This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004518 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR NP, T, EUR, EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2013 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: RFG: SHOULD THE EU BE INVOLVED WITH PSI? 
 
REF: A. STATE 254587 
 
     ¶B. ROME 3926 
     ¶C. ROME 3368 
     ¶D. PARIS 6747 
     ¶E. USEU TODAY 9/12/03 
     ¶F. USEU TODAY EXTRA 9/11/03 
 
Classified By: USEU Polmiloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.5 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request.  Please see para 10. 
 
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Summary 
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¶2. (C) At the September 16 meeting of the EU's Political and 
Security Committee (PSC), PSC Ambassadors broadly supported 
the case for EU involvement in, or association with, the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  They requested a 
Council briefing -- to be delivered at the September 29 
Brussels GAERC (meeting of EU FMs) -- on PSI and the EU's 
role in that initiative.  Council officials have requested 
our view on including the EU in PSI.  Department guidance 
requested para 10.  End Summary 
 
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EU Says it Needs a Role in PSI 
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¶3. (C) Key non-proliferation experts in the Council and 
Commission say that the EU and member states support the PSI 
principles (ref. A), see them as conducive to the EU's draft 
non-proliferation Principles, and believe the EU should 
somehow have a role in the new initiative because it has 
competencies unavailable to EU member states on a bilateral 
basis.  Italian MFA DG for Political Affairs Giancarlo 
Aragona made similar points to U/S Bolton on August 27 (ref. 
B).  On September 10 in Brussels, Solana's senior foreign 
policy advisor, Council DG Robert Cooper, told EUR PDAS Ries 
that he wants to work with the U.S. on finding ways to permit 
all EU member states to "buy into" the PSI, without making 
PSI membership too unwieldy.  The option currently favored by 
Cooper's principle policy planners, Antonio Tanca (Council 
Secretariat's chief non-proliferation policy expert) and John 
 
SIPDIS 
Mattiussi (UK FCO non-proliferation policy expert seconded to 
the Commission, but working also for Cooper), calls for an EU 
observership which would allow the EU to consult with PSI on 
Commission and Council Secretariat competencies, and assist 
dual EU-PSI members to meet their PSI commitments.  Tanca and 
Mattiussi -- who also attended the September 3-4 Paris PSI 
meetings as nominal members of the Italian delegation -- 
request USG views as they begin drafting their 
recommendations. 
 
¶4. (C) The EU supports PSI and the Statement of Interdiction 
Principles because they align in the EU's eyes with its Basic 
Principles for an EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of 
WMD, released at the June 2003 EU Summit in Thessaloniki. 
Mattiussi described the relationship between the PSI 
Principles and EU Principles as "operationally consistent," 
and observed that the participation of EU member states in 
PSI is adding momentum to the EU's own nonproliferation 
objectives.  (The EU's nonproliferation Principles are 
available online at http://ue.eu.int/en/summ.htm)  Moreover, 
eight of the eleven PSI members are also EU member states 
(Poland is acceding).  This represents almost three-quarters 
of the PSI, half of the EU at 15, and one third of the EU at 
¶25.  This significant numerical overlap means that PSI is a 
high profile issue for the EU.  It also means that EU norms 
and exclusive institutional competencies will be important 
factors in the success or failure of PSI, particularly once 
interdictions begin. 
 
¶5. (C) Dual EU-PSI members are reportedly pushing the EU on 
inclusion in part because they fear any potential for 
conflict between EU and PSI commitments.  Interlocutors 
stress that EU institutions have regulatory authority and 
competencies in policy areas that make full PSI participation 
by EU member states difficult without EU assistance.  They 
argue, for instance, that "Community" competencies in trade 
and border management could impact the outcome of certain 
interdictions -- perhaps not in the Pacific, but certainly in 
and around European waters and in transit points like Malta 
and Cyprus.  "The effectiveness of PSI members in the EU is 
decreased if the EU is not involved," Tanca said, "because 
the EU has competencies in many areas affecting the ability 
of EU members to fulfill PSI commitments."  Italian MFA DG 
Aragona also underscored this point to U/S Bolton during 
their August 27 meeting in Rome (ref. B). 
 
¶6. (C) Mattiussi, who was present at the September 16 PSC, 
reports that only a few of the "smaller states" were "more 
cautious" about an EU role in PSI.  (Cooper said that some 
non-PSI member states had "lingering suspicions" about the 
initiative.)  But Mattiussi assessed that these states would 
come over to the majority view once they better understood 
PSI and the issues at stake.  Otherwise, all the EU's more 
influential states and institutional organs were unanimous in 
their desire to see the EU somehow involved in PSI.  Asked 
whether any of the EU-25 preferred universal PSI inclusion 
for all EU member states bilaterally, instead of or in 
addition to EU institutional involvement, Mattiussi said that 
during the September 16 PSC discussion, member states "did 
not raise the idea of 25 EU members in PSI." 
 
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Delivering 25 Countries With Only One Observership 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶7. (C) The perception of Tanca and Mattiussi is that the PSI 
group "is almost too large already."  Cooper agrees, and has 
tasked Tanca and Mattiussi with drafting a paper on how to 
get all EU member states on board without making the 
membership too unwieldy.  In their internal consultations 
with EU and member state officials, Mattiussi and Tanca are 
therefore stressing the U.S. concept of PSI as "an activity 
rather than an organization" (Mattuissi says the UK also 
adopted this phrase in a recently circulated paper).  They 
say that one purpose of the paper is to pre-empt any 
suggestions that all 15(25) EU member states should be 
included in PSI by instead focusing on PSI as an activity and 
supporting observer status for the EU Troika (comprised of 
current and upcoming Presidency countries, the Council 
Secretariat, and the Commission).  They seek a role for the 
 
SIPDIS 
EU that could deliver results from the EU-25 without adding 
25 new delegations to PSI.  The extent to which others share 
this sentiment, however, is unclear.  Tanca reports that in 
recent non-proliferation coordinating group meetings, 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Hungary -- "among others" -- 
have all asked EU partners when they would be invited to join 
PSI. 
 
¶8. (C) In the forefront of options being discussed is the 
possibility of granting PSI observer status to the EU.  Many 
believe that as an observer, the EU could add value to PSI by 
serving as a clearinghouse of EU competencies and a 
facilitator of dual PSI-EU member capabilities.  Tanca and 
Mattiussi argue that this option would allow the EU to assist 
dual EU-PSI members in meeting PSI commitments.  They suggest 
also that EU institutional elements involved in PSI would be 
able to see pending PSI-EU conflicts in advance, and work 
quietly within the EU and/or PSI contexts to smooth them over 
before they become apparent to non-PSI insiders.  The EU 
would also be in a position to coordinate the 
counter-proliferation efforts of non-PSI EU members, in 
accordance with EU rules, and EU and PSI Principles. 
 
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How it Might Work 
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¶9. (C) The current favored option foresees something like a 
two-thirds EU observership.  When one of the 7(8) dual EU-PSI 
members holds the EU presidency, the EU would observe and 
consult in PSI proceedings as part of the EU presidency's 
delegation.  The precedent for this was set in Paris by the 
participation in the Italian PSI delegation of Tanca and 
Mattiussi (who alternated attendance).  After the EU grows to 
25 member states in May 2004, this would work one-third of 
the time (when one of the enlarged EU's eight dual EU-PSI 
members serves as EU Council Presidency).  The remaining 
two-thirds of the time the EU would have its own 
Troika-format observer status in PSI.  Other options have 
been floated, but as PSI position drafters, Mattiussi and 
Tanca favor this one because it puts what they see as a 
minimal EU footprint on PSI while also allowing the EU to add 
value. 
 
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RFG: USG Views Sought 
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¶10. (C) RFG: Tanca and Mattiussi are asking for USG views on 
any form of EU participation in PSI, especially in the manner 
outlined here.  They appear to be acting on Cooper's 
commitment to work with the USG as the EU explores ideas for 
an EU role in PSI.  Mission requests Department guidance on 
what we can tell the EU about its bid for PSI participation. 
Schnabel