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Viewing cable 03THEHAGUE2227, DUTCH THOUGHTS ON EU GYMNICH MEETING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03THEHAGUE2227 2003-09-04 13:46 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy The Hague
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

041346Z Sep 03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002227 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2013 
TAGS: PREL EU NL UNHRC OSCE
SUBJECT: DUTCH THOUGHTS ON EU GYMNICH MEETING 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 250490 
 
     B. THE HAGUE 2210 
     C. THE HAGUE 2173 
     D. THE HAGUE 2171 
     E. THE HAGUE 2114 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Mary E. Daly Reasons 1.5 (b) 
 
1.  (C) We spoke with working-level contacts about Gymnich 
while the FM was in Washington.  According to contacts, the 
Dutch will push EU counterparts at Gymnich for an EU 
designation of HAMAS (ref B) and greater international 
support for the transition phase in Iraq.  The Dutch will 
also query EU partners for ideas on how to improve the impact 
of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). 
 
2.  (C) On the European Security Strategy, Senior Dutch 
officials say they will encourage EU partners to make the ESS 
as compatible with the US National Security Strategy as 
possible.  However, in general the Dutch are pleased with the 
ESS draft, and do not want to waste time in the next few 
months "discussing it over and over again just because we 
have the time."  There is concern by the Dutch that other 
countries will attempt to make the document too specific. 
The GoNL prefers to leave it vague, with the plan to add 
annexes in the future as needed.  MFA contacts also noted 
that the EU plans to initiate a number of public seminars on 
ESS in the coming months. 
 
 
3.  (U) Following are excepts (informal translation) of the 
Foreign Minister's September 1 letter to Parliament in 
advance of the Gymnich meeting: 
 
EU Security Strategy (ESS) 
--------------------------- 
 
The Netherlands welcomes the analysis in the draft of the 
main threats and the strategic goals in the ESS, as well as 
the importance it attaches to the transatlantic relationship. 
 In order to be able to protect itself adequately against 
threats, the EU should focus in the first place on the 
security situation in, and relations with, neighboring 
countries.  In this context, one should think in particular 
of a strengthened dialogue and cooperation with the Arab 
world and better use of existing EU mechanisms instruments, 
for instance through intensification of the Barcelona 
process.  In addition, the EU should actively strive for a 
more effective multilateral system "with teeth" for the 
purpose of advancing global peace and security. 
 
The Netherlands attaches great value to the chosen broad, 
integrated approach on the security "Concept" in the 
document, in which, besides military aspects, development 
cooperation, trade, the environment and promotion of good 
governance, the rule of law and democracy are considered in 
their mutual context.  September 11 demonstrated unmistakably 
that internal and external security cannot be viewed 
separately.  This also means that the combat against internal 
and external threats are one and the same, which should be 
waged by making and optimal and coherent use of the 
instruments that the Union has at its disposal. 
 
The proposed ESS could be made operational in annexes that 
discuss in detail regional (the union's periphery) and 
thematic priorities (international order, non-proliferation, 
combat against terrorism, etc.).  The development of the 
security strategy should be discussed in conjunction with the 
development of ESDP.  The latter primarily concerns proposals 
to improve European military capabilities. 
 
MEPP 
---- 
 
The Netherlands sees no other option but to adhere to the 
political process laid down in the Roadmap.  The Netherlands 
will plead to add the political branch of HAMAS to the EU 
list of terrorist organizations, whose assets should be 
frozen.  (Note: see Ref B for complete report.  End note.). 
 
Iraq 
----- 
 
The Dutch believe there is growing awareness that the CPA has 
thus far not been able to bring about improved living 
conditions and to win the Iraqi people's confidence ("win the 
peace").  The GoNL believes this trend should be reversed by 
parallel progress on three tracks, namely "security" 
(including reinforced contribution of the international 
community to the stabilization force), "winning the people's 
hearts and minds" (through better facilities, particularly 
water and fuel), and "political reconstruction" (visible 
increased transfer of power to the Iraqis through the 
Governing Council and restoration of sovereignty in the 
second half of 2004 via 
"constitution-election-representative government").  The 
Dutch feel the UN has an important role to play in promoting 
greater involvement of the international community.  The GoNL 
believes that a new UNSC resolution could advance this and 
give a boost to the political process that has been initiated 
in Iraq. 
 
Relations with Mediterranean countries 
--------------------------------------- 
 
With the Union's imminent enlargement, the GoNL acknowledges 
the Mediterranean region will become increasingly important. 
The Dutch see possibilities to improve the multifaceted 
relations with this region in different areas.  First, the 
Netherlands supports the planned foundation of a 
Euro-Mediterranean foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures. 
The Netherlands attaches significant importance to promotion 
of dialogue among various cultures in this region.  It 
advocates a simple structure and financing on a voluntary 
basis.  It therefore places emphasis on concrete activities 
and cooperation, and not on burdening EU institutions. 
Secondly, the Netherlands is strongly in favor of giving more 
attention to human rights and democratization in relations 
with the Mediterranean partners.  It supports the idea of 
letting financial assistance depend on progress in these 
areas.  The Netherlands also advocates close regional and 
bilateral cooperation with these countries in the area of 
asylum and migration.  It seeks to conclude detailed 
re-admission agreements, as agreed in the association accord 
with most of these partner countries.  Finally, the 
Netherlands believes that instability and extremism in the 
region cannot be seen separately from economic circumstances. 
 In the economic area the Netherlands advocates more generous 
access to each other's markers, economic reform and regional 
economic integration rather than making available more 
sources of financing.  Wijnands comments that these ideas 
essentially boil down to the GoNL desire for the EU to 
increase its relationship with Mediterranean countries by 
fully implementing the numerous agreements already in place, 
rather than creating new agreements. 
SOBEL