This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 005566 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2008 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S EU CANDIDACY: FOCUS NOW ON IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 4834 
     ¶B. ANKARA 728 
     ¶C. ANKARA 3974 
     ¶D. ANKARA 5217 
     ¶E. ANKARA 3738 
 
 
Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch; reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: European diplomats in Ankara say the GOT's 
extensive human rights reforms have brought Turkey close to 
meeting EU accession criteria; the EU will now focus on how 
well the reforms are implemented.  However, Turkey still 
falls short of the criteria in some areas, and pro-EU 
advocates in the GOT say further reforms are needed. End 
Summary. 
 
 
¶2. (U) Ankara-based diplomats from EU states credit the GOT 
with passing broad, groundbreaking human rights reforms over 
the past two years.  Several of our contacts -- including 
British, German, Dutch, Italian, and Swedish diplomats -- 
believe that with the July passage of the seventh EU-related 
reform package (reftel A) the GOT has come close enough, on 
paper at least, to meeting the political criteria for EU 
accession that the EU has shifted its focus from Parliament 
to the bureaucracy, where reform legislation is implemented. 
"I'm amazed at what they've been able to pass in Parliament," 
said a German diplomat.  "But now they have to implement it." 
 At the December 2004 Summit, our contacts say, the EU's 
decision on whether to set a date to begin accession talks 
with Turkey will depend heavily on GOT performance in 
implementing the reforms it has adopted, though it will also 
be influenced by events in Cyprus and politics within the EU 
and its member states. 
 
 
¶3. (C) Officials in the MFA and the Secretariat General for 
EU Affairs, the GOT offices driving the EU-related reform 
process, have gotten the message on implementation.  Asligul 
Ugdul, political affairs director at the Secretariat General, 
said she recognizes that in some cases impressive-seeming 
legislative reforms have been undermined by highly 
restrictive implementing legislation.  She said she is 
working with MFA colleagues to develop a system for 
monitoring reform implementation.  At the same time, she 
acknowledges that the GOT is not in full compliance with the 
EU political criteria and will have to make further legal 
changes. 
 
 
----------------- 
Cyprus Settlement 
----------------- 
 
 
¶4. (C) Officially, a Cyprus settlement is not a prerequisite 
for a date to begin accession talks.  The written criteria 
only call on the GOT to "strongly support efforts to find a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem."  But many 
Europeans have made it clear in private that they want a 
settlement, or at least a major breakthrough toward a 
settlement, before offering a date.  Some GOT officials claim 
they could solve Cyprus quickly, but only after the EU sets a 
date; the EU wants to see a settlement first. 
 
 
¶5. (U) The following is an analysis of where the GOT now 
stands on each of the EU Political Criteria.  As the EU 
performs its upcoming evaluations, conclusions will depend in 
part on the effectiveness of Turkish implementation and in 
part on the subjective evaluations of the EU Commission and 
member states.  In the final analysis, although the accession 
criteria are designed to set an objective standard, EU 
accession decisions will remain political. 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Economic Development of Southeast/IDPs 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶6. (U) The GOT has moved this criterion from the political 
section to the economic section of its National Program for 
EU membership.  In part, this is a gambit to buy time -- the 
economic criteria are to be met during accession talks, while 
the political criteria are supposed to be fulfilled 
beforehand.  There is some logic to it as well, because 
fulfilling this criterion involves long-term economic 
development.  It is not clear, however, whether the EU will 
accept the idea of putting this issue on the slow track. 
 
 
¶7. (C) This criterion also involves assisting the return of 
IDPs who fled the southeast, or were forced out, during the 
PKK conflict.  The UN has recommended the GOT hold an 
international conference to develop a return program meeting 
international standards.  MFA supports the idea, but the 
Interior Ministry opposes.  We will report on this in more 
detail septel. 
 
 
------- 
Torture 
------- 
 
 
¶8. (U) The GOT has adopted a number of legal reforms relating 
to torture.  For example, thanks to recent reforms: 
prosecutors no longer need the permission of a police 
officer's supervisor in order to investigate an officer for 
torture; torture sentences can no longer be suspended or 
postponed; torture trials cannot break for summer recess; and 
the statute of limitations for torture has been extended. 
The challenge now is to implement the reforms. 
 
 
--------------- 
Attorney Access 
--------------- 
 
 
¶9. (C) Under a reform measure adopted in January, all 
detainees now have the right to immediate attorney access. 
Previously, detainees in State Security Court (SSC) cases 
were denied attorney access for 48 hours.  It is not clear 
how thoroughly this has been implemented; human rights 
activists accuse authorities of preventing some detainees 
from contacting attorneys, and then falsely claiming the 
detainees waived the right to consult with an attorney.  This 
reform is closely linked to anti-torture efforts -- since 
most torture occurs in the first 24 hours of police 
detention, immediate attorney access would constitute a 
strong deterrent. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Discrimination/Cultural Diversity 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
¶10. (C) The main problem in this area is the Kurdish issue. 
The GOT has adopted reforms lifting, in principle, 
restrictions against Kurdish language courses and broadcasts. 
 However, in both cases the bureaucracy has drafted highly 
restrictive implementing regulations that have made it 
impossible for interested parties to establish courses or 
broadcasts (reftels B-C).  The GOT has also revised census 
legislation used to prevent parents from giving their 
children Kurdish names.  However, Sezgin Tanrikulu, chairman 
of the Diyarbakir Bar Association, claimed in a press 
interview that authorities continue to enforce the previous 
restrictions. 
 
 
--------------------- 
Freedom of Expression 
--------------------- 
 
 
¶11. (C) A number of reforms have been adopted to soften the 
impact of various laws used to fight controversial speech. 
More importantly, State authorities over the years have 
become far less aggressive in pursuing and punishing speech 
crimes.  Still, existing law provides plenty of leeway for 
going after those who "insult" the State or its institutions. 
 
 
¶12. (C) This criterion requires Turkey to "remedy the 
situation" of the thousands of prisoners currently jailed for 
non-violent speech.  The GOT has adopted legislation allowing 
a retrial in a Turkish court for convicts who win their 
appeals in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).  The 
current, high profile trial of Leyla Zana and three other 
former Kurdish MPs is the first retrial under this measure. 
However, European and other outside observers have criticized 
the proceedings as biased against the defendants (reftel D). 
 
 
------------------------------- 
Freedom of Association/Assembly 
------------------------------- 
 
 
¶13. (U) The GOT has passed various measures to loosen 
restrictions on who can form and join an association, what 
types of associations university students can form, and how 
much advance notice is needed before holding a demonstration. 
 The reforms have also reduced somewhat the power of local 
officials to ban or postpone demonstrations, and made it 
easier for Turkish associations to add branches and join 
international associations.  Turkey still falls short of EU 
standards in this area, but has probably made enough progress 
to eliminate this as a stumbling block. 
 
 
------------------- 
Freedom of Religion 
------------------- 
 
 
¶14. (U) From the EU perspective, the key issue here is the 
State's approach toward religions other than Islam.  The GOT 
interprets the 1923 Lausanne Treaty as applying to three 
"minority" religious groups -- Greek Orthodox, Armenian 
Orthodox, and Jews.  Parliament has adopted reforms designed 
to allow the foundations of these Lausanne minorities to own 
property.  However, implementing regulations imposed onerous 
conditions on applicants, and a hostile Foundations 
Directorate has rejected many such applications. 
Non-Lausanne religious minorities lack legal status and have 
difficulty establishing houses of worship and practicing 
their faith. 
 
 
---------- 
NSC Reform 
---------- 
 
 
¶15. (C) The GOT has made a number of changes to the structure 
of the National Security Council.  The number of civilian 
representatives has been increased, constituting a majority; 
the number of NSC meetings has been cut in half; regulations 
have been changed to allow a civilian to be appointed NSC 
Secretary General; and the legal duties of the NSC have been 
 
SIPDIS 
revised to emphasize the body's advisory nature.  The EU 
criteria are vague on this score, requiring that the NSC be 
adapted "in order to align civilian control of the military 
with practice in EU member states." 
 
 
--------------- 
Judicial Reform 
--------------- 
 
 
¶16. (C) The biggest problem in this area is Turkey's State 
Security Court system, widely criticized for favoring State 
interests over individual rights.  The ECHR has consistently 
overturned SSC convictions; in March, for example, the ECHR 
ruled that jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan did not receive 
a fair trial, in part because the SSC where he was tried in 
1999 did not constitute "an independent and impartial 
tribunal."  However, there have been no significant changes 
to the SSCs, despite talk among reform advocates of revising 
or abolishing the courts. 
 
 
----------------- 
Prison Conditions 
----------------- 
 
 
¶17. (U) This does not appear to be a problem for EU 
candidacy.  The European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture, a Council of Europe body, regularly conducts 
unannounced prison inspections in Turkey, and has not raised 
fundamental concerns about conditions. 
 
 
------------------------- 
Police, Judicial Training 
------------------------- 
 
 
¶18. (C) The GOT has established human rights training for 
police and Jandarma, in cooperation with the EU and other 
outside donors.  One of our Kurdish nationalist-Islamist 
contacts said the Police Academy human rights training is now 
much more advanced than anything offered at the universities. 
 In addition, the Justice Ministry is training judges and 
prosecutors in how to implement the new reforms. 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
International Conventions, ECHR Compliance 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
¶19. (U) Turkey has ratified the required international 
documents: the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and its Optional Protocol; the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and Protocol 6 of 
the European Convention on Human rights. 
¶20. (C) The EU has criticized Turkey for consistently failing 
to respect ECHR rulings.  Recent reforms, mentioned above, 
allowing for a retrial in a Turkish court for those who win 
their appeals in the ECHR should improve the GOT's record; 
previously, successful appellants were entitled only to 
financial compensation.  However, Turkish judges are often 
ignorant of, or hostile to, ECHR rulings.  In one recent 
case, a writer was taken to court for the re-publication of a 
book, despite the fact that the ECHR ruled his previous 
conviction for the original publication improper (reftel E). 
The Justice Ministry is providing training to judges and 
prosecutors on the ECHR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EDELMAN