null
Diana T Fritz  03/20/2007 05:13:47 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                         October 02, 2003


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 4428 - UNKNOWN)         

TAGS:     PREL, PGOV                                             

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  SCENESETTER FOR A/S BURNS' VISIT TO THE UAE, OCTOBER 5 

Ref:      None                                                   
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 04428

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL 
    INFO:   PAO ECON RSO AMB DAO USLO DCM P/M 
Laser1:
    INFO:   PAO FCS 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: ECON:OJOHN, CG:JDAVIS, USLO:RSIMM, DAO:BKERINS

VZCZCADI211
OO RUEHC RUEHYN RUEHDE RUEHBUL RUEHXK RUEKJCS
RHEHNSC RHEFDIA RUEAIIA
DE RUEHAD #4428/01 2750831
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 020831Z OCT 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1912
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 1215
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 3449
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0138
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/DSCA-MEAN/ISA-NESA//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 004428 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, AND INR/NESA 
SANAA FOR NEA A/S BURNS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/13 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF IR IS IZ TC
SUBJECT:  SCENESETTER FOR A/S BURNS' VISIT TO 
THE UAE, OCTOBER 5 
 
Ref: A) Abu Dhabi 3940, B) Abu Dhabi 3178 
 
¶1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba, 
Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
¶2. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary Burns:  I look 
forward to welcoming you back to the UAE for your 
October 5 visit.  Your Emirati interlocutors are 
eager to see you.  We have requested meetings for you 
with MFA Minstate Hamdan Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (the de 
facto Foreign Minister), Armed Forces Chief of Staff 
LTG Muhammad Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (the de facto 
Defense Minister), and Dubai Crown Prince Muhammad 
Bin Rashid Al-Maktoum.  We had requested a meeting 
with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed 
Al-Nahyan, however, we learned he will be out of 
town.  In addition, we are proposing a brief 
interview for you with Abu Dhabi TV, time permitting. 
We will find out informally if President Zayed will 
be able to meet with you. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Summary continued: Your discussions with 
the Emirati leadership invariably will revolve around 
the major topics of the past year -- Iraq, Middle 
East peace talks, Afghanistan, and Iran.  You will 
want to make a point of congratulating each of your 
interlocutors on the UAE's successful hosting of the 
IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings; while the meetings 
were held in Dubai, the event was very much a joint, 
UAE-wide affair, with the UAE military in particular 
extensively involved in providing security.  There 
may be some lingering disappointment on the Emiratis' 
part over our decision to postpone the Strategic 
Partnership meetings, but you can reassure them of 
our commitment to this dialogue as soon as our 
calendars permit it.  I suggested to Sheikh Hamdan 
(HBZ) that we hold the meetings in Washington around 
the time of his visit in late October, but he has 
declined.  End Summary. 
 
¶4. (S/NF) We propose that you touch on the following 
key issues: 
 
-- Provide a readout of recent UN deliberations on 
Iraq resolution and the timetable for political 
transition, as well as a review of efforts to keep 
the Middle East peace talks on track; 
 
-- Be prepared to discuss the political and military 
situation in Iraq, with all three of your 
interlocutors; 
 
-- Thank the Emiratis for their tremendous 
humanitarian assistance throughout the Middle East, 
their public support and quiet lobbying for 
recognition of the Iraqi Governing Council, and their 
cooperation with our armed forces; 
 
-- Explain our role in keeping pressure on Iran to 
prevent it from developing a nuclear weapons 
capability; 
 
-- Reassure the Emiratis of our commitment to hold 
the Strategic Partnership and working sessions in the 
near future; 
 
-- Reaffirm our desire to finalize a bilateral ICC 
Article 98 agreement, a Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreement, and a Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty; 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Iraq: Unwavering support ($100 million to date) 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶5. (S/NF) Iraq will be high on the Emiratis' agenda, 
and they will not mince words.  They will laud us for 
toppling Saddam Hussein, yet criticize us for a de- 
Baathification that in their view runs too deep, and 
for dismissing the entire military and police force. 
They will urge us to work with moderate Sunnis in the 
political process, and warn us to remain vigilant 
about Iran's intentions in Iraq and in the Gulf 
region. 
 
¶6. (C) To their credit, the Emiratis strongly 
supported Iraqi delegations to the IMF/World Bank 
meetings in Dubai, and at the Arab League summit in 
Cairo.  In mid-August, the Emirati leadership hosted 
six members of the GC - the first Gulf country to do 
so.  Strong public statements of support for the GC 
and the Iraqi people followed the visit and after the 
formation of the new Iraqi Cabinet.  The Emiratis 
were among the first in the Arab world to step up to 
the plate in providing much-needed humanitarian 
assistance and medical relief to the Iraqi people. 
The Sheikh Zayed hospital in Baghdad continues to 
receive over a thousand patients a day.  The Emiratis 
have adopted six hospitals.  By the end of the year, 
the UAE will have contributed between $80 million to 
$100 million of humanitarian aid to Iraq. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Middle East peace: Support for our engagement 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Arab-Israeli conflict is the other high- 
priority agenda item for the Emiratis.  The papers 
continue to feature graphic photos of the continuing 
violence.  The Emiratis want us to stay engaged, but 
believe the recent U.S. veto of UNSC resolution and 
the Israeli cabinet decision to expel or kill Arafat 
has hurt USG interests and credibility in the region. 
HBZ believes Israelis should be more sensitive to the 
current situation in Iraq and help rather than hurt 
America's image and credibility.  In his view, Arafat 
and Sharon seem to be helping each other achieve 
their own goals that are not in the interests of 
either nation.  The Emiratis do not know Ahmed Qurei 
and are unsure of his ability to work independently 
of Arafat.  The Emiratis were just as disappointed as 
we were with the loss of Abu Mazen, recognizing the 
importance of internal reform and a leadership 
independent of Arafat. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
UAE largest Arab donor to Palestinians 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The UAEG has maintained a robust assistance 
package to the Palestinians.  It has channeled nearly 
USD 78 million in project assistance to Palestinians 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since September 2000. 
In addition, the UAEG pledged USD 42 million at the 
2003 Sharm-Al-Sheikh (USD 21 million) and 2002 Beirut 
(USD 21 million) Summits -- making the UAE the 
largest Arab donor to the Palestinians since the 
Intifada began three years ago (see Ref B).  Please 
note that the UAE has paid its Beirut and Sharm-Al- 
Sheikh pledges in full.  These efforts are carefully 
monitored and very much support our strategy to 
ensure that funds do not fall into the wrong hands. 
In addition to the government aid, private donations 
of ruling family members to the Palestinians 
certainly total tens of millions of dollars. 
 
---------------------------- 
Iran: An uneasy co-existence 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The UAE and Iran have hit recently another 
strained period in their relationship after the slow 
improvement we witnessed over the past two years. 
The effort to reach some compromise on the Abu Musa 
island issue came to a near halt in late spring/early 
summer of this year.  The Emiratis have made clear to 
us that they are deeply suspicious of Iran's 
territorial/military ambitions in the Gulf, 
particularly with respect to Tehran's nuclear and WMD 
acquisition policy.   As you heard during your 
meetings with Sheikh Muhammad Bin Zayed (MBZ) in 
Washington last July, the Emiratis are worried about 
Iranian designs in Iraq.  The Emiratis believe that 
the Iranians are actively seeking a foothold in the 
Sunni Iraqi community as well as with the Shi'a.  In 
their view, the Iranians are gaining ground within 
the Sunni community given their current sense of 
being left out of the new US-backed political 
process. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Afghanistan: UAE aid exceeds $150 million 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) The UAE continues to play a very helpful role 
in Afghanistan, particularly in the provision of 
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.  The UAEG 
also continues to provide substantial personal 
financial support to President Karzai.  The UAE Armed 
Forces has deployed a 35-man Emirati Special 
Operations contingent to Bagram Air Base to work 
side-by-side with U.S. forces.  UAE humanitarian and 
military programs in Afghanistan are ongoing, and we 
expect the final price tag to far exceed the $150 
million already spent (see Ref A). 
 
-------------------------- 
Article 98, TIFA, and MLAT 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) On Article 98, we are very close, but not 
quite there yet.  Some differences continue to plague 
us on one or two minor issues.  The UAEG owes us 
information on our latest text that we provided to 
them.  There has been good progress on a TIFA.  The 
UAE gave us back the text and their changes are being 
considered in Washington.  We are aiming for a 
November TIFA agreement signing and council meeting 
in Washington with Minister of State for Financial 
and Industrial Affairs Mohammed Khalfan Bin Kharbash 
leading the UAE side.  The MLAT text is with the UAE 
side and there is still work to be done.  A team from 
DoJ (OPDAT and OIA) is expected here later this month 
to hold discussions on MLAT with the UAE. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Domestic considerations: Sheikh Zayed 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (S) Since your last visit to the UAE, the 
domestic political situation has stayed about the 
same, with the exception of President Zayed, whose 
role in the day-to-day affairs of the state continues 
to diminish.  Sheikh Zayed returned to Abu Dhabi in 
mid-September after spending the summer in Europe, 
where he underwent minor surgery for a hernia. 
Despite his age and his many health problems, he 
continues to see local and regional leaders, 
including President Mubarak on September 29.  We 
believe his wife, Sheikha Fatima, and his sons shield 
him from situations where he may be embarrassed by a 
failure of memory or loss of train of thought.  We 
note he mostly accepts calls with people he is 
familiar with and/or are more courtesy than 
substance.  During his meeting with General Franks in 
June 2003, he did not address any substantive issues, 
but presented him with the UAE medal.  His sons have 
taken over the substantive day-to-day operation of 
all the major portfolios of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi 
and the Federal level ministries.  That said, we 
continue to hear evidence that he is "consulted" on 
major issues that are likely to come to his attention 
or require his approval to gain support from other 
quarters. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
UAE Mission: No longer a quiet post with 30% growth 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶13. (C) Our two governments continue to broaden and 
deepen bilateral ties in all domains, including 
military cooperation, law enforcement coordination, 
counter-terrorism training, trade and investment 
promotion, human rights monitoring, and educational 
and cultural programming.  This expanded relationship 
has been accompanied by a 30 percent increase in 
mission staff over the last three years, and other 
federal agencies are looking to Abu Dhabi for their 
regional offices.  When we move into our new Embassy 
next January, our space already will be at a premium. 
Time permitting, we will give you a brief windshield 
tour of the construction site. 
 
------------------ 
Dubai Crown Prince 
------------------ 
 
¶14. (C) You will want to open your meeting with 
Sheikh Muhammad Bin Rashid (MBR) by congratulating 
him on Dubai's successful hosting of the IMF/World 
Bank Annual Meetings two weeks ago.  The UAE at the 
Federal level was heavily involved in the IMF/World 
Bank event, but Dubai and MBR clearly viewed it as 
their opportunity to showcase the uniqueness of Dubai 
as a regional hub for business, tourism, and travel. 
Both Secretary Snow and Fed Chairman Greenspan came 
away very impressed with what they saw here.  You 
might also wish to express appreciation for the 
relatively large, high-ranking delegations that Dubai 
sent to represent the UAE at the US-Arab Economic 
Forum in Detroit (a women's delegation headed by 
Sheikha Lubna Al-Qassimi and a men's delegation 
headed by Sheikh Ahmad Bin Saeed Al-Maktoum). 
 
¶15. (C) When the conversation turns to politics, you 
can expect to hear -- in addition to pleasure at the 
fact that Saddam is now out of the picture -- deep 
concern at our handling of the occupation in Iraq, in 
particular what MBR views as our ill-advised decision 
to dismiss Iraq's 500,000 man strong army.  MBR is 
likely to argue that US soldiers and tanks should not 
be patrolling the streets of Iraqi cities but should 
rather be deployed to bases outside the cities; from 
there US commanders could work discreetly with local 
leaders and police to establish order inside the 
cities.  MBR will likely tell you that the US needs 
to work harder to employ Iraqi workers and businesses 
in the reconstruction of Iraq (two of his favorite 
anecdotes in this regard are a bridge in Baghdad that 
the US allegedly paid a US company "millions" to 
reconstruct when there was an Iraqi company willing 
to do it for a fraction of that, and an alleged US 
decision to send a huge order for printing new Iraqi 
textbooks to a US company, leaving Iraq's normal 
textbook printing companies standing idle.) 
 
¶16. (U) This cable was coordinated with AmConsul 
Dubai. 
 
¶17. (U)  MINIMIZE CONSIDERED 
WAHBA