This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002251 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INR/B 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2013 
TAGS: PINR YM KPRP DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: YEMEN OFFICIALS: AL-AHMAR AND SALIM SALIH MUHAMMAD 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 221932 
     ¶B. SANAA 2218 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alan G. Misenheimer 
for reasons 1.5, b and d 
 
¶1. (s) Answers are keyed to reftel questions.  See reftel b 
for more information on prominent exiles returning to Yemen. 
 
¶2. (s) Salim Salih Muhammad: 
 
¶A. (s/nf)  Why did President Saleh appoint Muhammad as his 
special advisor when he was Saleh's former political rival? 
 
President Saleh has been keen on reconciliation with those 
leaders of the former PDRY who were exiled (or who exiled 
themselves) after the 1994 war.  Observers believe his 
motives for seeking reconciliation are complicated and 
include several elements.  Some believe he wants to ensure 
the Republic of Yemen can never be split again into north and 
south by keeping close tabs on the PDRY's former leaders. 
Others argue that President Saleh wants to balance tribal, 
military and Islamist influences through high-level 
appointments such as Salim Salih's. 
 
¶B. (s/nf) How is Muhammad viewed in Yemen? 
 
Views about Salim Salih vary depending on one's political 
views.  General People's Congress (GPC) members would tend to 
think he's "come to his senses" by joining the government, 
while YSP members and other oppositionists would view him as 
an opportunist who is just seeking a government position and 
power.  He is also a long-time advocate for merging political 
parties, particularly YSP and GPC, both during early 
unification period and more recently in informal gatherings. 
Because he keeps a fairly low profile, it is unclear how the 
general public views him. 
 
¶C. (s/nf) What kind of influence does Muhammad have in the 
Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP)? 
 
Salim Salih formally remains a politburo member of the YSP. 
However, there is no evidence that he ever attends meetings, 
nor do YSP leaders cite him as one of their leaders. 
 
¶D. (s/nf) What are his leadership and personality traits -- 
does he have any influence or base beyond his YSP 
connections, e.g., among tribes or military officers? 
 
He is a prominent member of the Yafaa tribe, which is one of 
two tribes which has kept to strong tribal ways in the south. 
 The Yafaas are located in Lahaj governorate, although many 
of the most prominent leaders are businessmen in the southern 
port city of Aden.  While he is considered a leader, he is 
not a shaykh.  He does not appear to have mass popularity or 
a strong base beyond his tribe. 
 
In July 2003, rumors circulated in Yemen that Salim Salih was 
being groomed for the Vice Presidency.  The ROYG 
Vice-president Abdo-Rabo Mansoor was out of the country at 
the time.  The rumors speculated that President Saleh would 
appoint him Deputy Chairman of the GPC at the next party 
congress, a position held by VP Mansoor.  Rumors further 
noted that the President would appoint him Vice-President 
soon thereafter.  (Note: Mansoor was the leader of a group of 
southerners called Zumra who fled to the north after YSP 
in-fighting in 1986.  In 1994, the same group fought 
prominently on the side of the north.  End note)  These 
rumors have died down significantly since the return of 
Mansoor to Yemen later in July. 
 
¶3. (u) Additional bio notes: Salim Salih Muhammed is commonly 
known as "Salim Salih."  He was born in 1948 in Yafa'a in the 
Lahj governorate, and is married with children.  He graduated 
from Belqis College in Aden.  From 1980 to 1985, he was 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (PDRY).  He was first elected Assistant 
Secretary General of the YSP after the bloody infighting of 
 
SIPDIS 
YSP factions in 1986.  From 1990 to 1994, he was Assistant 
Secretary General of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) and 
 
SIPDIS 
member of the Presidential Council of the Republic of Yemen. 
Salih was a member of the Presidential Council of the 
proclaimed separatist government of the South during the 1994 
war (May to July).  His 1994 to 2002 exile in the United Arab 
Emirates ended when President Saleh appointed him an advisor 
in May 2003.  End bio notes. 
 
¶4. (s) Abdullah al-Ahmar: 
 
¶A. (s/nf) As the reappointed Speaker of Parliament and the 
leader of Islah, how has his relationship with President 
Saleh changed since the Islah party lost votes in the April 
27 election? 
 
It appears that the relationship has worsened, although it is 
by no means ended.  President Saleh called al-Ahmar "senile" 
in a televised interview with al-Jazeera in July 2003, 
shocking many observers.  (Comment:  None of the newspaper 
accounts of the interview mentioned the quote and it appears 
that a lid has been placed on discussion of the topic to 
prevent an escalation of personal tensions.  End comment.) 
At the same time, the general rhetoric against Islah by 
GPC-affiliated newspapers and commentators has increased, in 
some cases calling Islah the "taliban" and hinting at terror 
connections. 
 
¶B. (s/nf) Is his tribal position of less importance now than 
before -- did the election results diminish his influence 
with the tribes? 
 
There is no evidence that the election results have had any 
negative effect on his strong influence with the tribes. 
 
¶C. (s/nf) Are he and Salih equals, rivals or partners? 
 
They are both rivals and partners.  Al-Ahmar and Salih are 
not equals, but both have immense influence in different 
spheres.  Saleh's personal control of Yemen's executive 
apparatus, particularly the government's revenue stream, 
budget process and -- above all -- the military, place Saleh 
in a pre-emininent position.  (Comment:  It appears that 
Salih no longer needs al-Ahmar like he did during and 
immediately after the 1994 conflict, when the Islah party and 
al-Ahmar played key roles in winning the war.  Their 
partnership appears to come into play only when both sides 
have something to protect or to gain from it. End comment.) 
 
¶D. (s/nf) What is Abdallah al-Ahmar's familial/tribal 
relationship with President Saleh? 
 
Al-Ahmar is Paramount Shaykh of the Hashid federation, of 
which President Saleh is only a member.  There do not appear 
to be familial ties between them. 
 
¶E. (s/nf) What is his (Abdallah al-Ahmar's) relationship with 
Shaykh Zindani, for example, has he distanced himself from 
Zindani because of terrorism connections? 
 
Al-Ahmar's exact relationship with Zindani is unclear, but 
does not appear to be close.  During the election period, 
President Saleh gave Zindani a prominent role in the 
committee to ensure a Code of Conduct between the parties for 
a peaceful election.  (Comment: Saleh's aims were probably 
two-fold, both trying to encourage a split by Islah's 
factions (tribal, religious and business) and highlighting 
the extreme side of Islah.  End comment.)   Before that, 
Zindani had been keeping a low profile in the aftermath of 
the 9/11 attacks. 
 
¶F. (s/nf) Is he (al-Ahmar) as moderate and against terrorism 
as he claims to be or is there more of a story here? 
 
Al-Ahmar's rhetoric claims to be against terrorism, and Post 
has no evidence that there is "more of a story."  Some 
government measures to combat terrorism have been stymied by 
al-Ahmar, but the stated reasons are not linked to not 
wanting to fight terror.  For example, the ROYG's efforts to 
strengthen their gun control law have been stopped by 
al-Ahmar, but on cultural and traditionalist tribal grounds 
(where the carrying of weapons is an important symbol) and 
for reasons of personal power. 
 
¶G. (s/nf) What information do you have on his (al-Ahmar's) 
sons, i.e., do they still have drinking problems and are 
disliked? 
 
The sons are still widely disliked, and seemingly for good 
reason.  For example, a wide-ranging shoot-out near the 
British Embassy in Sanaa in late 2002 was a direct result of 
one of the son's bodyguards shooting at British Embassy 
guards when they tried to limit the al-Ahmars' ability to 
park near the Embassy.  The sons have also expanded their 
influence in political and business circles.  For example, 
four al-Ahmar sons (from both the Islah and GPC parties) are 
now members of Parliament, causing many to joke that their 
caucus rivals that of the YSP (which has seven members). 
 
¶H. (s/nf) Is he (al-Ahmar) still on the Saudi payroll? 
 
It is not known if al-Ahmar remains on the Saudi payroll, but 
he clearly has ties to the country.  For example, in August 
2003 he returned from the KSA after seeking medical 
treatment.  In 2000, he was instrumental in helping to broker 
the Yemen-Saudi border agreement. 
 
¶I. (s/nf) Does he (al-Ahmar) retain other prominent foreign 
connections? 
 
Some of his family members have married tribal leaders in 
other countries.  For example, in June 2003 his daughter was 
allegedly killed by her husband, a tribal leader in Jordan. 
 
¶J. (s/nf)  What are his (al-Ahmar's) major business/property 
interests? 
 
The al-Ahmar Group is involved in the oil and gas services 
industry and imports military and police equipment.  The 
group is also a major shareholder of SabaFon, one of the two 
prominent mobile communications companies in Yemen, and is 
part owner of Sabaa Islamic Bank and Universal Travel.  The 
group also owns franchises for Kentucky Fried Chicken and 
Baskin Robbins.  The Al-Ahmar family are reputed to be 
heavily invested in qat production. 
 
¶K. (s/nf) Do these affect/shape his (al-Ahmar's) politics to 
any agree? 
 
He appears to be able to separate his politics from his 
business interests.  For example, during the most recent war 
in Iraq, al-Ahmar called loudly for a boycott of American 
products, but he never closed his Kentucky Fried Chicken or 
Baskin Robbins franchises. 
MISENHEIMER