This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DJIBOUTI 001633 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2013 
TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL DJ KPAO
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI:  DEMARCHE ON ALIEN EXPULSIONS 
 
REF: A. STATE 250486 
 
     ¶B. DJIBOUTI 1592 
     ¶C. DJIBOUTI 1577 
     ¶D. DJIBOUTI 1510 
 
Classified By: ADCM Haywood Rankin for reason 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In response to ref A demarche dissociating 
the U.S. from Djibouti's on-going expulsions of foreigners, 
Minister of Interior Wais deplored U.S. insistence on making 
a public statement.  He stressed Djibouti's good historical 
record on handling refugees, noted that foreigners had been 
given an extra 15 days to leave, and claimed (falsely) that 
forcible expulsions had not yet occurred and that there had 
been no human rights violations.  In a subsequent meeting, 
Chief of Staff Fathi admitted that the popular view in 
Djibouti was that the U.S. had ordered the expulsions and 
said that Djibouti was entirely responsible, but he displayed 
no greater grasp of the potential negative repercussions of 
pinning the expulsions on the United States.  The Embassy 
will promulgate a public statement, drawn from ref A, with 
local and international news media.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Charge had back-to-back, hour-and-a-half meetings 
September 3 with Minister of Interior Abdoulkader Douale Wais 
and Chief of Armed Forces General Fathi Ahmad Houssein.  The 
meeting with Wais, requested by Charge, was devoted entirely 
to ongoing expulsions of undocumented foreigners and ref A 
demarche.  The meeting with Fathi was requested by Fathi and 
dealt principally with what Fathi described as President 
Guelleh's lack of clarity about the contents of U.S. 
assistance.  It was notable most of all for Fathi's frank 
statement that Guelleh was urgent to learn precisely what 
assistance Djibouti would be obtaining from the U.S., because 
of elections upcoming in 2005.  The concluding part of the 
meeting with Fathi addressed the expulsions.  General Zakaria 
Cheick Ibrahim, number two in the Djibouti armed forces, 
joined the meeting with Fathi just as the discussion on 
expulsions commenced.  (Note:  It was Zakaria, in Fathi's 
absence from the country, who made the request August 21 to 
CJTF-HOA Commander General Robeson for the U.S. to provide 
troops to help patrol the Djibouti land borders to ensure 
that Ethiopians and Somalis now being expelled not return, 
ref C.)  Charge left with both interlocutors a copy of ref A 
talking points, along with an Embassy translation of those 
points into French.  Charge was accompanied in both meetings 
by ADCM, USLO Major Anderson, and political-consular officer 
Beamer. 
 
------------------------ 
Wais and General Abizaid 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) Wais opened with praise for the very close 
cooperation between Djibouti and the United States in 
combatting terrorism, emanating from the meeting of President 
Guelleh with President Bush at the beginning of the year. 
Wais said he wanted to reinforce this cooperation in every 
way possible.  In this vein, he said that he had requested a 
meeting with General Abizaid during the recent Golden Spear 
exercise in Ethiopia.  He had informed General Abizaid of 
Djibouti's deep concern about the large population of 
clandestine immigrants in Djibouti.  Somali immigrants were a 
worry because Somalia had no government, and Ethiopian 
immigrants were a worry because there might exist some of 
them in Djibouti who collaborated with Oromo or Somali armed 
fronts opposing the Ethiopian government.  Wais said that he 
had told General Abizaid that he did not want Americans in 
Djibouti to be worried about problems from such immigrants, 
nor did he want Djiboutians to be worried because the 
Americans now were present in Djibouti in significant 
numbers.  He said that he had asked General Abizaid to help 
Djibouti in its effort to control clandestine immigrants, 
both on the border and within the country. 
 
¶4.  (C) Wais said that since the policy of expelling 
clandestine immigrants had been announced July 26, tens of 
thousands had peacefully and volutarily departed.  Djibouti 
had now extended the deadline from September 1 to September 
¶15.  With the departure of these illegal immigrants, the 
problem would shift toward surveiling and controlling the 
borders so that they did not return.  Wais had already been 
in close contact with the Embassy on improving border control 
modalities.  He looked forward to ever closer collaboration 
to ensure that only properly documented persons entered the 
country.  Djibouti and the United States, he said, were 
entirely in the same boat in the effort to consolidate 
security. 
 
------------ 
The Demarche 
------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) Charge expressed his great pleasure in making his 
first call upon arriving in Djibouti on Wais and his complete 
agreement with Wais's positive characterization of the close 
cooperation between the United States and Djibouti.  However, 
Charge said, the United States was deeply concerned about the 
perception among the Djiboutian populace that the present 
expulsions of undocumented immigrants were attributable to 
the United States.  The concern was sufficiently acute that 
he had received instructions to address the issue at the 
highest levels of the Djibouti Government.  In addition to 
leaving copies of these instructions, he would take the 
opportunity to discuss each element with the minister in some 
detail. 
 
¶6.  (C) Charge said that, as the minister knew, human rights 
were a basic and a legislatively-mandated principle and key 
element in the United States' relations with every country. 
Human rights became even more important and closely watched 
in any relationship in which the security element was large 
and growing rapidly.  For example, Charge noted, human rights 
organizations that had not previously devoted much time to 
Djibouti were now beginning to watch Djibouti very closely, 
on account of the new U.S. military presence and close 
collaboration.  The United States recognized the sovereign 
right of every state to control its borders and, 
specifically, Djibouti's sovereign right to deport 
undocumented aliens.  As the minister had pointed out, we 
were working closely with Djibouti to improve its border 
security. 
 
¶7.  (C) Charge said that the United States had had no role 
whatever in the formulation of Djibouti's policy to expel 
foreigners.  We were deeply concerned about reports on human 
rights abuses that were occurring as a result of these 
operations.  It might be that such reports were false, but 
whether true or false, they came in the context of a public 
perception that the United States was behind the operations. 
While the United States recognized Djibouti's absolute 
sovereign right to deport aliens, it held as a fundamental 
principle that deportations be carried out in a fully 
transparent manner and with full assurance of fundamental, 
internationally-recognized human rights.  Djibouti had thus 
far engendered no focused hostility from within the U.S. 
Congress or among human-rights groups, but unless it were 
careful in its handling of its expulsion operations, that 
situation could change.  Moreover, there was the possiblity 
of unfortunate accidents and unintended events -- for 
example, deaths of deported persons in the deserts of 
neighboring states -- which would be blamed, derivatively, on 
the United States. 
 
¶8.  (C) In addition to the points in his instructions, Charge 
continued, he wanted to point out that there was a security 
concern on the part of the CJTF-HOA emanating from the public 
perception of U.S. instigation of the expulsions.  It was 
clear that many people, Djiboutian and non-Djiboutian, were 
opposed to the operation.  Some of these people could 
conceivably direct their anger toward the United States, 
given the wide perception of U.S. involvement.  CJTF was 
concerned that it might have to lower its profile, with 
consequences for its civic-action and humanitarian projects 
in Djibouti as well as liberty for its soldiers to move 
outside the camp, with concomitant negative economic 
consequences for Djibouti.  (Note:  This point was raised by 
General Robeson during Charge's introductory call on him 
September 2.) 
 
¶9.  (C) Charge, concluding, said that the United States would 
make a public statement dissociating itself from Djibouti's 
expulsion policy.  In regard to the minister's request for 
assistance of the previous week (note:  Wais requested an 
immigration information program, creation and enlargement of 
transit centers, rehabilitation of former prisons, 20 trucks, 
10 jeeps, and 300 tents, ref B), the United States would not 
be able to address the items as an expedited package, 
although it might be possible to discuss certain elements in 
the future under propitious conditions. 
 
------------- 
Wais's Regret 
------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  In response, Wais provided a lengthy review of what 
he described as Djibouti's excellent and humane record in 
handling refugees, including those from the 1977 
Ethiopian-Somali war immediately after Djiboutian 
independence, those later from the fall of Mengistu, those 
from Siad Barre's attack on Somaliland, those from the 
bloodshed and instability that flowed from Siad Barre's fall, 
and also refugees from war and instability in Eritrea and 
Yemen.  The present operations did not touch any of these 
refugees, nor did they touch those foreigners who were at 
present requesting asylum.  These operations affected only 
those persons who were present in Djibouti with no legal 
standing whatever.  Considering the respect and dignity which 
Djibouti had always afforded all persons who had ever entered 
its territory and who could provide the least indication of 
refugee or asylum status, Wais deplored and regretted that 
the United States now sought to make a public statement of 
this kind.  False rumors and disinformation were an 
unfortunate part of the world today.  It was necessary to 
operate not by rumor but on the basis of reality.  The 
Charge's officers in the Embassy should have properly 
informed Washington on these issues and undertaken full 
discussions with Djibouti before embarking on such a public 
statement.  The Charge was free to go where he liked, when he 
liked, throughout Djibouti to see for himself the falseness 
of these rumors.  The government had not yet started 
operations at all, but merely invited illegal foreigners to 
leave; no one had been touched or harmed.  So many people had 
already departed the country, following his many broadcasts 
on television and radio, that he did not think there would be 
any need for a mass expulsion operation. 
 
¶11.  (C) Charge said that the present demarche and public 
statement were in no way intended to criticize Djibouti in 
its handling of refugees in the past.  The issue was the 
association of the United States as author of a policy which 
engendered much opposition and much bad press.  Djibouti's 
relations with the United States would now be held to a 
higher standard than previously and it was in the interest of 
both nations that the United States not be associated with 
this policy.  Our public statement would serve both nations' 
interests. 
 
¶12.  (C) Wais said that Djibouti remained confident in its 
policy and proud of its record on human rights.  It would not 
change its policy.  He hoped that American preoccupations 
about the expulsions policy would dissipate when it became 
clear that rumors of human-rights violations were completely 
false.  He hoped that officers in the Embassy would portray 
accurately for the Charge Djibouti's exemplary record and the 
extraordinary warmth with which the Djiboutian people had 
welcomed the U.S. military into their midst. 
 
----------------------------- 
Less Defensive Chief of Staff 
----------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C)  At the conclusion of the separate, follow-on 
meeting with Chief of Staff General Fathi, Charge raised the 
issue of expulsions and the particular problem the United 
States had with being portrayed as responsible for them. 
Fathi immediately interjected that, indeed, people in 
Djibouti did believe that the U.S. had ordered the 
expulsions.  Charge remarked that this perception created a 
serious problem for the U.S. politically, to which Fathi 
seemed surprised and asked why? 
 
¶14.  (C) Charge furnished Fathi with ref A talking points and 
offered a precis of the demarche.  In sum, he said, 
associating the U.S. with the expulsions could only diminish 
the considerable support that Djibouti's relations with the 
U.S. now enjoyed in the Congress and among human-rights 
groups.  Fathi remarked that problems with Congress were an 
issue for the United States not Djibouti, to which Charge 
demurred.  The Embassy was going to put out a public 
statement underlining that the United States had nothing to 
do with the policy.  Fathi said that it was incumbent on the 
Embassy to set the record straight with policy-makers in 
Washington.  Charge replied that reports in the press carried 
far more impact than anything that an embassy might report. 
Then, Fathi exclaimed, it was for the embassy to invite in 
journalists and set them straight.  Indeed, the policy to 
deport illegal foreigners was a Djiboutian decision by the 
Djiboutian government.  Such foreigners represented forty 
percent of the population, at a time when the unemployment 
rate was increasing.  If a Djiboutian went to Ethiopia or 
Yemen he was not permitted to work, so why should Ethiopians 
or Yemenis come to Djibouti?   Charge repeated that the 
United States completely recognized Djibouti's sovereign 
right to make this policy.  Fathi said, "We are responsible 
for it, and we take the responsibility." 
 
¶15.  (C)  Comment:  Wais took this demarche much harder than 
Fathi, as he had much more at stake in the policy.  It caught 
Wais unawares, and his surprise and the difficulty he had in 
comprehending the rationale for the demarche and public 
statement are a measure of how poorly he comprehended the 
human-rights ramifications of the expulsions and the 
implications for the Djibouti-U.S. relationship.  The entire 
Djiboutian power elite may share much the same lack of 
comprehension.  Wais's assertion that the expulsions had not 
yet started was simply false.  We suspect that Wais was 
behind media leaks pointing to U.S. complicity.  Fathi 
notably made no attempt to associate the current expulsion 
policy with a security need.  Rather, he emphasized the 
economic and employment dimension, in contrast to Zakaria's 
earlier emphasis on security (ref C). 
SMITH