This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 002365 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINS VM DPOL
SUBJECT:  Party-State relations in Vietnam 
 
Ref:  A.  Hanoi 2364   B. FBIS SEP20030722000042 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary.  The Communist Party continues to run 
the show in Vietnam, and there are even calls for it to 
"strengthen" its leadership over the State at a time when 
direct Party control over the economy and over individual 
lives has been generally declining.  The CPV's leadership 
role stems directly from the trust of the people, according 
to senior CPV officials; in order to retain that trust the 
Party must be willing to admit mistakes.  Apart from setting 
general guidelines, CPV committees also retain oversight of 
GVN implementation and sometimes provide ongoing advice to 
State organs, which has led to some Party-State conflicts, 
especially at lower levels.  While the judiciary remains 
technically "independent," Party officials continue to have 
input into investigations, arrests, and prosecutions, 
although not -- in theory -- on actual sentencing, even on 
sensitive political cases such as cyber-activist Pham Hong 
Son.  CPV cells remain omnipresent throughout the 
bureaucracy, at all levels.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U)  The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam specifies that the Communist Party of Vietnam is the 
"force leading the State and society" but that all party 
organizations  must "operate within the framework of the 
Constitution and the law."  The realities of Party-State 
relations remain little understood or discussed, however. 
 
¶3.  (U)  The pinnacle of the CPV is its 15-man (literally; 
there are no women members) Politburo, while that of the 
State is the "Government" (comparable to the Cabinet in the 
U.S.), composed of the Prime Minister, three Prime 
Ministers, and 26 ministers or ministerial-equivalents (the 
chairmen of Commissions on Ethnic affairs, on Population, 
Family, and Children, and on Physical Training and Sports, 
as well as the heads of the State Bank, State Inspectorate, 
and Office of Government.)  Institutional overlap between 
Party and Government is inevitable:  sitting on the 
Politburo -- in addition to General Secretary Nong Duc Manh 
and party chiefs for Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City -- are the 
President, Prime Minister, one Deputy Prime Minister, and 
three Ministers (Public Security, Defense, and Culture and 
Information), as well as the Chairman and one Vice Chairman 
of the National Assembly. 
 
Who gets which jobs 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  (U)  In a meeting with Ambassador and Pol/C (ref a), 
Politburo member and CPV Organization Commission Chairman 
Tran Dinh Hoan admitted that the Party had the final say on 
major State appointments.  He cited the example of Vice 
Ministers, who must be vetted by the Party cell (see para 
12) within the Ministry first, then recommended by the 
Minister and approved by the Prime Minister.  After the 
Prime Minister's decision, however, the Organization 
Commission must give its blessing (or not), Hoan said, while 
nonetheless stressing that the CPV did not have the 
exclusive role in deciding.  He added that there was "close 
coordination" between Party and state organs during this 
"open" process, which in principle could be as short as two 
weeks.  The CPV was primarily responsible for ensuring that 
appointees meet criteria for "dignity and character" and 
that they "deserved" the appointment. 
 
¶5.  (U)  Hoan emphasized that CPV membership was not a 
requirement for senior-level appointments, noting that 
historically there had been Deputy Prime Ministers as well 
as Ministers (especially in technical fields such as 
Education, Agriculture, and Health) who were non-Party 
figures.  He indicated that, currently, "some" Vice 
Ministers were non-CPV members, without giving examples.  He 
admitted, however, that as non-CPV members rose through the 
State ranks, the CPV often "brought them in." 
 
Making mistakes 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  (U)  Hoan described CPV leadership as setting the 
"strategic orientation" for the "concrete implementation" by 
the State.  He emphasized that the CPV did not and should 
not "replace" the State, and that the CPV remained only a 
"part of the political system," which it nonetheless leads. 
He claimed that the CPV drew its strength and authority from 
"the people."  In slight contrast, he noted that "the 
people" also built the State, but could also "overthrow" it, 
whereas no one would wish any alternative to the CPV.  He 
stressed the importance that the CPV admit its mistakes to 
the people and take responsibility, as it had when Ho Chi 
Minh apologized publicly and removed then-General Secretary 
Truong Chinh over post-1954 land reform mistakes.  Hoan 
added that mistakes originated whenever the Party "didn't 
listen to the people."   In response to the "opinions of the 
people," the CPV also must continually engage in self-reform 
("tu doi moi," an expansion of the term for Vietnam's 
economic renovation program since 1986). 
 
Readjusting relations 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (U)  In a separate meeting with Pol/C, Le Duc Binh 
(former head of the CPV's Internal Affairs Commission) and 
Dr. Pham Ngoc Quang (former dean at the Ho Chi Minh 
Political Academy) elaborated on a July 2003 article (ref b) 
on "strengthening Party leadership in State management work" 
in the CPV's theoretical publication "Communist Review" (Tap 
Chi Cong San).   Binh noted that the CPV's leading role 
stemmed not from "force" but from the "people's wishes," 
without which the CPV could not maintain its power.  The 
role of the CPV is to "help" the State to "develop the 
potential and interests" of the nation, he claimed.  He 
described the CPV as only a "political party, not a 
manager."  He predicted that the CPV leadership quality 
would continue to rise and push the State's legal 
development and socialist progress to "even higher stages," 
while ensuring also "better service." 
 
¶8.   (U)  In their article, however, the authors highlighted 
the need to "enhance" Party leadership over the State as 
well as to "strengthen" its leadership "over the political 
system in general."  They explicitly reminded that the CPV's 
role was not only to set the "orientation" for the State (as 
suggested by Hoan) but also to "lead in the implementation 
of these policies and directly settle some serious issues." 
Interestingly, they also admitted some "conflicts" between 
Party Committees and People's Committees at provincial and 
local levels due to this overlap.  They cited specifically 
the central role of CPV organs in reviewing performance of 
and in assigning State cadres. 
 
¶9.  (U)  Binh and Quang explained that the impetus for their 
article at this time was that "some" State cadres continue 
to "misunderstand," "implement badly," or even to "violate" 
CPV policies and guidelines.  Therefore, "strengthening" the 
Party would "raise State effectiveness to a higher level." 
They admitted the increasing "dangers" of corruption and 
over-bureaucratization, which had sparked public criticism 
via the National Assembly.  Binh also admitted that the CPV, 
and therefore the GVN, had "made mistakes" due to its 
limited experience in economic affairs in the post-doi moi 
era.  As a result, CPV "leadership capacity" and the 
"feelings of the people" had been "hurt," another reason for 
the immediate need to strengthen Party leadership now in the 
face of new challenges. 
 
Judiciary work 
-------------- 
 
¶10.  (U)  The "Communist Review" article admits an important 
role for the CPV in juridical work, including in the 
"arrest, investigation, and prosecution" phases, while 
simultaneously emphasizing the independence of judges. 
However, the authors noted that "apart from political and 
major socioeconomic transgression cases, the Party will let 
the judicial sector handle all other cases" and that "for 
cases involving political crimes," the Party cell would 
"provide orientations on court trial."  They also admitted 
past cases of "incorrect leadership," in which Party 
committees had "interfered deeply into activities of the 
judicial sector."  Binh explained these comments as a 
reflection on the relative newness of the legal system in 
Vietnam, in which CPV "advice" remained valuable to judicial 
officials.  He reiterated that judges were strictly 
"independent" and influenced only by the law.  The role of 
CPV cells in judicial organs was only to "oversee that they 
follow the law," not to "interfere," Binh claimed. 
 
¶11.  (U)  While admitting that the CPV retains a special 
interest and role in "political crimes," Binh assured that 
the CPV did not "dictate" outcome of individual trials. 
Specifically in the case of cyber-activist Pham Hong Son 
(who was given a 13 year sentence in June on grounds of 
"espionage," only to have the term shortened to five years 
upon appeal), Binh maintained that the CPV itself had not 
made the decision either on the original sentence or on the 
appeal, and that "international concerns" were not at all 
relevant in judicial decisions. 
 
Pervasive network 
----------------- 
 
¶12.  (U) Binh and Quang confirmed that the CPV network 
spreads throughout the State mechanisms at the national, 
provincial, and state levels.  Each Ministry has a central 
Party Cell, usually chaired by the Minister, composed of 5-7 
members at smaller Ministries (probably like MFA) and 13-14 
people for larger ministries.  Similar cells exists downward 
within Ministries for branches and departments, as well as 
in other State agencies, schools, universities, etc.  (Many 
institutions and State organs also run parallel cells for 
the Youth Federation, whose members go up to the age of 
about 28.)  Binh claimed that the main function of Party 
cells was to act as "model" for State employees, not to 
decide on specific policies, as well as to "propagandize" 
Party guidelines and orientations.  They claimed, however, 
that formal meetings of the Party Cells were rare, sometimes 
only once every year or two, while declining to generalize 
upon less formal mechanisms for retaining the Party 
leadership within each Ministry and agency. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The longer-term trend in Vietnam over the past 
fifteen years has been toward the diminishment of the role 
of the Party -- and indeed of the State -- in the economy as 
well as in the lives of individual citizens.  The CPV 
nonetheless continues to maintain its monopoly of political 
power and remains the ultimate arbiter of all major 
decisions, in all sectors.  Its network ensures broad and 
deep -- but not always effective or impartial -- oversight, 
and the redundancy between Party and State roles also helps 
to ensure that GVN cadres hew to the Party line.  In the 
midst of Vietnam's efforts to build a "law governed" society 
and international efforts (including by USG) to promote rule 
of law, CPV protestations of judicial independence ring 
somewhat hollow, at least on sensitive cases.  Increasingly, 
the long-standing tradition of rule-by-party will run into 
conflicts with the growing maturity of rule-by-law. 
BURGHARDT