This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001259 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO FOR EAP/BCLTV 
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY 
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM BM
SUBJECT: RAZALI'S RANGOON MEETINGS DISAPPOINT 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1239 
 
     ¶B. USUN NEW YORK 2392 
     ¶C. RANGOON 1207 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: UN Special Envoy Razali departed Rangoon on 
October 2nd, calling his trip a "total failure."  Though he 
did not achieve any tangible results, his visit was important 
in assessing the degree of open mindedness on all sides for 
the SPDC's recently announced "road map to democracy."   All 
on the opposition side seemed willing to give the regime's 
plan a try, as long as they could freely participate.  The 
regime, though, would not commit to this yet.  Sadly, judging 
from the statements of the autocrat Senior General, it may 
not ever.  End summary. 
 
"Total Failure," But an "Historic Opportunity" 
 
¶2. (SBU) On the evening of October 2nd, UN Special Envoy 
Razali told assembled diplomats that his three day visit to 
Rangoon had been necessary, but "a total failure" in getting 
tangible results.  After initial delays, Razali was able to 
meet once with National League for Democracy (NLD) leader 
Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) at her house.  He also met at length 
with Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt, and briefly with 
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) Chairman Senior 
General Than Shwe.  Razali also spent several hours meeting 
on October 1st with representatives of ethnic minority 
political factions. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Razali said that he got the impression during his 
meetings with the opposition groups that the Prime Minister's 
recently outlined "road map" for democratization, beginning 
with a reconvening of the National Convention was being 
viewed as an "historic opportunity."  However, for this 
opportunity to bear fruit, all sides had to participate 
actively and freely both in establishing the modalities for 
the Convention, and in drafting the actual constitution. 
 
ASSK Ready to Rejoin Battle 
 
¶4. (SBU) Unfortunately, the Prime Minister could not (or 
would not) commit to including the eager opposition groups in 
this way.  Though General Khin Nyunt did not "reject out of 
hand" Razali's notion that the NLD and other groups be 
included in the National Convention Convening Commission, the 
Prime Minister said it was too early to agree to such a step. 
 Razali opined, and ASSK later agreed, that the Prime 
Minister did not have the "mandate" to agree to such an 
initiative -- hinting that the final say on this matter lay 
with the Senior General. 
 
¶5. (SBU) According to the Special Envoy, ASSK looked healthy, 
was in good spirits, and said she expected to be fully 
recovered "in a few weeks."  He noted that she shared the 
cautious optimism of the ethnic opposition groups, and said 
she was willing "under certain circumstances" to work with 
the new Prime Minister and his road map proposals.  However, 
ASSK was adamant that she, the detained members of the NLD 
Central Executive Committee, and those jailed during the 
Depeyin attacks, be released before she would cooperate in 
any way.  She insisted, further, that she would not accept 
release unless these others were released with her.  ASSK was 
also concerned that NLD offices, shuttered after the May 30th 
attack, be re-opened.  However, she apparently did not make 
this a condition for cooperation with Khin Nyunt. 
 
¶6. (C) Razali indicated that ASSK was still "incensed" over 
the May 30th Depeyin ambush.  However, he said in their 
conversation she put the need for an investigation of the 
attack into "perspective," saying that such an inquiry was 
essential "someday." 
 
They're Coming to Take Me Away, Ha, Ha! 
 
¶7. (C) Perhaps the most sobering moment of the briefing was 
Razali's description of his session with Senior General Than 
Shwe.  Though the Senior General was in an "affable mood," 
and had "lost weight," he came after Razali right away asking 
if "one person was more important than the state, than 52 
million people?"  Razali responded that one person was not, 
but that this one person represented the welfare of the other 
51,999,999.  Than Shwe also insisted that there was no need 
for political parties to represent the will of the people, 
pointing out that the recent "mass rallies" (totally stage 
managed by the regime; see ref C) in favor of the road map 
showed that the people already support the government and its 
policies.  This statement verifies in our mind the fact that 
the Senior General has completely lost touch with reality -- 
whether willfully or because of his sycophantic advisors is 
unknown. 
 
Comment: Not Much Hope, For Now 
 
¶8. (C) The mood of Razali's briefing was resigned, but not 
pessimistic.  Clearly the opposition groups, including ASSK, 
are willing to keep an open mind on the SPDC's road map. 
Furthermore, the Special Envoy said that he was "impressed" 
by the Prime Minister's determination "to do something."  A 
pall, though, was cast by the acceptance, spoken and 
unspoken, that the less flexible Senior General was still 
pulling all the strings.  Than Shwe's clear hatred of ASSK, 
and his complete removal from reality, are major impediments 
to prospects for genuine progress under the regime's new 
initiative.  Nonetheless, Razali indicated that he'd try to 
come back in a couple of months -- apparently quashing rumors 
that this visit would be his last if there were no success -- 
to see if there was more room for compromise or dialogue. 
Martinez