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Viewing cable 03ANKARA6270, AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH TGS DEP CHIEF BASBUG FOCUSES ON IRAQ AND CYPRUS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ANKARA6270 2003-10-06 15:48 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006270 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2013 
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR MOPS PTER PINR CY IZ TU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH TGS DEP CHIEF BASBUG FOCUSES ON IRAQ AND CYPRUS 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman.  Reason: 1.5 
(b) and (d) 
 
 
1.  (S)  Summary:  The Ambassador's lengthy (1.5 hours) 
initial call on the TGS DCHOD, General Basbug, focused 
primarily on Iraq and Cyprus.  On Iraq, Basbug asserted that 
TGS supports a GOT decision to contribute troops to Iraq, 
preferably before a new UNSCR is passed, although he worried 
that media reports of political conditions on the $8.5 
billion US loan program for Turkey might complicate the GOT's 
deliberations.  He expressed understanding why the US would 
not take significant military action against the PKK/KADEK in 
northern Iraq now, but suggested a "token" act, e.g., turning 
over one or two leaders or an air strike, would reinforce 
what he hoped would be a strong message from both countries 
that the PKK/KADEK's days in Iraq were numbered.  Information 
that Kurds would make up 50% of Iraq's new defense forces 
concerned TGS, he said.  Basbug worried that the Cyprus issue 
might complicate Turkey's EU accession ambitions, and 
suggested that lifting the embargo on northern Cyprus would 
contribute to a solution.  He did not respond to the 
Ambassador's suggestion to cancel exercises on the island. 
On other issues, Basbug acknowledged that the Turkish Land 
Forces' attack helicopter procurement project was "frozen" 
but the requirement and the program were was still valid; TGS 
J5 would be convening a meeting on the program's fate the 
following week.  He also said he would "study" a proposal to 
hold the High Level Defense Group in November with an acting 
ASD if one were offered.  End Summary. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
US-Turkey:  Recovering from March 1 and the HLDG 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
 
2.  (C)  The Ambassador made his initial call on TGS Deputy 
Chief of Defense General Mehmet Ilker Basbug on October 2. 
After opening the discussion by contrasting different 
approaches to international politics (Basbug is a believer in 
realpolitik), the general raised Iraq.  Recalling the 
reaction to the failed vote to permit US forces to transit 
Turkey on March 1, Basbug said the media coverage of the vote 
and statements attributed to senior USG officials 
"disappointed" the Turkish armed forces whose support for the 
GOT's position had been clear.  He asserted that although the 
vote had a negative impact on the bilateral mil-mil 
relationship, it had not damaged it.  As a result, he 
preferred to talk about the need to "improve" the 
relationship, not to "repair" it.  To that end, he noted that 
a meeting of the High Level Defense Group (HLDG) could be 
helpful, but he had heard that his counterpart, ASD Crouch 
would be leaving his position.  The Ambassador responded that 
that US could accept the Turkish dates with the understanding 
that acting ASD Ricardel would chair our side.  It would 
likely be some time before a permanent successor to Dr. 
Crouch was in place.  Basbug noted that it would be useful to 
have a meeting this year and requested the US side provide 
the proposal to convene the HLDG during the week of November 
17 as TGS proposed, and he would consider it.  (Comment: 
Septel makes recommendations on how to do this.) 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
TGS Backs Contribution to Stability Force 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
3.  (C)  Regarding Turkey's possible troop contribution to 
the stability force in Iraq, Basbug confirmed the 
Ambassador's understanding that TGS supported a contribution 
as both in Turkey's interest by contributing to Iraq's 
territorial integrity and by strengthening US-Turkey 
relations but that the final decision was up to the 
government and the parliament.  Basbug emphasized that Turkey 
"should not be indifferent" toward developments in Iraq and 
that while TGS was "quite optimistic" about a positive 
decision, he was not sure when that would come. Nonetheless, 
the generals were advising the politicians that it would be 
"even better" for Turkey if Ankara were to decide before the 
UN Security Council passes a new resolution. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Concerns About Iraq:  Favoritism, Kurds, Loans... 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
4.  (C)  Basbug recalled that in the run-up to the March 1 
decision to not approve passage by the 4ID through Turkey, 
Turkish officials had offered American interlocutors who 
asked the following advice on Iraq: 
 
 
--  Iraq's territorial integrity must be preserved.  The way 
to do that was by treating all ethnic groups equally.  Not 
doing so would be "seeding some problems" for the future. 
Although Basbug understood that relying on the Kurds "in the 
short term" was expedient, he worried about information he 
had received that the new Iraqi defense force would number 
40,000 by the end of next year with half its members being 
Kurds.  He also had heard that the numbers would swell to 
200,000 by the end of 2013, yet Kurds would continue to make 
up half the force.  He thought dissolving the former Iraqi 
armed forces had been a mistake.  The Ambassador said he was 
unaware of any ethnic quotas in assembling a new national 
army in Iraq.  One key objective in Iraq was to move people 
toward thinking of themselves first as Iraqis and not as 
Kurds, Shia, etc. 
 
 
--  The interim administration of Iraq should be effective. 
The way to do this was to include individuals who were 
respected by the Iraqi people.  Basbug reiterated this point 
several times throughout the meeting.  Rocgnizing that Basbug 
was trying to promote the new Iraqi Turkmen Front leadership, 
the Ambassador responded that the US was following recent 
developments within the ITF closely. 
 
 
5.  (C)  Turning to the USG's $8.5 billion loan guarantee 
program for Turkey, Basbug stated that TGS was concerned that 
the political conditions in loan agreement could negatively 
impact on the parliament's consideration of the troop 
contribution question.  The conditions in the agreement about 
avoiding unilateral action in northern Iraq were "nonsense," 
and "irrelevant," he said.  Currently, there was no reason 
for Turkey to consider a cross-border operation; in the 
future there might be.  However, there is only one authority 
in Iraq and that is the US, Basbug declared, and it was 
unimaginable that Turkey would enter Iraq without consulting 
with the US first.  He accepted the Ambassador's explanation 
of how the loan agreement simply reflected the law 
authorizing the credit guarantees which included the 
condition because of the circumstances last spring when it 
was adopted.  Basbug nevertheless lamented that the language 
had an impact on public opinion despite the public denials by 
US representatives. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Need Joint Action Against the PKK/KADEK 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
6.  (S)  "Today a very important meeting is occurring," 
Basbug stated, referring to S/CT Ambassador Cofer Black's 
meeting with a GOT interagency team (septel).  He explained 
that TGS did not want action against the PKK/KADEK tied to a 
Turkish troop contribution to Iraq, underlining that Turkey 
needed action taken against the terrorists regardless of its 
troop decision.  At the same time, the PKK/KADEK issue is a 
"vital" and "sensitive" issue for Turkey.  He said that a day 
earlier he had told MFA officials that they should try to 
convince the US to issue a joint declaration.  The Ambassador 
summarized Ambassador Black's approach for Basbug. 
 
 
7.  (S)  Basbug agreed that the major objective for the time 
being should be to convince the PKK/KADEK that its time in 
northern Iraq is about to end.  Both countries' taking a 
clear and firm position was "more important than physical 
action for the time being," he said.  He agreed with the 
Ambassador's assessment of the news reports' negative impact 
and noted that military intelligence suggested the PKK/KADEK 
leadership had been nervous about what would happen to them 
when the OIF began, but now they believe they are safe.  If 
the PKK/KADEK membership could be made to believe their 
future in Iraq is dark, many would take advantage of the 
Repentance Law. 
 
 
8.  (S)  Basbug declared that simply putting the organization 
on the EU foreign terrorist organzations list would not solve 
the problem.  The public expected action, although he allowed 
that that could come later.  For now, he thought a signal 
would be important to underscore the seriousness of Turkey's 
and the US's resolve.  For example, if the US were to hand 
over one or two PKK/KADEK leaders, it would be a "great blow" 
to the organization.  Alternatively, Basbug suggested one or 
two aircraft could conduct an air strike against PKK/KADEK 
locations in the mountains.  The point would not be to kill 
the terrorists, but just to shake them up.  Basbug understood 
that the US did not have any available forces for a major 
operation against the PKK/KADEK now, but he hoped that would 
change in the future.  He noted that Turkey was always ready 
to participate in a joint effort, although DAS Pascoe's 
statement that the US would not want Turkish forces involved 
puzzled him. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Cyprus:  Worried about EU and Resettlement; Mum on 
Exercises 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
 
9.  (C)  Basbug next turned to Cyprus.  He affirmed Turkish 
armed forces' support for EU membership but worried that the 
Cyprus issue could be a serious obstacle.  The general 
understood that the status quo could not continue forever and 
that a solution must be found, but finding one after Cyprus 
joins the EU would be very difficult.  A lasting solution, he 
thought, must preserve the bi-zonal system because there is 
currently a lack of confidence between the two communities. 
He also thought the guarantee powers system should be 
preserved with some military presence, although "the numbers 
are not important," he said.  He thought the lifting of the 
trade embargo on northern Cyprus would "help the situation." 
Although he claimed not to be opposed to the Annan Plan (or 
any plan) per se, he thought recommendations should be tied 
to events.  He said he agreed with FM Gul that a new approach 
should be found. The Ambassador responded that the period 
between the December northern Cypriot elections and Cyprus's 
May 2004 EU accession would be the best opportunity to reach 
a settlement.  It was clear that the people on both sides 
want a settlement and that the Annan Plan was the best 
available for a quick solution.  The US had already set aside 
funds to help deal with the resettlement problem.  Basbug 
picked up on the last point to lament the huge problem 
resettlement will pose, with 100,000 families moving, costing 
up to $5 billion.  The Ambassador argued that the price tag 
may be a bit inflated, and noted that he hoped Special 
Negotiator Weston would visit Ankara in the near future where 
this issue could be further explored. 
 
 
10.  (C)  The Ambassador asked whether Turkey could follow 
last year's precedent of canceling its annual fall exercise 
with Cyprus if the Greek side did the same.  Basbug did not 
respond.  (Note:  The Ambassador had raised this same subject 
with DefMin Gonul on October 1.  Gonul understood the 
importance of the issue, but he was not prepared to respond 
at that time.) 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Other issues: Attack Helicopters, EUCOM Visit 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 
11.  (C)  On other issues, the Ambassador asked Basbug of 
TGS's attitude toward the long-stalled Land Force's attack 
helicopter procurement.  Basbug said the "project is not 
dead," at least not yet.  "Frozen" (a word PM Erdogan used 
with a visiting American Turkish Council delegation earlier 
in the week) was correct at the moment.  Basbug emphasized 
that the requirement and the program were still valid.  He 
recalled two problems with the program: the unit price "is a 
little high;" and, the lack of agreement on the terms and 
conditions regarding the mission computer.  He said that 
TGS J5 would be convening a meeting next week on the program 
after which the Turkish side would inform us of the program's 
status. 
 
 
12.  (C)  The Ambassador recalled that Basbug had received an 
invitation from EUCOM Deputy Commander Gen Wald.  Basbug 
acknowledged receiving the invitation, but gave no indication 
of when he would want to take it up. 
EDELMAN