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UNCLAS  ROME 004672 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
AIDAC 
 
FROM FODAG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF UG TZ WFP UNHCR UN
SUBJECT:  WFP'S COLLABORATION WITH UNHCR IN PROVIDING FOOD 
ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES IN TANZANIA  JOINT MISSION 
ASSESSMENT 
 
REF: (A) ROME 04340 
 
(B) DAR ES SALAAM 01536 
(C) SECSTATE 183319 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. John Brooks, Project Budget Specialist, U.S. Mission to 
the UN Agencies for Food and Agriculture (FODAG), and Mary 
Margaret Knudson, Refugee Officer, U.S. State Department's 
Office of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), 
conducted a joint assessment of the collaboration between 
the World Food Program (WFP) and the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) regarding the delivery of food aid to 
to 
refugees in western Tanzania, August 28  September 2, 
¶2003.  Tanzania hosts the world's largest refugee 
population, nearly 500,000.  Reduced food rations, under- 
resourced income-generating activities, refugee movement 
and land restrictions by the Government of Tanzania (GOT) 
have worked together to create a challenging situation for 
refugees.  Furthermore, questionable refugee population 
figures could leave some WFP food aid donors with a 
stomachache.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
TANZANIA'S REFUGEE POPULATION 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. More refugees reside in Tanzania than in any other 
country in Africa.  According to figures from WFP and 
UNHCR, Tanzania hosts nearly 500,000 refugees in camps with 
an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 additional refugees 
integrated locally.  This represents a slight decrease in 
the overall refugee population receiving international 
assistance in organized camps.  As recently as August 2003, 
UNHCR reported that Tanzania was hosting over 1,000,000 
refugees, with approximately 513,000 in camps. 
 
¶3. The majority of refugees in Western Tanzania are from 
Burundi (340,850), while the remaining refugees are from 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (149,788), Somalia 
(3250), Rwanda and other countries. 
 
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GOT MEASURES TO ACCOMMODATE REFUGEES 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. Unlike in Uganda (Ref A), the GOT and many of the 
communities that surround the country's refugee camps have 
grown less welcoming and tolerant of the refugees within 
their borders in recent years.  Mission met with a number 
of district-level GOT representatives who made clear that 
refugees were to be seen as temporary asylum seekers and 
not as candidates for integration into Tanzanian 
communities.  Some GOT officials blamed refugees for an 
increase in crime in the refugee-affected areas. 
 
¶5. In response to the rise in crime, the GOT suspended its 
four-kilometer rule, which had allowed refugees to engage 
in cultivation and other activities within a four-kilometer 
radius of their camps.  This rule was first suspended in 
Kasulu district in early March 2003.  The level of 
enforcement of this suspension varies from district to 
district.  For example, it has been more strictly enforced 
in the Kigoma and Kibondo areas.  As a result, refugees 
have become increasingly dependent on the food assistance 
they receive from WFP because they cannot travel outside 
the camp to participate in income-generating activities or 
work on neighboring farms. 
 
¶6. The GOT is also much less generous than the Government 
of Uganda (GOU)(Ref A) with the amount of agricultural land 
it allots to refugees.  According to WFP, in 1998, the land 
that the GOT had earlier allocated for refugees' 
agricultural activities outside the camps was reduced by 45 
percent.  Therefore, most of the camps remained only with 
the four-kilometer outside perimeter -- most of which land 
was already in use by local Tanzanian villages -- and 
kitchen gardens.  These kitchen gardens vary in size from 
7.5 meters by 15 meters to 40 meters by 50 meters.  In some 
 
camps, there are plots of land for common agricultural 
activities.  This makes it more difficult for them to grow 
their own food with which to supplement WFP rations. 
 
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REFUGEE FOOD RATIONS 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. Before the 2000 Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), refugee 
food rations were at 1991 kcal per person, per day. 
Following the 2000 JAM, rations were reduced to 1857 kcal. 
This level was determined because the evaluators felt that 
the refugees could supplement their ration with farming and 
other coping mechanisms.  In addition, the donors felt 
strongly for the reduction as a component of an envisioned 
self-reliance strategy for the refugees.  This 
recommendation went into effect in August 2001. 
 
¶8.  In February 2003, WFP was forced to cut refugee food 
rations in Tanzania due to a break in the pipeline. 
Between February and April 2003, maize was being 
distributed at 50 percent of the full ration ("full ration" 
in Tanzania is 1857 kcal per person, per day).  It then 
went up to 72 percent until July 2003, when it was 
increased to 100 percent.  As recently as June 2003, pulses 
and corn-soy blend (CSB) were being distributed at 75 
percent of the full ration, while vegetable oil was being 
distributed at 50 percent (Ref B). 
 
¶9.  WFP's appeal for assistance from the international 
donor community led to contributions of both cash and in- 
kind commodities.  The USG contributed 44,860 MT of food 
valued at approximately USD 23.2 million and USD 4.4 
million in cash, the European Community Humanitarian Office 
(ECHO) contributed 10 million Euro, while Europe Aid 
contributed an additional 10 million Euro. 
 
¶10.  These contributions facilitated WFP's recent move to 
raise the vegetable oil ration to 100 percent as of 
September 2003.  WFP intends to increase the CSB and pulses 
rations to 100 percent as of the beginning of October 2003. 
 
¶11. WFP reports that its current pipeline insures full- 
ration distributions through July 2004.  If new commitments 
are not received by February 2004, however, WFP foresees 
future pipeline breaks. 
 
¶12.  Refugees anecdotally reported that decreases in 
rations contribute to increased cases of refugee girls 
trading sex for grain milling costs, school fees or food. 
Refugees generally said that the only food they eat comes 
from WFP.  They reported not having additional sources of 
income with which to supplement their rations.  Refugees 
also indicated that they exchanged WFP commodities for non- 
food items, including pots and cooking utensils. 
 
---------------------------- 
INCOME-GENERATING ACTIVITIES 
---------------------------- 
 
¶13.  Refugees are engaged in a number of income-generating 
activities sponsored by UNHCR and designed to decrease 
their dependence on food assistance.  These activities 
include basket weaving, soap production and raising 
poultry. 
 
¶14.  These activities appear to be having limited success. 
Due to the movement restrictions imposed by the GOT and the 
lack of a market outside of the immediate area of the 
camps, many of these activities have little chance of 
achieving profitability or expansion.  For example, the 
only revenue generated by a basket-weaving initiative came 
from the charitable contributions of government, UN and 
donor-government officials who were visiting the camps. 
Indeed, during our visit we were encouraged to buy 
something in support of the initiative.  A number of these 
projects do not make enough money to cover their production 
costs. 
 
¶15.  The inevitable weakness of these projects and other 
coping mechanisms is further reinforced by the fact that 
GOT does not support them because they fear that they could 
 
lead to local integration, something that the GOT wishes to 
discourage.  For example, suspension of the four-kilometer 
rule prevents refugees from working on the land of local 
Tanzanian farmers. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
WFP/UNHCR JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION (JAM) 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  Each year WFP and UNHCR conduct joint food assessments 
of refugee camps in Tanzania.  This year's assessment 
covered a wider range of issues, not just food security, 
and was done June 16-26, 2003. 
 
¶17.  Among its findings was recognition that the refugee 
ration level should be increased beyond 1857 kcal per 
person, per day; the GOT should be encouraged to be more 
lenient towards the movement of refugees and their 
interactions with the surrounding communities; and UNHCR 
should assist refugees in gaining access to wider markets 
for their handicrafts. 
 
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REFUGEE REGISTRATION 
--------------------- 
 
¶18.  It is UNHCR's responsibility to register refugees. 
Refugee registration was last conducted in Tanzania in late 
2001, nearly 2 years ago. 
 
¶19.  Some UN field staff believe that the refugee count in 
camps in Tanzania is inflated.  In one instance in 
particular an interlocutor estimated that the inflation 
could be as high as 20-30 percent, although this estimate 
has been called into question and he was not able to offer 
any concrete evidence. 
 
¶20.  UNHCR/Tanzania will serve as the pilot for a new 
initiative for registering refugees.  This system, known as 
biometrics, involves retinal scanning and/or fingerprint 
analysis to identify and register refugees.  UNHCR should 
begin the pilot program within the year. 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
BUFFER STOCKS: A QUESTION OF TERMINOLOGY? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶21.  In response to concerns that it was more concerned 
with replenishing depleted buffer stocks as opposed to 
providing refugees the full ration (Ref C), WFP responded 
that it was not sitting on a supply of excess or buffer 
commodities while refugee food ration levels were less than 
100 percent. 
 
¶22.  WFP representatives explained that having a two month 
buffer stock simply meant that they try to retain a two- 
month supply in the camps at all times in case of any 
logistic hiccups that might arise.  It is not/not 
additional in any way.  Rather, it is a part of their in- 
country stocks and an integral part of the food pipeline. 
 
------------------------- 
COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
------------------------- 
 
¶23.  Notwithstanding WFP's move to increase refugee food 
rations above 1857 kcal per person, per day, concerns 
remain as to whether or not this ration level is adequate. 
There are those who believe that the current level is 
adequate, while others advocate that the level should be 
raised to the international standard, which is 2100 kcal 
per person, per day. 
 
¶24.  The recent JAM assessment, while supportive of an 
increase in the current ration level, was inconclusive as 
to what the appropriate ration level should be. 
 
¶25. The JAM assessment also found that the fluctuations in 
the ration level had no impact on the overall malnutrition 
level of refugees.  However, a recent UNHCR/UNICEF 
nutrition report concludes that ration cuts and government 
 
restrictions on the movements of the refugees contribute to 
higher levels of malnutrition in the Tanzanian camps. 
 
¶26.  UNCHR was questioned as to why Tanzania was not chosen 
as a country for the implementation of a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between WFP and UNHCR that transfers 
some responsibilities for refugee feeding from UNHCR to 
WFP.  UNHCR responded that they were hesitant to experiment 
with such a large refugee population and thought that such 
a move would weaken their link with the refugees.  This 
rationale appears weak and it is hence recommended that 
this issue be further reviewed by WFP and UNHCR. 
 
¶27.  Exaggerated figures of the overall refugee population 
in camps should be of great concern to WFP and the donor 
community and highlight the need for an updated 
registration of refugees. 
 
¶28.  Efforts by WFP and UNHCR to encourage the GOT to relax 
the movement restrictions on refugees should be supported. 
HALL 
 
 
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 2003ROME04672 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED