This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001888 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS AND DS/IP/SA 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  MAOISTS OFFER TEN-DAY HOLIDAY TRUCE; 
GOVERNMENT NONCOMMITTAL 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 1836 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (U)  On September 26 the Maoist leadership issued a press 
statement declaring a ceasefire from October 2-9 in honor of 
the Hindu festival of Dashain.  In announcing the truce, 
Maoist leader Prachanda cited the "feeling of the masses and 
appeals from different political and human rights 
organizations and civil society."  (The Maoist website on 
which the statement is posted notes that "it is quite ironic 
that a revolutionary movement aimed at total . . . 
transformation of the society has to consider . . . some 
traditional  festivals would take a long time to fade out of 
the consciousness of the masses.") 
 
¶2.  (U) Prachanda's statement went on to allege that "we want 
a genuine ceasefire, peace and progress in this country."  He 
attempts to shift the blame for breaking the January 29 
ceasefire onto the "regressive old feudal state, playing into 
the hands of foreign power centers, particularly US 
imperialism, (which) has falsely and deliberately charged us 
with having broken the ceasefire and peace talks .  . . . 
(but) who compelled our Party and the masses to go for 
resistance by openly violating the ceasefire since the 
beginning. . . ."  He cautions that the unilateral ceasefire 
may give "the old state" and its security forces "undue 
opportunity," and thus calls on "all the democratic political 
forces, human rights organizations, civil society and the 
general masses of the people in the country to focus pressure 
on the old state . . ." 
 
¶3.  (U)  So far, however, public reaction to the announcement 
has been fairly muted.  Only one of Nepal's numerous human 
rights organizations was quoted in the local press as 
welcoming the truce.  Response from mainstream political 
parties has been similarly restrained, although Madhav Kumar 
Nepal, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal - 
United Marxist Leninist (UML), commended the move on 
September 27 and is quoted in the local press as calling on 
the Government of Nepal (GON) to reciprocate.  The GON so far 
has been noncommittal in its response to the declaration. 
Cabinet Ministers Kamal Thapa and Sarbendra Nath Shukla were 
both quoted in the local press as welcoming the 
ceasefire--while adroitly sidestepping the question of 
whether the GON would reciprocate. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Comment:  Since unilaterally breaking the ceasefire 
on August 27, the Maoists have earned much condemnation from 
"civil society" without being able to demonstrate many 
tactical successes.  Most important, the Maoists have thus 
far proven unable to mount the kind of large-scale attacks 
against GON security forces that stunned the RNA in November 
2001 or the systematic urban guerrilla warfare that many 
observers feared they had been planning during the 
seven-month moratorium on fighting.  With the exception of 
the assassination of an RNA colonel the first day after the 
ceasefire ended, in the one month since the resumption of 
hostilities, the Maoists have little more to point to as 
successes than the killings of village-level leaders, 
lower-ranking policemen, and a three-day imposition of the 
ever-unpopular general strike, or "bandh."  Under such 
circumstances,  the Maoists may have decided that extending 
an olive branch, however short, will deflect public scrutiny 
of their unimpressive performance so far.  The RNA is 
aggressively pursuing the Maoists their mid-western 
heartland, while security authorities in Kathmandu have made 
a number of significant arrests, which forestalled or 
disrupted Maoist plans. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Comment Continued:  The RNA, bolstered by its 
apparent victory in Rolpa (Reftel), feels more confident than 
before of its ability and is unlikely to advocate accepting a 
ceasefire, however limited.  The security authorities clearly 
believe that they are putting considerable pressure on the 
Maoists and want this pressure to continue.  The 
less-than-overwhelming public reception of Prachanda's 
statement probably has more to do with the Nepali public's 
wariness--and weariness-of the Maoists' pretensions to peace 
than with any real appetite for a protracted conflict.  The 
insurgents have demonstrated their lack of credibility too 
many times already for either the GON, the security forces, 
or even the general public to believe that this offer is much 
more than a cynical attempt to divert public criticism of 
their tactics and forestall further RNA successes for the 
near future. 
MALINOWSKI