This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 004683 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/NGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2013 
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IR KU IAEA
SUBJECT: (C) IRAN:  GOK PESSIMISTIC, BUT REMAINS ENGAGED 
 
REF: KUWAIT 4078 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: AMB. RICHARD H. JONES; REASON 1.5 (B,D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The GOK sees no short-term hope that 
Iranian reformists will be able to challenge the conservative 
mullahs effectively, but intends to remain engaged with 
Tehran.  It claims to have told Iran the international 
community is united on the need for it to comply with IAEA 
conditions.   END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) NEA PDAS Larocco called on Shaykh Sabah al-Khalid 
al-Hamad al-Sabah, Chairman of Kuwait's National Security 
Bureau, October 13, during a brief visit to Kuwait.  This 
message reports what Shaykh Sabah al-Khalid (protect 
throughout) had to say about Iran (other topics septels). 
 
¶3.  (C) Sabah al-Khalid related that Iranian FM Kharrazi had 
made a quick visit here September 8 at his own request, to 
meet with Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber 
al-Sabah in advance of an IAEA Board of Governors meeting 
chaired by Kuwait's Ambassador Nabila al-Mulla.  Kharrazi had 
warned that unless al-Mulla steered the IAEA meeting in the 
right direction, the bilateral relationship would be affected 
significantly.  The Prime Minister shot back that as Chair, 
al-Mulla was in no position to exert such influence; she had 
to reflect the will of the members, which was clear:  Iran 
must comply with IAEA conditions. 
 
¶4.  (C) The Prime Minister went on that it was unthinkable 
for Kuwait to condone Iranian development of nuclear weapons 
or other WMD.  Kuwait was relieved that the Iraqi threat had 
been removed; Iran should be too.  Now it was Iran's turn. 
Kuwait as a small, weak country was committed to a region 
free of WMD.  Iran should recognize this as a natural 
position.  The GOK wanted to continue its excellent relations 
with Iran, and hoped that Kharrazi would take this message 
back.  But Sabah al-Ahmed wanted to be clear:  it appeared to 
Kuwait that the international community was united that Iran 
should comply with the IAEA. 
 
¶5.  (C) Sabah al-Khalid told PDAS Larocco that 
Kuwaiti-Iranian relations continued to be excellent despite 
the threat conveyed by Kharrazi.  The GOK was seriously 
concerned, even pessimistic, however:  60% or more of 
Iranians who had been aggressively pro-reform were now 
dispirited and dormant.  The GOK saw no hope in the 
short-term that reformists would be able to challenge the 
conservative mullahs effectively, because the reformers have 
no one to turn to. 
 
¶6.  (U) Ambassador Larocco was the source of this message, 
but did not have time to clear the cable itself. 
 
¶7.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
JONES