This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 001427 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU
SUBJECT: ISTANBUL VIEWS ON SENDING TURKISH TROOPS TO IRAQ 
 
 
Classified By: Consul General David Arnett for Reasons 1.5 (b&d) 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Istanbul residents from all walks of life 
continue to worry about the situation in Iraq and the 
prospect of sending troops to Iraq.  Whomever we meet with, 
and whatever the subject, the conversation inevitably turns 
to Iraq.  Despite the widespread opposition before the U.S. 
intervention, Turks here are now split on the issue of 
whether to send troops to Iraq.  Many see the March 1 
decision and the preceding negotiations as having been 
"disastrous" for U.S.-Turkish relations.  Nevertheless, 
several of our interlocutors insist on the need for a U.N. 
Security Council (or at least NATO) mandate.  With the 
notable exception of the Turkish Industrialists' and 
Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD), the business community 
has largely come out in support of Turkish participation in 
Iraq on the grounds that it would help secure a foothold for 
Turkish companies in that market and would ensure the 
continuation of good U.S.-Turkish relations.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C) The following sample of comments on Iraq provide a 
general snapshot of the views that we have been hearing: 
 
 
-- Istanbul Health Director (and close acquaintance of PM 
Erdogan) Erman Tuncer waxed eloquently on the importance of 
U.S.-Turkish relations, lamented how difficult (but 
democratic and correct) the March 1 decision had been, and 
insisted that a UNSCR would be critical to securing the 
participation of Turkish peacekeepers (Note: Tuncer somewhat 
disingenuously sought to blame this prerequisite on President 
Sezer's position. End Note). 
 
 
-- Former Istanbul CHP Chairman (and recent challenger) 
Mehmet Boluk also emphasized the need to maintain the 
U.S.-Turkish relationship and said that he would have 
supported closer cooperation with the U.S. from the 
beginning, including in the March 1 vote.  Boluk criticized 
the CHP for not behaving like a "real" opposition and for 
ignoring Turkey's interests, noting that the British 
opposition had provided critical support to British PM Blair. 
 (Note: Boluk has an axe to grind with CHP Chairman Baykal. 
End Note). 
 
 
-- Istanbul AKP Vice Chairman Murat Yalcintas told us that 
the AKP rank and file are opposed to sending Turkish 
peacekeepers, seeing it as an American effort to minimize 
U.S. casualties.  They are suspicious, moreover, as to why 
the U.S. has not acted against the PKK terrorists in northern 
Iraq.  Without some developments on that front, Yalcintas 
thinks it will be difficult to persuade the general public 
and even AKP parliamentarians to support sending Turkish 
troops. 
 
 
-- CHP parliamentarian Damla Gurel defended her decision to 
vote against the March 1 resolution on the grounds that 
"inside AKP sources" had told them that the vote would pass 
in any case and to do otherwise would have been personal 
"political suicide."  Both Gurel and fellow CHP 
parliamentarian Onur Oymen separately told poloff that CHP is 
in close consultation with President Sezer and that the party 
remains opposed to any deployment of Turkish forces without a 
U.N. (or at least NATO) mandate. 
 
 
-- The managing director of AK Sigorta (one of the top three 
Turkish insurance companies) Ragip Yergin told poloff that 
Turkey had made a mistake not approving the March 1 
resolution and that PM Erdogan "could not afford" to have 
another resolution fail (with or without a UNSCR).  If there 
is a UNSCR, approval of a Turkish resolution is a 
"non-issue." 
 
 
-- MUSIAD Vice Chairman and Albayrak General Coordinator Omer 
Bolat said that he (and most MUSIAD members) supported the 
March 1 decision to deny U.S. troops access to Turkey, but 
that "now the situation is different."  Bolat told us that 
the U.S. should move quickly to multilateralize the foreign 
presence in Iraq and Turkey should participate (providing 
there is a new UNSCR). 
 
 
-- TUSIAD's position shifted in the other direction, however, 
with an equivocal September 19th statement by Chairman Tuncay 
Ozilhan.  While the press widely reported that Ozilhan called 
for a UN resolution as a precondition for any decision to 
send troops to Iraq, and argued that it did not appear likely 
that Turkish troops could contribute to stability there, 
TUSIAD sources stress that his actual statement (which they 
concede was "unfortunately worded") simply argued that 
because of increasing uncertainty in Iraq, "Turkey must think 
more deeply" about whether sending troops will contribute to 
stability there. 
 
 
-- Ulker (food processing giant) CEO Murat Ulker, while 
professing ignorance on political issues, said that "Saddam 
had to go and only the U.S. could do it."  Ulker expressed 
regret about the March 1 decision and support for a possible 
future deployment of Turkish troops. 
 
 
¶3. (C) Comment: The impression we get here is that a decision 
to send troops remains deeply unpopular.  At the same time, 
many of those who supported the March 1 decision acknowledge 
that the situation has changed.  Most are responsive to the 
argument that contributing to a stable, democratic, secular, 
and prosperous Iraq is very much in Turkey's own interests, 
but, at a minimum, they are looking for a UNSCR to provide 
"international legitimacy" and a cover to disassociate a 
Turkish troop presence from the unpopular U.S. "occupation." 
The most perplexing shift is that of TUSIAD, for despite 
arguments by Deputy Chairman Mustafa Koc and others that the 
September 19 statement did not represent a change in the 
organization's policy, it clearly marks a step back from 
TUSIAD's much more unequivocal position in favor of the March 
1 resolution.  Some argue that TUSIAD sensed the way the wind 
was blowing in the government, but former Ambassador and 
TUSIAD board member Cem Duna told us on September 24 that in 
his view the odds of Turkey's ultimately providing troops are 
still "well above 50 percent."  He himself noted, however, 
that he had felt similarly in March.  In any case, though 
TUSIAD represents Turkey's largest companies, it is not part 
of the AK government's constituency, and so is largely 
irrelevant to this government's decision making process. 
ARNETT