This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004996 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
FOR DEA, CUSTOMS AND NARCOTICS OFFICERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AF KCRM SNAR IR RS XD EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: PARIS PACT ROUNDTABLE ON IRAN 
 
REF: A) BRUSSELS 04564 B) STATE 280875 
 
¶1. Summary.  The second roundtable convened by the "Paris 
Pact" for countries affected by the Afghanistan Opium Economy 
was held at the headquarters of the World Customs 
Organization in Brussels on October 15.  This meeting was a 
considerable improvement over the first roundtable on the 
Balkans held in September for two reasons: the focus on a 
single country rather than a region, and the presence of a 
knowledgeable Iranian who contributed greatly to the 
discussion. The primary task of the upcoming Consultative 
Group meeting in Rome on November 21 must be to decide 
whether the level of specificity (or generality) of the 
recommendations produced by these first two roundtables meets 
the original objectives of the Paris Pact.  It is unlikely 
that future roundtables will ever produce more specific 
recommendations, nor will potential donors use these meetings 
to sign up for funding identified assistance gaps. One of the 
outcomes of the Iran roundtable was the unprecedented 
invitation to send a mission of international experts to Iran 
to evaluation its anti-drug efforts and the opportunities for 
regional cooperation in combating drug trafficking.  The 
meeting may also eventually lead to the posting of western 
DLO's in Teheran.  While not among the original objectives of 
the Paris Pact, this is certainly a happy outcome and perhaps 
justifies giving the Paris Pact further opportunities to 
prove its value.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. The second roundtable convened by the "Paris Pact" for 
countries affected by the Afghanistan Opium Economy was held 
at the headquarters of the World Customs Organization in 
Brussels on October 15.  The U.S. delegation to the meeting 
included USEU/NAS Frank Kerber, DEA/Brussels James C. Kabel, 
and DEA/Istanbul Jim Allen.  About 30 persons attended the 
five-hour meeting which was again chaired by Bernard Frahi, 
Chief of the Partnership in Development Branch, UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Vienna.  Delegations included the 
European Customs Organization, World Customs Organization 
(WCO), the EU Directorate for External Relations, and 
national delegations from Iran, Greece, Turkey, France, UK, 
Italy, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and Ireland. 
(Comment. Interpol, which had attended the Balkans Route 
Roundtable in October, was absent.  Significantly, Europol 
has not attended either meeting. End comment.) 
 
Overview of the Problem 
----------------------- 
 
¶3. The meeting began with the UNODC's overview of the 
problem: the primary entry and exit routes into and out of 
Iran, data on drug seizures, and Iranian efforts to staunch 
the drug flows.  This was followed by a brief presentation by 
the Iranian representative, Police Colonel Mazoud Rezvani, 
Drug Liaison Officer (DLO) to Pakistan resident in Islamabad. 
 Reznavi confirmed the drug routes outlined by the UNODC.  He 
said the southern sea route through the Gulf States had been 
discussed at a recent meeting he had with the Pakistani Coast 
Guard.  Iranian efforts to staunch the drug flows include 
construction of 212 border posts, 205 watch towers, 22 
concrete barriers, 290 km of canals, and the forced 
evacuation of Iranian villages used by drug traffickers on 
the Afghan border.  The greatest seizures within Iran have 
been opium and hashish.  Drug seizures of heroin, morphine, 
opium, and hashish have been greater in the first six months 
of 2003 than in all of 2002.  There are 1.8 million drug 
addicts in Iran.  Morphine only transits the country, while 
opium and heroin are consumed by the population.  Harald 
Frohlich, head of the Regional Intelligence Liaison Office 
(WCO and ZKA), said that seizure reports coming out of Iran 
do not give a clear and reliable picture.  There is a clear 
lack of national and regional coordination and a regional 
intelligence strategy.  Iran has invested one billion dollars 
to control the drug routes through its territory.  Customs 
departments focus on the legal trade routes, not the illegal 
routes used by traffickers.  Reznavi countered that the 
national drug intelligence unit in Teheran, which brings 
together officers from the Ministries of Health, Education, 
Interior, Intelligence, the judiciary and police, coordinates 
Iranian anti-drug efforts.  This anti-narcotics center 
maintains regular contact with Turkey, the Gulf States and 
Pakistan.  Joint training programs with Pakistan have been 
sponsored by the UNODC.  The UNODC summarized this overview 
with the following points: 
 
--  Drug entry routes into Iran from Afghanistan are through 
poor and remote areas of the country. 
--  Internal checkpoints within Iran are producing seizure 
results. 
--  A currently minor exit route through Iraq deserves 
attention now as instability there could allow this route to 
flourish. 
--  There are clearly gaps in reporting and coordination. 
--  Need for Customs in Iran to distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate trade. 
 
Review of Multilateral and Bilateral Assistance 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4. The next agenda item was a review of current multilateral 
and bilateral anti-trafficking assistance to Iran.  The UNODC 
CIRUS Project (Combined Interdiction Unified Strategy) with a 
total budget of Euro 8.5 million is one of the largest UNODC 
anti-trafficking projects in the region.  Most of the funds 
are used for equipment, including vehicles, night vision 
devices, heavy-duty construction equipment for border 
fortifications, narcotics and chemical drug precursor testing 
kits, drug detection equipment, and radio communication 
equipment, . Smaller bilateral assistance efforts are being 
funded by Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Spain and the 
UK.  The EU assistance has been targeting at demand reduction 
and institution building.  The EU assisted in setting up the 
Drug Intelligence Unit in Teheran. Drugs are a high priority 
in the EU-Iran cooperation agreement currently being 
developed.  The UNODC's assessment is that assistance is 
needed to control sea traffic to the Gulf States 
(particularly the ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas), on the 
northern Iraq border, and on the borders with Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan.  Reznavi countered that Iranian resources are 
primarily directed at staunching the drugs flows into Iran 
along the Afghan and Pakistan borders where drug seizures 
have been the greatest and not on the exit routes.  This 
policy is unlikely to change, given limited Iranian resources 
for this effort.  The UK mentioned its long-term interest in 
posting a Customs/DLO (drugs liaison officer) in Teheran. 
USDEL agreed that DLO's from donor countries stationed in 
Teheran would greatly assist the coordination effort and 
produce more reliable intelligence on the drug trafficking 
through the country.  While not responding to the call for 
DLO postings in Teheran, Reznavi responded that Iran, 
Pakistan and the Gulf States were meeting December 8-9 in 
Islamabad to review anti-drug cooperation and repeatedly 
invited the Paris Pact to come to Iran to assess its efforts 
first-hand.  Delegations welcomed a report on the December 
Islamabad meeting. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶5.  The chair noted that the results of the two roundtables 
on the Balkans and Iran would be presented to the Paris Pact 
Consultative Group meeting in Rome on November 21.  He 
invited the delegations to submit suggestions on the agenda 
as well as attendees.  The next roundtable would be on 
western Russia and would be held in Moscow during the first 
quarter of 2004.  Future roundtables could focus on such 
areas as Central Asia, the Caucasus, Pakistan, the Gulf 
States, Albania, or Montenegro,  Whenever possible, future 
roundtables will be held in the region, rather than in 
Brussels. 
 
¶6. Frahi closed the meeting by noting that the purpose of the 
Paris Pact was to identify assistance gaps in combating drug 
trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe.  The two roundtables 
held to date had identified gaps, but it was unclear whether 
the intended level of specificity was attained.  Further, 
donors had not been identified to fill the gaps.  He appealed 
to the delegations to send both experts and policy-makers to 
the next roundtable to ensure that both gaps and funding are 
addressed. 
 
¶7. Comment.  This meeting was a considerable improvement over 
the first roundtable on the Balkans held in September for two 
reasons: the focus on a single country rather than a region, 
and the presence of a knowledgeable Iranian who contributed 
greatly to the discussion.  DEA agents on the delegation also 
found the meeting interesting and informative since they do 
not have a presence in Iran and must rely on third-country 
reporting.  If nothing else, the Paris Pact provided a 
multilateral forum to deal with the Iranians on an issue on 
which we agree, but at a politically-charged time in our 
bilateral relationship. Perhaps we should suggest future 
roundtables be held on other countries who might similarly 
feel more comfortable dealing with us in a multilateral 
setting.  The next roundtable on western Russia in Moscow 
gives us the opportunity to field an experienced delegation 
for a straightforward discussion with Russian drug policy 
makers.  The Iran roundtable clearly demonstrates the value 
of closer coordination among our like-minded partners in the 
Paris Pact before the meetings and better communication and 
direction for UNODC, which appears desperate for guidance. 
 
¶8. The primary task of the upcoming Consultative Group 
meeting in Rome must be to decide whether the level of 
specificity (or generality) of the recommendations produced 
by these first two roundtables meets the original objectives 
of the Paris Pact.  It is unlikely that future roundtables 
will ever produce more specific recommendations, nor will 
potential donors use these meetings to sign up for funding 
identified assistance gaps.  One of the outcomes of the Iran 
roundtable was the unprecedented invitation to send a mission 
of international experts to Iran to evaluation its anti-drug 
efforts and the opportunities for regional cooperation in 
combating drug trafficking.  This mission may also eventually 
lead to the posting of western DLO's in Teheran.  While not 
among the original objectives of the Paris Pact, this is 
certainly a happy outcome and perhaps justifies giving the 
Paris Pact further opportunities to prove its value.  End 
comment. 
SCHNABEL