This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ZAGREB 001925 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE PASS OES/RSMITH AND L/AROACH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2014 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHSA EWWT EFIS SENV SI HR EUN
SUBJECT: INTENT TO DECLARE EEZ ADDS NEW WRINKLES TO OLD 
DISPUTE 
 
REF: A. LJUBLJANA 862 
     ¶B. ZAGREB 1903 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Isabella Detwiler, Economic officer, reasons 1.5 (b and 
d) 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (C) On September 3, the Slovenian Charge called upon the 
DCM to deliver a fairly low-key pitch that the U.S. and EU 
help "create the atmosphere" for a resolution over the 
conflict over the Croatian intention to announce an exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) in the Adriatic.  In a presentation that 
seemed to mix personal opinion with instructions from 
Ljubljana, he downplayed Slovenian economic interests, 
instead emphasizing Slovene concerns over access to open seas 
and a belief that Croatia intended to use the EEZ declaration 
as an attempt to strengthen its hand in the still-unresolved 
negotiation of a sea and land border agreement. 
 
¶2.  (C) In a separate meeting with the Croatian MFA, the head 
of the Legal Department assured us that an EEZ would not 
cause problems in navigation (including for warships), and 
would not affect existing Slovene-Croatian fishing 
agreements.  Our interlocutor said discussions were ongoing, 
and that no definite decision had been made to declare an EEZ 
as opposed to an ecological and/or environmental zone.  End 
Summary 
 
EEZ and Border Agreement -- Separate but Linked 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3.  (C) On September 4, Slovenian Charge Hocevar called on 
the DCM.  He noted that the Slovenian non-paper on the EEZ 
issue, presented to an embassy colleague the day before 
(faxed to EUR/SCE, L and OES), was "already" old, and that 
the Slovenian arguments were evolving, especially as it 
prepared for an October 22-24 meeting in Brussels and a EU 
fisheries meeting in Venice, set for November.  He emphasized 
that while the EEZ and the border agreement were legally 
separate, the main Croatian motivation in declaring the EEZ 
was to put Croatia in a stronger position in the border 
negotiation (an earlier settlement, which covered both 
maritime boundaries and some small adjustments to the land 
border, was initialed by the GOC and GOS, but repudiated by 
the GOC after meeting fierce opposition in Croatia).  Hocevar 
speculated that Croatia may also wish to cement rights over 
gas deposits. 
 
¶4.  (C) While conceding that the repudiated agreement was not 
legally binding, Hocevar was confident it would form the 
"basis" of an arbitrated agreement.  When asked if the GOS 
was willing to accept arbitration, he noted that the GOS was 
concerned about the possible partiality of a judge on the 
International Maritime Court in Hamburg, so had rejected that 
venue.  The International Court of Justice in the Hague was a 
possibility, but the GOS had not made a final decision. 
 
Electioneering 
-------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Hocevar was pointed in ascribing current Croatian 
policy statements to electioneering.  He believed that Deputy 
Foreign Minister Simonovic was the architect of this 
anti-Slovenian campaign waged in the press without 
consultations with Ljubljana.  Hocevar also commented that 
the Slovenian side should lower its rhetoric, and not allow 
itself to be baited by the Croatians. 
 
"Basic Right of Access" 
----------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Hocevar downplayed Slovenian economic interest in 
fisheries, guessing that there were only about 50 Slovenian 
fishermen.  However, history, the coastal way of life and 
"tradition" gave the sector more weight than the employment 
numbers would indicate.  The main reason for Slovenia's 
concern was a fear of being cut off from the open sea.  When 
the DCM noted that the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
guarantees the right of innocent passage, Hocevar replied 
that in cases of "national emergencies," EEZs could be closed 
off, creating crises -- e.g., Panama under Noriega or a 
Greek-Turkish conflict that almost led to war.  Hocevar 
argued it was in the interest of all countries, including the 
U.S., to preserve as open access as possible to the high 
 
 
seas, and that it was the "basic right" of Slovenia to have 
access to the sea.  Slovenia would seek a joint-ecological 
zone.  "Hopefully, Croatia will see the importance of EU and 
NATO in today's world," Hocevar concluded. 
 
A Concession Too Far 
-------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Previously, we met with the head of the MFA's 
international legal department, Andreja Metelko-Zgombic.  She 
confirmed many of the points made the day earlier by the 
Deputy Minister to the diplomatic corps (ref B).  Discussing 
the repudiated border agreement, which the Slovenians believe 
enhances their rights to "territorial access" to the open sea 
(as opposed to merely effective access through transit 
rights), Zgombic said the agreement had been opposed even 
before its initialing by most Croatian legal experts, but had 
been a good-faith effort to promote good neighborly 
relations.  It ultimately proved to be too generous to gain 
the constitutionally required parliamentary ratification. 
The agreement, which included both sea borders and minor land 
border adjustments, would have ceded Croatian territorial 
waters to create an open sea corridor from internationally 
recognized open seas to Slovenian territorial waters.  In 
doing so, it would have cut off a triangle of Croatian 
territorial waters from the rest of Croatian jurisdiction. 
The Croatians had also negotiated some concessions on the 
land border within the same agreement, which were also not 
now operable.  Zgombic reiterated previous Croatian 
assertions that the GOC was ready to seek arbitration in any 
relevant court, including the ICJ. 
 
¶8.  (C) When asked to comment on Slovenian press suggestions 
for a Monaco-like solution (France ceded some territorial 
waters to Monaco to ensure Monaco's access to open sea), 
Zgombic noted that France "gave" this away -- it was not a 
right of Monaco -- and a similar approach had already been 
tried in the form of the rejected agreement and found 
politically infeasible. 
 
If Navigation, Fishing and Gas Not Issues ... 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) On practical issues, Zgombic said that existing 
fisheries treaties with Slovenia, which extend fishing rights 
in territorial waters, would continue in force (the EEZ would 
have no impact on territorial waters).  Croatia was prepared 
to negotiate special fishing rights in the EEZ for Slovenia 
as a Geographically Disadvantaged Country as provided for 
under Article 70 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
The right of innocent passage without prior notification 
through the EEZ, including for military ships, was not in 
doubt.  The memorandum recently signed by Croatia, Italy and 
Slovenia, which created counter-clockwise commercial traffic 
lanes in the Adriatic, would remain in force.  Finally, 
Zgombic looked surprised when asked if an EEZ would have any 
impact on exploitation rights of the seabed in the Adriatic. 
She noted that it is clear in law that an EEZ has no impact 
on the rights related to the underlying seabed, which are 
determined by agreements on the continental shelf, which is 
not in dispute. (Note: at least so far.) 
 
¶10.  (C) Zgombic claimed that no firm decisions had been made 
on the declaration of an EEZ.  The options of declaring an 
ecological zone or a fisheries zone were still in play.  She 
saw little difference between a combined fisheries/ecological 
zone, and an EEZ.  (Note: the previous day, the Deputy 
Minister had told the diplomatic corps that the GOC 
preference was for an EEZ because of its more solid legal 
base.) 
 
... Then Why the Decision? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) When asked why the government had decided to make 
this declaration of intent now, after having mulled over the 
issue publicly so long, Zgombic ventured that the EU policy 
of encouraging fishery or ecological zones had been an 
important factor, as well as evident degradation of the 
environment and decline in fish stocks.  Earlier, Croatia had 
been constrained by political considerations, including a 
perception that Italy would object to losing automatic access 
to nearby open sea.  (Comment: It is very likely Croatia 
would negotiate special fishing rights for Italy when 
delimiting the overlapping Croatian and Italian EEZ claims. 
It is also likely that Croatian elections, slated for 
 
 
November, factored in the decision; being tough on the 
Slovenians is always a political winner.  End Comment.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12.  (C) While confident of its right to declare an EEZ, the 
GOC is aware of its obligation to consult -- but it does not 
believe that consultations need to be concluded to Slovenian 
satisfaction before it can act.  Nevertheless, the government 
has said it will not declare an EEZ precipitously.  It has 
(belatedly) sought consultations, and publicly called for the 
return of the Slovene ambassador, recalled by Ljubljana 
earlier this week.  While the GOC has mustered its legal 
arguments, it is unclear whether the GOC has considered all 
the political consequences -- especially if the GOS puts 
teeth in its alleged intimations that its support for 
Croatia's EU membership is at risk.  We concur with Embassy 
Ljubljana's recommendation that Croatia and Slovenia be 
encouraged to work this out bilaterally, or in an EU context. 
FRANK 
 
 
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