This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001853 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC 
 
E.O. 12958:   DECL: 10-27-13 
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS CE NO KWMM
SUBJECT:  Norwegian envoy says his government continues 
to review President's demand for ouster of chief monitor 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo-SA/INS 10/27/03 class email 
 
-      (B) Colombo 1845, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Charge' d'Affaires James F. Entwistle. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In an October 24 meeting with Charge', 
Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar related that the GoN 
continues to review President Kumaratunga's demand that 
chief monitor Tellefsen be removed from his job. 
Despite reports that the president wants to curb 
cooperation, the GSL has issued assurances that it will 
continue to work with the monitors.  This recent 
controversy comes against the backdrop of a large -- if 
smaller than expected -- Opposition rally in Colombo on 
October 24.  The President's ignition of this 
controversy seems as much aimed at rattling the PM's 
government, as at the monitors.  Brattskar still plans 
to travel to Kilinochchi to receive the LTTE 
counterproposals at the end of the week.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) NORWEGIAN READOUT:  Charge' met late October 24 
with Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar to discuss 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga's formal demand (see Ref 
B) that Tryggve Tellefsen, the head of the Norwegian-led 
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), be removed from his 
position.  Brattskar passed Charge' a copy of the 
President's letter requesting Tellefsen's ouster, which 
was sent to SA/INS in Ref A.  Brattskar told Charge' 
that during his October 23 meeting with the President on 
this matter Kumaratunga claimed that her demand was not 
meant as a criticism of the Norwegian government 
facilitation effort, but was rather based on her 
concerns about how Tellefsen was conducting his duties. 
According to Brattskar, Kumaratunga then cited several 
instances (in skewed fashion) where she was unsatisfied 
with Tellefsen's conduct, feeling that he was taking a 
pro-Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) stance.  She 
noted, for example, a proposal made by the SLMM in April 
that the LTTE's "Sea Tigers" be accepted as a "de facto 
naval unit," which had stirred up considerable 
controversy at the time.  Also of concern to Kumaratunga 
was the SLMM's report following the sinking of two 
Chinese fishing trawlers in March (see Ref B), which the 
monitors ruled had been done by unnamed "armed elements" 
despite indications that the Tigers had in fact sunk the 
ships. 
 
¶3.  (C) Queried on whether the Norwegian government 
would in fact remove Tellefsen, Brattskar said no 
decision had yet been taken, and that the matter 
continued to be discussed within the Norwegian MFA. 
Brattskar emphasized the need to defuse the situation 
and not let the incident disrupt the peace process.  He 
went on to note that Tellefsen was prepared for whatever 
decision the Norwegian government might take regarding 
his tenure as head of the SLMM.  Brattskar related that 
he clearly saw this move as part of the ongoing 
cohabitation tussle between the President and the Prime 
Minister. 
 
¶4.  (C) Charge' asked Brattskar if the controversy over 
the President's demand would change Brattskar's plans to 
travel to the LTTE-controlled town of Kilinochchi on 
October 31 to receive the response developed by the 
Tigers to the GSL's proposal regarding the formation of 
an interim administration in the north/east (see Ref B). 
Brattskar replied that there had been no change in his 
plans.  He expressed concerns, however, that the Tigers 
might be upset at this latest move by the President, 
seeing it as an effort by her to try to upset the 
domestic political situation in the south on the eve of 
the unveiling of their counterproposals. 
 
¶5.  (C) REPORTS OF A PRESIDENTIAL ORDER:  According to 
several press reports, President Kumaratunga, following 
her formal request to have Tellefsen removed, sent 
written orders on October 24 to the commanders of the 
Sri Lanka army, navy and air force telling them that 
they did not need to take instructions or advice from 
Tellefsen.  Speaking for the government, however, 
Defense Secretary Austin Fernando told the press on 
October 26 that the armed forces and police would 
continue to cooperate with the monitors fully and that 
the GSL would continue to abide by the terms of the 
February 2002 ceasefire agreement. 
 
¶6.  (C) BIG OPPOSITION RALLY:  President Kumaratunga's 
move against the SLMM chief came against a backdrop of 
an anti-United National Party (UNP) governing coalition 
rally sponsored on October 24 by the Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party (SLFP).  The rally, at which the SLFP had 
predicted 60-80,000 people, fell far short of 
expectations, with 40,000 people in attendance, although 
it did clog up the streets of Colombo.  In a speech to 
the rally, SLFP spokesman Mangala Samaweera, a close 
adviser to the President, cited her call for Tellefsen's 
removal as being a proper exercise of her executive 
powers, adding that she was "prepared to use her 
executive powers further if the people rally around her 
like today."  Commenting on the situation, Jehan Perera, 
media director for the National Peace Council, a local 
think-tank, told poloff on October 27 that in asking 
that Tellefsen be removed, the President was trying to 
"whip up" additional support before the rally.  Perera 
said he believed there was not much public support for 
the President's actions, and that she was merely trying 
to assert her authority vis-a-vis her cohabitation 
rival, the PM. 
 
¶7.  (C) COMMENT:  As noted by Brattskar and Perera, the 
President's ignition of this controversy seems as much 
aimed at rattling the PM's government, as at the 
monitors.  There is little doubt that she is furious 
that Prime Minister Wickremesinghe's peace initiative 
has been so successful, especially as she sees herself 
as the country's natural peacemaker (though her main 
effort at peace ended in failure in 1995).  In her 
anger, she is lashing out and the monitors are an easy 
target. So far, by not taking her bait, the PM's 
government is acting in a restrained way.  Understanding 
the tricky situation, it is also positive that the 
Norwegians seem intent on not fanning the flames and to 
be taking their time in developing a considered 
response.  Most importantly, it appears that this latest 
cohabitation scuffle will have no effect on the 
Norwegian Ambassador's trip to Kilinochchi at the end of 
this week to receive the LTTE counterproposals, the next 
key step in the peace process.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶8.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
ENTWISTLE