This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ZAGREB 001937 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2013 
TAGS: PARM PREL HR LY
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR DISCUSSES 
LIBYA, ARTICLE 98, REGIONAL RELATIONS, ICTY AND IRAQ 
 
REF: BELGRADE 2018 
 
Classified By: DCM Patrick Moon for Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) The DCM met September 3 with President Mesic,s new 
Foreign Policy Advisor, Ambassador Ivica Mastruko.  Mastruko 
said there had been no discussion of military-related 
projects during President Mesic,s recent trip to Libya. 
President Mesic has washed his hands of any personal efforts 
to facilitate the surrender of Croatian ICTY indictee 
Gotovina to The Hague.  Although Mesic,s upcoming first 
official visit to Belgrade would be heavy on protocol events, 
Mesic would likely meet with Croatian-Serb refugees and urge 
them to return home.  Mastruko said work was underway on an 
Article 98 proposal that Picula would present in the U.S. 
this month.  Finally, Mesic would neither promote nor 
criticize the GOC,s proposal to send a military contingent 
to Iraq.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) In our first ever meeting on September 2 with 
Ambassador Mastruko (see paras 10-11 for bio information) 
since he took over as President Mesic,s foreign policy 
advisor late last month, Mastruko emphasized the importance 
of the Croatian relationship with the U.S. and his strong 
desire to consult closely, frequently and candidly with the 
U.S. Embassy.  The DCM explained that newly arrived 
Ambassador Frank had established informal relationships with 
senior GOC officials to promote good communication and a 
better understanding of each country,s points of view. 
 
Libya 
----- 
 
¶3.  (C) Mastruko understood U.S. sensitivities regarding 
Croatia,s warming relations with Libya and explained that 
President Mesic,s only objective was to gain commercial 
projects for Croatian firms.  He made clear that there were 
no representatives of military-related firms on Mesic,s trip 
to Libya last month and there were no discussions of any 
military projects with the Libyans ) nothing on military 
ships, nothing on aircraft (contradicting reftel allegations 
from Yugoimport).  He did say that the Libyans expressed 
interest in using Croatian shipyards to overhaul old 
commercial vessels. 
 
¶4. (C) Mastruko said that Mesic had even acted on behalf of 
other countries in the region in promoting specific 
commercial projects such as the sale of Macedonian steel and 
Bosnian road building capabilities. 
 
¶5.  (C) However, Mastruko ended this discussion by noting 
that although Croatia would never do so, he was aware that 
Serbia and Montenegro may be considering a Libyan proposal to 
train pilots. 
 
Trip to Belgrade 
---------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Mastruko said that Mesic,s upcoming first official 
trip to Belgrade would be heavy on protocol and light on 
substance.  However, Mesic was seriously considering a 
meeting with Croatian Serb refugees to urge them to return 
home. 
 
Troops to Iraq 
-------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) When the DCM expressed appreciation for the GOC,s 
decision to send a small military contingent to Iraq, 
Mastruko carefully observed that Mesic had agreed with PM 
Racan not to comment publicly on this proposal before the 
Sabor endorses it, which the GOC expects by the end of 
September.  Mastruko noted that there had been some criticism 
of this deployment in the press and the public did not seem 
strongly supportive.  (Comment:  We believe that President 
Mesic has reservations about deploying Croatian troops 
without a specific endorsement by the UNSC.  End comment.) 
 
Article 98 
---------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Mastruko confirmed that the MFA was working on two 
possible alternative approaches to an Article 98 agreement. 
One would be an extradition treaty and the other an MLAT-type 
agreement.  He said FM Picula would take the proposal to the 
U.S. this month for discussion with senior U.S. officials. 
(Comment:  It was not clear whether Mastruko was suggesting 
the proposal would include both agreements or whether the MFA 
was studying whether to propose one or the other.  End 
Comment.) 
 
 
ICTY 
---- 
 
¶9.  (C) In light of UNSCR 1503 and Gotovina,s failure to 
act, Mastruko said that President Mesic had dropped all his 
efforts to facilitate Gotovina,s surrender and transfer to 
the ICTY.  He was now encouraging the Ministry of Interior 
and other GOC organizations to do everything possible to 
capture Gotovina who was now &on his own.8 
 
Biographic Information 
---------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Ambassador Mastruko was born on an island near Zadar 
in 1940.  His work experience is as follows: 
 
1963-1966   Journalist for Narodni List weekly 
1966-1972   Professional politician in district 
             committee of Communist Party 
1972-1974   Manager and editor-in-chief of Zadar Radio 
             and Television Center 
1974-1978   President of Executive Council of the 
             Zadar Municipal Assembly 
1978-1982   President of Zadar Municipal Assembly 
1979-1989   Professor at Zadar Faculty of Philosphy 
1989-1991   SFRY Ambassador to Vatican 
1992-1993   Croatian Ambassador to Italy 
1993-1996   Croatian Ambassador to Greece and Armenia 
1996-2000   Croatian Ambassador to Slovenia 
2000-2001   Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
2002-2003   Advisor to President Mesic on Domestic 
             Affairs (Relations with Religious Communities) 
2003- Advisor to President Mesic for Foreign Policy 
 
¶11.  (C)  Mastruko speaks excellent English, is fluent in 
Italian and is &proficient8 in German and Slovenian. 
Mastruko clearly enjoyed his diplomatic postings.  He is 
married and has two grown sons who work in Zagreb. 
FRANK 
 
 
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