This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 GUATEMALA 002288 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KCRM KDEM ASEC PINR PHUM GT
SUBJECT: VIOLENT CRIME: GROWING THREAT TO GUATEMALAN 
DEMOCRACY 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Guatemalans have become numbed by the daily 
press reports of violent crime, and an increasing number 
identify the lack of public security as the nation's number 
one problem.  The emergence of gangs ("maras") has taken the 
violence even to the remote rural areas of the country, and 
the under-funded, ineffective and corrupt justice system has 
not provided a response.  The growth of violent crime in 
recent years is undermining Guatemalans' faith in democracy 
and influencing them to vote for a "strong hand" in the 
upcoming elections.  Recent polls show that voters' faith 
that former General Rios Montt and his FRG could deliver 
security has greatly declined as a result of the FRG 
government's poor performance on crime during these past 
three years in office.  According to the latest polls, GANA 
candidate Oscar Berger has taken the lead in public 
perception of being able to fight crime -- although he has 
not defined his platform.  The Portillo Government's 
half-hearted attempts to improve public security by putting 
the military on the beat and by introducing anti-gang 
legislation will do little to change the crime situation 
between now and the January 2004 assumption of power by the 
new government.  But there is widespread hope that a new 
government will create jobs, redirect budget resources from 
the military to law enforcement and administration of 
justice, and adequately fund social programs aimed at the 
root causes of crime.  This cable is divided into three 
parts: snapshots of the daily reality with our best 
statistics, the staggering weakness of the justice system, 
and implications for democracy. End summary. 
 
The Daily Reality 
----------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) As a bus pulls away from its latest stop, a man in 
front stands up and randomly shoots a fellow passenger dead, 
terrifying the other passengers.  A man in the back of the 
bus announces that all passengers are to hand over their 
valuables, and then moves to the front, under the watchful 
eye of his partner, collecting cash, jewelry and cell phones 
from each passenger as he goes.  Upon reaching the front of 
the bus, the driver is ordered to stop and the men disappear. 
 In a variation on this theme, the bus is boarded by a group 
of youths who threaten all on board with an array of weapons 
that can range from grenades or handguns to assault rifles to 
home-made shotguns.  They announce that they are collecting 
"war taxes" or "circulation taxes" depending on which gang 
they belong to, and pass a hat.  If the passengers are lucky 
their cell phones, watches, and wallets will satisfy the gang 
members.  If the passengers are unlucky, these robbers are 
invading the "turf" of a rival gang, resulting in a 
shoot-out, with the passengers caught in the crossfire. 
Every week there are between two and three violent assaults 
reported on-board busses, according to police reports.  Bus 
owners, however, report that assaults and shake-downs of bus 
passengers and drivers by gang members average 60 a day in 
Guatemala City. 
 
¶3.  (U) As PolOff was purchasing fruit in the highland 
village of Tecpan, two young men with shaved heads and 
numerous tattoos strolled through the market openly stealing 
merchandise.  One of them laughingly kicked over a table 
laden with bread, ruining all of it.  No one said a word. 
Tecpan has virtually no police presence (8 percent of 
Guatemala's 330 municipalities have no police).  Tecpan 
residents say police are useless anyway against the criminal 
gangs that now prey on even the smallest towns.  Such is the 
frustration with the justice system that police have even 
been chased out of some towns and had their stations sacked 
when they tried to prevent mobs from taking the law into 
their own hands.  A mob in Concepcion Tutuapa recently doused 
two suspected pickpockets with gasoline and burned them 
alive.  When a police officer asked the mob to reconsider, he 
too was doused in gasoline but allowed to flee.  Back in 
Tecpan, PolOff's vendor shrugged off her losses saying "we 
know who the gang members are and where they sleep; we're 
just waiting for a chance to hang them."  Mobs in rural 
Guatemala lynched 104 people last year, about forty percent 
of them for suspected theft. 
 
¶4.  (U) It is impossible to pick up a Guatemalan newspaper 
without reading about someone being gunned down in traffic, 
killed for their cellphone, or caught in a drive-by-shooting; 
the list is endless.  Common crime has become so widespread 
that the recent murders, in public, under separate but 
suspicious circumstances, of high-profile individuals such as 
Judge Hector Rodriguez, former Congressmen Diego Velasco and 
Jose Lobo Dubon, and opposition party leader Jorge Alberto 
Rosal caused hardly a ripple, much less sustained public 
demands for investigation.  In fact, the public has become so 
inured to daily doses of violent crime that when organized 
crime figures wish to send a message, they must go to great 
lengths--such as the October, 2002 incident in broad daylight 
at a major intersection in one of the city's better zones, 
where gangsters took the time to pump over 250 bullets into 
their victim's car--in order to distinguish their actions 
from common crime. 
 
Police Statistics - A Crime Wave by the Numbers 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
--        murders (total) murdered women  car thefts 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
2000            2,905          n/a          7,072 
2001            3,210          222          7,784 
2002            3,631          244          8,650 
2003 (Jan-Jun)  2,930          158          4,891 
 
¶5.  (U) According to police estimates, there were 95 deadly 
assaults on-board busses in Guatemala City in 2002.  Between 
10 - 15 cars were stolen each day in the metro area. 
Murder rates have skyrocketed in the past three years, 
reaching an average of 10 per day in 2002.  The murder rate 
continues to rise in 2003, averaging 16 per day in the first 
half of 2003.  This murder rate approaches 45 per 100,000 
inhabitants.  Nearly 43 percent of residents in the Guatemala 
City metro area report being victims of a crime during the 
past 12 months, and 67 percent reported (to pollsters, not 
the distrusted police) observing activity in their 
neighborhoods they believed to be associated with narcotics. 
The same survey indicated that only one in five non-violent 
crimes is reported.  For the first time since 1997, 
Guatemalans fear crime more than losing their jobs, according 
to a July survey. 
 
¶6.  (U) There has been an alarming rise in the murder of 
young women in 2003.  A spate of double murders of young 
women over the last six weeks has attracted substantial media 
attention.  Many of the cases of murdered young women have 
been attributed to growing gang activity, while others are 
related to sexual crimes and narcotics trafficking. 
Investigations of these crimes by the police have not been 
effective.  There has also been an increase in kidnappings, 
especially in so-called "express kidnappings."  In the first 
six months of 2003, the police reported 80 kidnappings in the 
Guatemala City metropolitan area, though many (if not most) 
kidnappings are never reported to the police.  Madres 
Angustiadas, an NGO tracking crimes against women and 
children, has recorded 240 cases of kidnapping to date for 
¶2003.  Most of the victims are middle class women or 
children, who are kidnapped in the city's better zones and 
exchanged a few hours later for relatively small ransoms, 
typically 2,000 to 5,000 dollars. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Gangs ("maras") are a growing source of crime not 
only in Guatemala City, but even in the most remote corners 
of rural Guatemala.  The growth of gangs has been abetted by 
the lack of jobs, the breakdown of the traditional family 
(especially in indigenous areas), the return of 
Guatemalan-born gang members deported as criminal aliens from 
the U.S., a growing narcotics consumption problem in 
Guatemala, and by the ineffective rule of law.  The 
government has proposed legislation to curb gang membership 
(similar to laws being considered in other neighboring 
countries), but the law raises serious human rights concerns, 
and does nothing to address the root causes of gang 
membership.  Furthermore, recent attempts to round up gang 
members en masse have resulted in gruesome prison riots, as 
rival gangs have slaughtered each other live on TV to the 
horror of most Guatemalans. 
 
Staggering Weakness in the Justice System 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Guatemala's judiciary has never been very effective 
in prosecuting crime and, despite procedural improvements 
during recent years (funded in part by us), popular faith in 
obtaining justice from the courts is not high.  Low salaries, 
poor training, and weak disciplinary procedures, especially 
in the police, provide fertile ground for corruption, which 
feeds public distrust in all law enforcement officials and 
the rule of law more generally.  Lack of continuity in law 
enforcement leadership (under the Portillo Administration 
there have been 4 Interior Ministers, 9 Police Directors, and 
11 heads of the special narcotics police) limits 
institutional development, contributes to infighting for 
scarce resources and reinforces counter-productive 
institutional rivalry. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The Police.  The police are overwhelmed, 
undereducated and poorly paid.  The Peace Accords stipulated 
that the ranks of the police should grow to a minimum of 
20,000 officers, a level that was reached in 2000.  Since 
then budgets have been systematically reduced and in some 
cases funds budgeted for the police were transferred to the 
military (as then-Minister of Interior, retired General 
Arevalo Lacs transferred Q20 million from the Ministry of 
Government's budget to the EMP, or Presidential Military 
Staff).  In 2002, the Police Academy was only allocated a 
budget of 22 million quetzales (approximately $2.8 million), 
while the Military Academy was allocated Q100 million 
(approximately $13 million).  According to press reports, 
none of the 20,000 agents trained since 1997 have had 
refresher training, and the academy recently cut new recruit 
training time from 11 to 6 months in an effort to get more 
police officers on the streets. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Congress approved a police budget of Q1,324 million 
for 2003 ($200 million), eighty percent of which is needed 
for salaries alone.  As a result, the police lack fuel, 
radios, and spare parts for patrol cars (40 percent are 
inoperable).  In the patrol cars that do operate, police are 
rationed to 3.5 gallons of gas per day - down from 5 gallons 
per day last year.  Police stations often have no phones or 
electricity because bills go unpaid.  The ratio of police to 
residents in developed countries is about 4 officers for 
every 1,000 residents.  Guatemala has roughly one officer for 
every 2,200 residents.  Few police officers are from 
indigenous communities or speak indigenous languages. 
Another challenge, according to the current PNC Director, is 
that only one fourth of the on-duty police force is actually 
patrolling at any given time, as the rest are: guarding 
people under house arrest, transferring prisoners to and from 
courts, checking weapons permits held by the army of private 
security guards (who outnumber the police 3 to 1), providing 
protection to a growing list of threatened persons, or 
discharging administrative functions. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The Prosecutors.  The Public Prosecutors are 
similarly not able to keep up with the growth of violent 
crime.  With offices in only ten percent of Guatemalan 
municipalities, prosecutors can take days to reach a crime 
scene.  According to a comprehensive study carried out by 
USAID in 1999, prosecutors in Guatemala City received around 
90,000 criminal complaints that year.  Reception clerks, left 
to their own devices without official criteria, refused to 
accept about one third of these cases, believing them to be 
without merit.  About half of the remaining cases were 
dropped because the complaintant failed to clearly identify 
the alleged guilty party.  The remaining cases were divided 
among 35 prosecutor teams.  Only about 1,100 of these cases 
resulted in actual court filings.  Of the 90,000 criminal 
complaints studied, less than one percent resulted in a 
successful prosecution. 
 
¶12. (SBU) A more recent three month analysis of the 
prosecutor's office reputed to be the best in Guatemala City 
showed that 100 percent of victims and witnesses recanted 
their testimony, refused to cooperate, or otherwise withdrew 
their complaint during the study period.  Investigators 
report that victims are intimidated, but crime victims often 
say what little faith they had in their justice system was 
crushed by contact with it.  Even assuming a wide margin of 
error in the studies and variations among prosecutors' 
offices, the results support Guatemalan's perceptions that 
the justice sector does not work well.  Research released in 
August by GAM, a civil society group, shows that 
investigations have been completed in only 3 percent of the 
over 12,500 murders that have taken place in Guatemala since 
Portillo assumed power in January 2000.  Guatemalan legal 
experts consulted by the Embassy estimate that about 10 
percent of criminal complaints make it to court. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The Courts.  In a recent regional study of public 
faith in administration of justice in the hemisphere, only 
Peru ranked lower than Guatemala.  The court system as a 
whole suffers from the same lack of resources and endemic 
corruption that afflict the police and the public 
prosecutors.  The majority (60.9%) of prisoners in 
Guatemala's violent jails are being held in pre-trial 
confinement, and by the time their cases reach a judge, many 
have spent more time in detention than they would have served 
if convicted, according to a recent PNUD study.  Judges 
assigned to the interior provinces usually do not speak 
indigenous languages, rarely live in the communities they 
serve, and frequently misunderstand or disregard the cultural 
impact of their rulings.  However, there are bright spots. 
Courts rendered landmark convictions in the Mack and Gerrardi 
trials (overturned in the Mack case and under appeal in the 
Gerrardi case) and handed down 25-year sentences to 16 former 
narcotics police for extrajudicial killings in the Chocon 
incident.  NAS has had some success with High-Impact Courts 
and USAID's Justice Centers are supporting case tracking 
systems, indigenous translators, and greater use of oral 
procedures for pre-trial motions.  Additionally, USAID 
supports alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in 
communities largely outside the reach of the current justice 
system. 
 
¶14. (U) Another indication that courts are beginning to have 
some impact -- although hardly a bright spot -- is the rising 
number of threats and attacks against judges.  More than 60 
judges have received death threats in the first half of 2003. 
 Judge Hector Rodriguez Argueta was murdered in January and 
Judge Jaqueline Espana de Olivet narrowly escaped 
assassination in February when assailants put more than 20 
bullets through her windshield.  Judges are unable to 
purchase life insurance and have asked the government to 
establish a special police force to provide protection.  Of 
the more than 700 judges in Guatemala, 31 have opted to hire 
private security guards, according to press reports.  Not all 
the threats come from narcotics traffickers -- one community 
attempted to lynch its local magistrate when he levied only a 
small fine in a theft case.  Another judge was threatened 
with his life if he ruled against recent teacher strikes. 
 
Implications for Democracy 
-------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) The high levels of crime, especially violent 
crime, the growth of organized crime, and the corruption of 
public officials impose significant economic and social costs 
on Guatemala; they also directly undermine the legitimacy of 
democratic governance in the eyes of its citizens.  The 5th 
Democratic Indicators Monitoring System (DIMS) study 
(published bi-annually, most recently in April, 2002) 
documents the weakness of public support for democracy in 
Guatemala during the past five years in which crime has 
spiraled.  Respondents expressing satisfaction with the 
performance of democracy in Guatemala dropped from 40% in 
1997 to 25% in 2001 (note: in Costa Rica, 68% said they were 
satisfied with the performance of their democracy. End note). 
Forty-seven percent of Guatemalans said that the government 
needs "a strong hand" to bring order.  Guatemalans' support 
for specific democratic institutions (courts, Congress, 
Electoral Tribunal, public offices and political parties) is 
also low and has fallen into negative territory for the first 
time since the DIMS studies began in Guatemalan in 1993. 
These results are confirmed by other public image polling in 
which the political parties, the government, and Congress all 
have very low ratings (less than 10% positive image) compared 
with the press (67% positive), the churches (82%) and 
volunteer firefighters (90%).  There was also a notable 
increase in the number of respondents who answered "none" to 
a question about which institutions are best placed to solve 
problems.  In 1999, 22% said the central government was best 
placed, in 2001 only 11% agreed. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Although Guatemalans have become accustomed to 
high levels of crime, over time the corrosive effect of 
increasingly violent crime feeds popular frustration with 
democratic government that apparently fails to live up to its 
promise.  Guatemalans are increasingly cynical, yet a 
majority are still looking to the next government for a 
solution to their security problems, which now outrank 
economic problems.  An election poll taken in early August 
showed that 51 percent of respondents considered crime to be 
Guatemala's biggest national problem, followed by 
unemployment (31%).  The FRG was elected in 1999 in part on 
General Rios Montt's image as a strong-handed crime fighter, 
but continued deterioration of public security during the 
FRG's nearly four years in office has deprived the party, for 
the most part, of that banner in the current election.  A 
recent poll shows that 41% of voters believe that 
presidential candidate Oscar Berger would do the best job of 
controlling crime, while 21% believe Efrain Rios Montt would. 
 
Comment: 
-------- 
¶17. (SBU) The Portillo Government's anemic, last-minute 
attempts to address the crime problem by putting the military 
on the streets in a crime control capacity and introducing 
anti-gang legislation are not expected to have much impact on 
growing violent crime rates in the months remaining in his 
presidency.  The leading candidates in the upcoming election, 
however, have identified and promised to address the three 
leading causes for the growth of crime -- the lack of jobs, 
an inadequately funded administration of justice system, and 
the lack of an effective social policy addressing the root 
causes of crime.  The Embassy will make cooperation with the 
new government in its broad strategy to combat crime one of 
our highest priorities. 
HAMILTON