This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001362 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CM BM
SUBJECT: EAP/BCLTV DIRECTOR'S MEETING WITH CHINA'S 
AMBASSADOR TO BURMA 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1029 
 
     ¶B. RANGOON 1031 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for reasons 1.5 (B/D). 
 
SUMMARY 
--------- 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Chinese Ambassador to Burma Li Jinjun posited 
in a late October meeting that current efforts by the 
international community on Burma should be aimed at 
establishing a platform for stable cooperation between Aung 
San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and the SPDC.  The U.S. should consider 
lifting economic sanctions, at least partially, and work with 
China to identify concrete areas for cooperation between ASSK 
and the SPDC.  ASSK should seek to de-emphasize her role as 
leader of the Burmese democratic and human rights movement 
and take steps to portray herself as a statesperson willing 
to grapple with economic development issues.  The May 30th 
attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters was an almost 
inevitable outcome of a poorly managed process after ASSK's 
release in 2002 from house arrest.  It is only a matter of 
time before ASSK is released from her current detention, 
although the SPDC will not take any action that could be 
perceived as being the result of outside pressure, the 
Chinese Ambassador concluded.  End Summary. 
 
What a difference a year makes 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) In an October 22 meeting with Chinese Ambassador Li 
Jinjun, EAP/BCLTV Director Judith Strotz noted that the 
situation in Burma had changed significantly and for the 
worse since her meeting with Ambassador Li the year before; 
that the result had negative implications not only for 
stability within Burma but for the region as a whole; and 
that the U.S. remained concerned about indications that Burma 
was seeking to obtain a nuclear reactor from Russia and 
weapons from North Korea. 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador Li stated that the international community 
sometimes had the view that China was happy with the SPDC; 
this was not the case.  He continued that he had not been 
surprised by the May 30th attack on National League for 
Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), commenting 
that the initial response to ASSK's release from house arrest 
in May 2002 from all parties, including the international 
community, had been overly optimistic and ignored that ASSK 
and the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) were only 
in the initial stages of confidence-building.  In addition, 
ASSK had insufficient opportunities to engage in dialogue 
with the SPDC, a problem that was compounded by the failure 
of ASSK, the SPDC, and the international community to 
formulate a concrete plan of action.  As a result, ASSK's 
increased freedom, the activities she and the NLD pursued, 
and the SPDC's response to them, rather than building 
confidence, created doubt and disappointment on both sides. 
 
¶4. (C) Continued and increased pressure by the United States, 
Japan, the European Union (EU), and ASEAN for ASSK's 
immediate release will be counterproductive as the SPDC will 
not take any action that could be perceived as being the 
result of outside pressure, Ambassador Li said.  In addition, 
by focusing only on ASSK's release, the international 
community runs the risk of creating a situation that will 
lead to a repeat of the May 30th attack.  ASSK's release 
should not be a precondition for lifting sanctions or 
returning to dialogue, argued Ambassador Li.  Rather ASSK, 
the SPDC, and the international community should aim at 
establishing a stable platform of cooperation between ASSK 
and the SPDC, an approach that UN Special Envoy Razali 
supports.  Thus, the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
other EU countries that support ASSK must not ignore recent 
steps taken by the SPDC, including the assignment of General 
Khin Nyunt as Prime Minister and the recently announced road 
map.  Criticism will only shut down prospects for progress, 
Ambassador Li stated.  A better option is the tack being 
taken by ASEAN, which provides Burma with space to come up 
with its own solution. 
 
ASSK:  Democracy Fighter or Stateswoman? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) According to Li, now that the SPDC has announced the 
road map, the ball is in ASSK's court.  Her apparent lack of 
response to the road map--which Ambassador Li said it is in 
her best interest to support--gives the impression that the 
SPDC has the upper hand.  It is positive, however, that ASSK 
has said that she is pleased with Khin Nyunt's selection as 
Prime Minister, Ambassador Li noted.  ASSK should be wary of 
sticking too tightly to her principles, as should the SPDC, 
if there is to be progress.  ASSK should de-emphasize her 
role as leader of the Burmese democratic and human rights 
movement and take steps to portray herself as a statesperson 
willing to grapple with economic development issues.  He 
suggested that ASSK could join the SPDC on a commission to 
review international aid projects.  In response to Strotz's 
comment that the SPDC had turned down this suggestion from 
Razali, the Ambassador said that initially Razali saw his 
mandate as promoting political reform; however, he now 
believed that work also needed to be done on economic issues, 
implying that a future suggestion might have a more positive 
response.  SPDC Chairman Senior General Than Shwe regards 
ASSK as a member of the military family, but a rebellious one 
who has been influenced negatively by external influences, 
according to Ambassador Li.  Strotz noted that a number of 
military family members had met unhappy ends, including 
former leaders Tin Oo and Ne Win. 
 
6 (C) Although China has continued to adhere to its policy of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign 
countries post-May 30th, China has approached the SPDC on 
issues such as economic growth, social stability, and the 
welfare of the Burmese people in an effort to help the SPDC 
deal with those issues more effectively.  While China can't 
claim to have a great deal of influence with the SPDC, these 
measures have had some impact, Ambassador Li assessed.  It is 
not enough to persuade the SPDC, however.  The U.S. might 
want to use its influence to persuade ASSK to take some kind 
of action, Ambassador Li suggested. 
 
Have you met with Aung San Suu Kyi? 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Strotz commented that there are areas of commonality 
in the U.S. and Chinese understanding of Burma.  She agreed 
that the U.S. and the international community need to look 
beyond ASSK's release in order to avoid a repeat of the 
events of the past year.  Strotz also noted that the U.S. 
deliberately had not criticized the road map, suggesting only 
that it should include ASSK, the NLD, and the ethnics groups 
and that it would be useful to have some sort of timeline. 
 
¶8. (C) Strotz added that the U.S. had a more positive view of 
ASSK's role.  The release of ASSK was a priority.  The USG 
could not engage ASSK if we continued to be denied access to 
her.  ASSK needed information from multiple sources in order 
to be able to respond to the current situation.  Since this 
information was being withheld from her, ASSK likely did not 
have sufficient data to assess the current situation. 
Responding to Director Strotz's question concerning whether 
Ambassador Li would consider meeting ASSK, Ambassador Li 
acknowledged that ASSK was an important person and that the 
NLD was an important political force in Burma.  However, it 
would not be prudent for him to meet with ASSK at this time, 
as doing so would have a negative impact on his ability to 
meet with the "top three" senior SPDC officials, said 
Ambassador Li.  He added that they share their "inner 
thoughts" with him. 
 
Support the Road Map 
-------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador Li indicated he was pleased to learn that 
the U.S. has not publicly criticized the road map, although 
U.S. comments on the need for a timeline and inclusion of the 
NLD were not necessarily helpful.  Urging more public U.S. 
support of the road map, Ambassador Li suggested that perhaps 
the U.S. could go further and show a positive response, 
partially lifting sanctions.  Then, the SPDC will resume 
confidence-building initiatives with ASSK, although not 
necessarily dialogue, as both sides still are skeptical of 
one another, offered Ambassador Li.  The SPDC and ASSK must 
engage in concrete, substantive cooperation in specific 
fields to establish a firm foundation for further dialogue. 
China and the U.S. should work to foster cooperation between 
the SPDC and ASSK.  China is doing what it should and hopes 
that the U.S. will as well, Ambassador Li said in closing. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Strotz noted that the U.S. believed the SPDC 
responded positively to pressure but, when it felt it had 
leeway, it took negative actions.  The sanctions conveyed a 
clear message to the SPDC and we hoped that they would help 
bring about positive change. 
 
Comment:  Chicken or Egg? 
------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Ambassador Li's approach this time was quite 
different from that of a year ago.  He continued to urge 
engagement with the regime and argue against exerting 
pressure on Burmese leaders.  However, he was much clearer on 
China's displeasure with the SPDC and on the steps China had 
taken to influence the situation, while continuing to mouth 
support for non-interference in internal affairs.  Also, he 
was much more forthright on the need for ASSK to play a role 
in the future of Burma. End Comment. 
 
¶11. (U) This cable was cleared by EAP/BCLTV Director Judith 
Strotz. 
McMullen