This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T  ROME 004933 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR EUR, EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, PM, SA, NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2013 
TAGS: MOPS MASS PREL AF IZ IT IRAQI FREEDOM AFGHANISTAN
SUBJECT:  REQUEST FOR ITALIAN TROOP EXTENSIONS AND 
CONTRIBUTIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: A. STATE 303817 
 
¶B. ROME 4678 
 
Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon for reasons 1.5(B),(D) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary.  As instructed, the Ambassador met with MOD 
Martino to request new Italian troop commitments in three 
areas:  renewal of Italy,s deployment to Iraq beyond 2003; a 
new deployment of 1,000 Italian troops to Afghanistan in 
March 2004; and the standing up of an Italian PRT in Ghazni. 
Martino expects extension of Italian military forces in Iraq 
to garner relatively easy political approval, especially in 
light of the recent UNSC resolution.  He said return of 
Italian forces to Afghanistan is somewhat more difficult, 
given their recent deployment there and the fact that Italy 
is effectively maxed out on the number of troops it can 
sustain on overseas missions.  That said, Martino undertook 
to task his CHOD with reviewing possibilities, adding that an 
April start might be more realistic than March.  Martino was 
less enthusiastic about PRTs, expressing concern that 
security needs in the Ghazni area might require a more robust 
number, but agreed to study our request.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (S) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and Pol-Mil 
Counselor, met with Defense Minister Antonio Martino on 
October 29 to raise Ref A points requesting Italian troop 
extension in Iraq, return of an Italian OIF contingent to 
Khowst, and the creation of an Italian PRT in Ghazni. 
Martino was joined by Diplomatic Advisor Francesco Trupiano. 
The Ambassador opened with praise for Italy,s work alongside 
the UK in Iraq.  Noting that the British Embassy in Rome had 
advised us that -- in today,s meeting in London -- PM Blair 
would ask PM Berlusconi to extend Italy,s troop commitment 
beyond 2003, the Ambassador said the US strongly urges such 
an extension. 
 
¶3. (S) Martino was receptive.  He said that this request 
would require a political decision.  However, with the recent 
UN Security Council resolution, he expected few problems 
garnering parliamentary approval of such an extension.  (NB: 
Martino was not specific about the length of time Italy might 
remain in Iraq, but took on board our request that Italy 
extend its deployment in Iraq "well into 2004".) 
 
¶4. (S) The Ambassador also urged Italy to deploy OEF troops 
in March 2004 to the Khowst area, where an Italian battalion 
had served so ably until its departure in September 2003. 
Martino agreed that his forces had performed well, adding 
that this had been a particularly dangerous mission because 
of its location.  He said that this request involved 
logistical and planning issues, so he would ask the CHOD to 
review Italy,s capacity to respond favorably.  An April 
start might prove more feasible than March. 
 
¶5. (S) Martino was less enthusiastic about the PRT request, 
saying he feared that a considerable commitment of personnel 
might be required; his staff had advised that 300 troops 
would be required to provide the necessary security.  The 
Ambassador reinforced a message we had already passed to MOD 
and MFA officials:  it was our experience that only a 
combined civ-mil force of 60-90 was necessary and, while the 
Germans had reportedly poured hundreds into their PRT, we 
believed a smaller footprint was sufficient.  Martino added 
with amusement that he also understood the Germans had 
cherry-picked, selecting an area of Afghanistan that posed 
relatively few security challenges.  Ghazni, however, was 
different.  Italy might even find it necessary to field a far 
more robust number, if it were to stand up a PRT, in order to 
meet security needs.  It is, he added, unclear whether Italy 
has those resources.  We noted that the UK has offered to 
share with Italy its lessons learned on PRTs, and that this 
would also address the numbers of personnel required. 
Martino agreed to study the matter. 
 
¶6. (S) Comment.  Martino is the key official for garnering 
new Italian military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.  He 
correctly notes that the recent UNSC resolution is likely to 
pave the way for relatively broad parliamentary support of 
extension in Iraq. (One center-left leader has already 
signaled his receptivity to an extension.)  Afghanistan is a 
harder case.  Martino was always concerned about the dangers 
 
 
Italian troops faced there -- Italy,s first major combat 
deployment since WWII -- and expressed relief when the troops 
returned home without serious casualties.  His decision to 
engage the CHOD will give Martino cover, and time, to 
reflect, but we have no doubt that, whatever the CHOD,s 
advice, the decision will be Martino,s.  We view Martino,s 
focus on a possible April start (vice March) as a positive 
signal that he is favorably disposed to a renewed deployment 
at some point in 2004.  Martino,s concerns about security in 
Afghanistan likewise color his views of PRTs.  We will follow 
up with MOD and other officials to push all three requests. 
As of day one, however, we are off to a good start. 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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2003ROME04933 - Classification: SECRET