
meeting outcome.  Underscoring U.S. commitment to expanding 
economic assistance to Yemen, Burns noted that Yemen has to 
date been the number one beneficiary of program funding under 
the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI).  He continued 
that Yemen may also qualify to benefit from the Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA) if it moves forward on essential 
reforms, e.g. in civil service, the judiciary and corruption. 
 Burns urged Saleh to move ahead decisively in these areas. 
Saleh asserted that the World Bank, the IMF and the USG need 
to understand Yemen's problems, including the population 
explosion, absence of tourism, limited oil revenues and 
limited export markets for Yemeni goods. 
 
¶6. (C) A/S Burns referred to U.S. support for the nascent 
Yemeni Coast Guard, including the delivery of EDA patrol 
craft set for January 2004.  Saleh half-jokingly suggested 
that the U.S. provide Yemen 15-20 new vessels from the UAE 
shipyards, as this would be faster and cheaper than the old, 
refurbished craft the USG was sending.  Saleh complained that 
Yemeni CT cooperation with the United States had caused the 
international community to criticize the ROYG's human rights 
record.  A/S Burns responded that Yemen has moved ahead in 
some areas, such as women's rights and increased voter 
registration, and had a self-interest in showing the same 
determination in other areas of civil society and political 
freedoms.  This was not a favor to the U.S., but a step 
forward for Yemenis. 
 
NEW AL-QAIDA LEADERSHIP; SAUDI ARABIA IS A "DEN" FOR HIDING 
TERRORISTS 
 
¶7. (S/NF) A/S Burns asked Saleh's assessment of recently 
expanded security cooperation with Saudi Arabia.  Saleh said 
it was good, and that recent exchanges of information and of 
prisoners was very positive.  Nevertheless, the KSA remains a 
"den" in which terrorists find safe hideouts, and cutting off 
Saudi-origin funding for terrorism must be a priority.  Saleh 
revealed that he had envisioned a three-way meeting with 
Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Mohamed bin Naif to correspond 
with the recently postponed visit to Yemen by FBI Director 
Mueller.  He said he still hoped to arrange such a session 
when Mueller's visit is rescheduled.  Saleh noted that the 
ROYG killed seven Saudis in recent clashes in al-Jawf, Marib 
and Houdeidah and that he has passed their names to Mohamed 
bin Naif.  Saleh passed Ambassador Hull the name Ali al Hajj, 
who he said had replaced al-Nasheri as new head of al-Qaida 
operations in the Arabian peninsula). 
 
¶8. (C) Saleh commented the May bombings had an "excellent" 
effect on the SAG, as the Saudis are now focused on CT as 
they never were previously.  Asked by AMB Hull to specify 
Yemen's coordinator for the expanding cooperation with the 
Saudis, Saleh named two: Interior Minister Alimi handles the 
relationship on a political level, while PSO chief Gamish 
handles details -- e.g. exchange of telephone numbers, names 
and other information on terrorist suspects.  In response, 
Ambassador noted that Alimi was upbeat on cooperation with 
the Saudis, while Gamish told us privately that it was 
unproductive.  Saleh responded that Gamish was "sensitive" 
because the Saudis were often slow to respond to specific 
requests for information -- e.g. the KSA's slow response to 
Yemen's long-standing request for extraditions. 
Nevertheless, said Saleh, overall Saudi-Yemeni CT cooperation 
is better than at any time in the past. 
 
ARTICLE 98: REQUEST FOR POWELL-QIRBI LETTER 
 
¶9. (C) A/S Burns emphasized the importance of reaching a 
U.S.-Yemeni agreement on Article 98 promptly, since Yemeni 
ratification of the ICC treaty without such an agreement in 
place could trigger curtailment of U.S. assistance.  Saleh 
initially said that Yemen was "opposed," but quickly backed 
off as A/S Burns elaborated on the issue.  Saleh asked that 
an official letter be sent from Secretary Powell to FM Qirbi 
spelling out the issue (once again) and the steps Yemen 
needed to take.  A/S Burns agreed that the USG would provide 
such a letter.  Saleh concluded that the ROYG would consider 
the matter carefully and hopefully offer a positive response. 
 
DIPLOMATIC POUCH/DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FLIGHTS 
 
¶10. (C) Apparently briefed by Qirbi that A/S Burns intended 
to raise U.S. concerns over continuing Yemeni restrictions on 
the pouch and diplomatic support flights for Embassy Sanaa, 
Saleh pre-emptively raised the issue himself.  He complained 
that U.S. insistence on importing large volumes of material 
and refusing to have it inspected was a violation of the 
Vienna Convention and a source of embarrassment for the ROYG. 
 He fretted that Parliament and the opposition parties were 
aware of the issue and pressed the government not to sell out 
Yemeni sovereignty by acceding to these excessive U.S. 
demands. 
 
¶11. (C) Saleh then offered a "solution."  He said the ROYG 
would permit Embassy Sanaa to bring in anything it wished, as 
long as it is inspected first.  He expanded on this theme, 
inviting the Embassy to import even secret/sensitive items -- 
e.g. "eavesdropping devices," "espionage equipment," weapons, 
explosives, bombs, rockets, cameras, computers, etc. -- but 
to cooperate with Yemeni authorities in doing so.  Inspection 
of such "secret" items could be performed in a "locked room" 
with only a single Yemeni security official present, after 
which the items could be taken immediately to the Embassy 
compound.  Inspection was unavoidable, however, and must 
occur in the airport -- i.e. on Yemeni soil -- rather than at 
the Embassy, which was American soil and therefore outside 
the scope of Yemeni sovereignty and control. 
 
¶12. (C) A/S Burns replied that the diplomatic support flight 
scheduled for the following day (10/5) would meet the 
President's concerns as it contained only five dip pouches -- 
which, by common assent, were non-inspectable -- and items of 
diplomatic cargo which were all inspectable.  He asked that 
Yemeni authorities cooperate fully to make the 10/5 flight a 
shared success which could set the stage for future progress 
on this important bilateral issue.  (Note: The 10/5 
diplomatic support flight was off-loaded in record time with 
full Yemeni cooperation.  End note.) 
 
IRAQ 
 
¶13. (C) At Saleh's request, A/S Burns provided an overview of 
current conditions and U.S. aims in Iraq.  Reviewing themes 
covered in his recent meeting with GEN Abizaid (ref b), Saleh 
offered a range of "friendly" opinions and advice on Iraq: 
the Iraqi army should not have been disbanded; police and 
administrative responsibilities must be placed in Iraqi 
hands; that former soldiers and former Baathists must be 
given an economic stake; restoring security is a top 
priority, ahead of creating a model democracy; many 
opposition figures who arrived with coalition troops are not 
credible.  A/S Burns expressed appreciation for FM Qirbi's 
helpful role in getting the Iraqi delegation seated in the 
Arab League and asked that Yemen maintain such a supportive 
posture. 
 
ISRAEL-PALESTINE AND THE ROADMAP 
 
¶14. (C) Saleh strongly urged the USG to press the parties for 
implementation of the roadmap, which he said would give the 
U.S. credibility with the Arab countries.  He commented that 
by overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but refusing to work with 
Arafat, the U.S. was using a double standard.  A/S Burns 
outlined the U.S. approach, stressing commitment to the 
roadmap and a two-state solution.  President Saleh said Yemen 
is against Hamas, adding that Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Syria, Lebanon and Jordan are all ready to press the 
Palestinians to stop the violence, but the U.S. must 
guarantee that Israel will stop the settlements.  The A/S 
agreed that the Palestinians must have a sense of hope if the 
extremists are to be marginalized, but emphasized again that 
Palestinian performance on security is critically important. 
Saleh agreed and said that Yemen is ready to help and 
cooperate.  He equated a Palestinian state with Israeli 
security.  (Note: The meeting occurred prior to the 10/4/03 
Haifa suicide bombing.) 
 
ROYG-DPRK COOPERATION; SCUDS 
 
¶15. (S/NF) In a brief private exchange with Saleh at the end 
of the meeting, A/S Burns underscored the importance of 
cutting off Yemeni cooperation with North Korea.  Saleh said 
Yemen had taken the decision to do so, including the 
Houdeidah naval base, but discussions were underway regarding 
the "defective" SCUDs imported last winter (ref c).  This 
could lead to either a North Korean refund payment to Yemen 
or possibly a DPRK technical team to visit Yemen and effect 
repairs.  A/S Burns cautioned again that Yemen should limit 
all interaction with North Korea. 
 
¶16. (U) This cable was cleared by NEA A/S Burns. 
HULL