This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 002123 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR S. DELISI AND M. RAYNOR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MDC LEADERSHIP ON COURT CASES, TALKS, VIOLENCE 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 2105 (B) HARARE 2094 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai and 
Secretary General Welshman Ncube on October 23 confirmed to 
 
SIPDIS 
the Ambassador that court consideration of the party's 
election petition would commence November 3 and that 
Tsvangirai's treason trial would be postponed until next 
 
SIPDIS 
year.  The parties had not made any progress toward talks and 
Ncube's secret constitutional discussions with Justice 
Minister Chinamasa were deadlocked on key transitional 
issues.  The South African High Commissioner had indicated to 
Tsvangirai that President Mbeki was interested in visiting 
 
SIPDIS 
Harare within the next two weeks in hopes of stimulating 
movement by ZANU-PF.  The MDC intended to maintain the 
party's non-violent approach but strong local party chapters 
could respond to ZANU-PF-instigated violence with force 
themselves instead of turning to ineffective police.  The 
leadership's comments on MDC problems in the administration 
of Harare's city council are reported septel.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Court Cases 
----------- 
 
¶2.  (C) At a lunch at the Residence October 23, Tsvangirai 
and Ncube advised Ambassador Sullivan that Tsvangirai would 
accede to the High Court's request that the treason trial's 
commencement once again be delayed, this time until next 
year.  Its latest starting date had been October 27, and it 
remais possible that the Court could dispose of the 
prosecution's application to amend its pleadings (a technical 
motion unlikely to affect the case's outcome) before the 
Court adjourned for the year in November. 
 
¶3.  (C) Tsvangirai confirmed that the MDC's challenge of the 
presidential election results was slated to begin November 3. 
 A first phase would address legal issues revolving around 
the constitutionality of the Electoral Act and the Election 
Supervisory Commission.  If the court found for the MDC on 
the first phase, a new election would have to be held.  If 
not, proceedings would move to a second phase in which the 
court would examine alleged abuses associated with the 
election, and rule whether they fatally flawed the election 
result.  A finding for the MDC on the second phase would 
require a new election.  The first phase was expected to last 
a week but it was unclear how quickly the court would rule on 
it or, if it found against the MDC, how long the second phase 
would take. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ncube reported that the three MDC youths shot in the 
Harvest House episode October 18 (ref B) had been transferred 
from the hospital to the jail, where they faced potential 
unspecified charges.  (NOTE: A press report had a police 
sources earlier indicating they could face attempted murder 
charges.  END NOTE)  However, police officials told Ncube 
recently that senior police levels had ordered a full 
investigation of the Harvest House incident, complete with 
forensic tests on Chihota's confiscated weapon, and they 
expected to arrest Chihota within the next few days. 
Elaborating on Chihota, Ncube said his lease in Harvest House 
predated the MDC's acquisition (through an affiliate) of the 
building.  He claimed to be a lawyer but Ncube had never seen 
evidence of such status.  The only time he remembered meeting 
Chihota when Chihota approached him at a Harare hotel six 
weeks ago and acted like they knew each other.  He speculated 
that Chihota was mentally disturbed but said nothing about 
his possible affiliation with security officials, as alleged 
by MDC Harare Chairman Morgan Femai. 
 
No Progress on Talks 
-------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Tsvangirai indicated that the parties were no closer 
to recommencing talks.  Contacts were being made only "on the 
periphery," and ZANU-PF had not responded to overtures from 
Tsvangirai and the bishops to engineer a face-to-face meeting 
 
SIPDIS 
between Tsvangirai and Mugabe.  He noted that the ZANU-PF had 
raised the possibility of a national consultative forum that 
would bring all political parties and broad elements from 
civil society to address a full range of political, economic, 
and social problems comprehensively (an idea ZANU-PF Chairman 
John Nkomo earlier floated by the Ambassador).  This was 
unacceptable to the MDC because it avoided critical 
ZANU-PF/MDC engagement on resolving the political crisis. 
 
¶6.  (C) Ncube reported that his secret consititional talks 
with Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa continued but seemed 
at a deadlock over key transitional issues.  At their most 
recent meeting on October 16, little meaningful agreement was 
reached on four key issues.  On election timing under the 
instrument's transitional provisions, MDC had tried to bridge 
differences with a proposal to conduct the election between 
September 2004 and July 2005, at date to be determined by the 
Independent Electoral Commission.  ZANU-PF's response -- 
elections in 2006 -- represented a regression.  Regarding MDC 
demands for the reopening of The Daily News, ZANU-PF doggedly 
insisted that the paper's status was not a political issue 
for discussion and was appropriately left to the courts, 
which Ncube affirmed it was not, since the ZANU-PF-controlled 
Government intended to use every means to keep The Daily News 
shut.  As for MDC's call for the disbanding of the National 
Service/militias, ZANU-PF urged that the parties instead 
discuss reforming the system by revising curriculum, assuring 
more open enrollment, etc.  The parties had reached tentative 
agreement on the need to revise POSA and AIPPA.  Ncube would 
draft essential amendments for ZANU-PF consideration but 
feared that meaningful agreement may yet prove elusive. 
Ncube was scheduled to meet Chinamasa again on October 28. 
 
¶7.  (C) Tsvangirai and Ncube elaborated on the continuing 
impact of ZANU-PF's succession crisis as a constraint on 
talks.  A majority within ZANU-PF, even among the highest 
levels, supported inter-party talks.  Nonetheless, Mugabe's 
posture continued to be decisive, and he gave sway to an 
increasingly isolated minority that included Chinamasa, 
Information Minister Jonathon Moyo, and Minister For National 
Security Nicholas Goche.  This minority lacked a base in the 
party.  The factions were completely absorbed in trying to 
checkmate each other's influence and battling over credit in 
the public's eye and, most significantly, the boss's.  Such 
dynamics prevented the party from reaching a decision to move 
forward on talks.  Indeed, Presidency Minister John Nkomo 
some weeks ago had prepared a Mugabe-Tsvangirai meeting that 
fell away because of internal ZANU-PF opposition. 
 
¶8.  (C) They said they did not expect the situation to change 
until ZANU-PF resolved the Mugabe succession issue.  They 
dismissed prospects that intra-party elections and the 
December Party Conference would likely clear obstacles to 
dialogue.  Ncube observed that the intra-party process 
underway now was quite different from the one in 2000 that 
yielded John Nkomo's surprise victory over Emmerson Mnangagwa 
in the race for party chairmanship.  At that time the party 
was relatively unchallenged and consciously was trying to 
develop internal democratic processes.  Soon afterward, the 
party had reversed course and regressed back into a rigid, 
centrally directed command structure; the pressure wrought by 
economic collapse and political crisis only reinforced an 
unhealthy anti-democratic posture.  Honest debate within the 
party now, much less with the outside, was virtually 
impossible.  As an institution, the party remained unequipped 
to deal with the challenges of democracy.  ZANU-PF's strategy 
would likely continue to be to hurt the MDC on a sustained 
basis in an effort to force the MDC to accept whatever 
ZANU-PF was willing to put on the table, i.e. a junior role 
in a government of national unity. 
 
¶9.  (C) Tsvangirai reported that South African High 
Commissioner Ndou advised him that President Mbeki was 
interested in coming to Zimbabwe within the next two weeks in 
an effort to shake things loose.  He observed that Mbeki was 
"learning the hard way" how far one can trust Mugabe.  Ncube 
contrasted Mbeki's success with the Congo and Burundi with 
his ineffectiveness on Zimbabwe.  He attributed Mbeki's 
successes outside to an impartial, even-handed and principled 
approach he claimed was lacking in his posture toward 
Zimbabwe.  Faced with Mugabe's lies and double-crosses, Mbeki 
continued to exercise absolutely none of the potential 
leverage he held. 
 
Inter-party Conflict 
-------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Tsvangirai was unaware of the recent violence in 
Redcliff (ref A) but appeared to be upset by it.  He 
reiterated the party's non-violent posture and expressed 
concern that MDC-initiated violence would only play into the 
hands of ZANU-PF's superior force.  He assured that violence 
would not be permitted to get out of hand. 
 
¶11.  (C) Ncube was familiar with the Redcliff events and 
defended the MDC's actions there.  Confirming the account 
related by MDC MP Malinga (ref A), Ncube said MDC youths had 
retaliated against ZANU-PF officials seen as responsible for 
attacks on MDC homes the night before and previously.  The 
party organization in Redcliff was strong and judged that it 
was time to send a message to ZANU-PF that they would not 
take aggression lying down, as they had in the past by simply 
reporting attacks to ineffectual police.  This would 
hopefully make pivotal local ZANU-PF officials more reticent 
to instigate violence in the future.  He indicated that 
strong party structures in areas like Redcliff may responsd 
to force with force again in the future. 
 
¶12.  (C) Tsvangirai's and Ncube's comments on the MDC's 
struggles in Harare's fractious politics are related septel. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13.  (C) The MDC leadership's status report reflects a 
restive political stalemate that is likely to continue into 
next year.  ZANU-PF remains unwilling to move forward on 
talks and we see little evidence that either the December 
Party Conference or a visit from Mbeki, if it transpires, 
would likely shake things loose.  The public's absorption 
with the increasing challenges of everyday life and the 
security forces' capacity to nip nascent demonstrations in 
the bud make civil unrest an unlikely prospect at this time. 
For its part, the MDC has not sought to exploit the 
ever-deteriorating economic situation and provocations like 
The Daily New closing and ZCTU and NCA crackdowns beyond 
critical press statements.  For now, the MDC must content 
itself with a largely reactive posture, although it is 
responding to the challenging media environment by actively 
refurbishing its grassroots organization.  Tsvangirai spent 
the last two weeks meeting with local leaders and addressing 
rallies in Masvingo, Beitbridge, Gwanda, and Mutare, the last 
of which reportedly attracted 25,000. 
SULLIVAN