This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 005623 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2013 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: NEPHEW OF SLAIN IRAQI SHIA CLERIC AL-KHOEI SEEKS 
TO WORK WITH U.S. TO STABILIZE SOUTHERN IRAQ 
 
REF: KUWAIT 4071 
 
Classified By: CDA David M. Hale for reasons 1.5 (B)(D) 
 
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SHI'A JOY AT THE FALL OF SADDAM 
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¶1.  (C)  Iraqi Shia cleric Sayed Jawad al-Khoei (nephew of 
Sayed Abd al-Majid al-Khoei, who was assassinated in Najaf on 
April 10) and Ghanim Jawad from the London-based al-Khoei 
Foundation called on PolCouns September 2.  Al-Khoei said 
that the removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime from Iraq 
had produced "great joy" among Iraqi Shi'a, who had been 
oppressed by the Ba'athi regime for many years.  There is, 
consequently, a reservoir of good will toward the U.S. among 
Shi'a.  He warned, however, that increased instability and 
the slow pace of assistance and reconstruction in the south 
would eventually sour Iraqi Shi'a on supporting the coalition 
(see also Kuwait reftel).  He urged the coalition to work 
more closely with and seek the advice of Shi'a clerics -- 
especially himself and the al-Khoei Foundation -- to make 
quicker progress in the south.  Jawad complained that the USG 
has not consulted the al-Khoeis since the assassination of 
the elder al-Khoei in April, and expressed a strong desire to 
work with the USG and coalition on both political and 
humanitarian projects. 
 
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SHIA CAN BE LESS VIOLENT THAN SUNNIS IF... 
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¶2.  (C)  Al-Khoei argued that the presence of a religious 
clergy and hierarchy in Shi'ism has helped keep the situation 
in southern Iraq relatively quiet up to this point.  Shi'a, 
he continued, listen to and obey their religious leaders, and 
are told to consult with their local Imam before undertaking 
any major life event -- he mentioned choosing an educational 
course, marriage, or using violence to solve a dispute. 
Sunnis, he commented, are taught that they have a direct 
relationship with God, and, consequently, "any Sunni can 
consult with God himself and decide to blow himself up" in a 
terrorist attack.  For Shi'a, however, such a decision should 
be consultative.  In this way, he argued, Shi'a clerics have 
the influence to calm -- or incite -- their followers more 
readily than Sunnis.  In general, he said, he and other Shi'a 
religious figures have been telling Iraqi Shi'a not to use 
violence against coalition forces in Iraq.  This is the main 
reason, he concluded, that the south has remained relatively 
calm since the end of the war. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Al-Khoei and Jawad then accused Iran of providing 
support to radical Shia elements in order to consolidate 
Iranian control over Iraq's Shi'a population.  He claimed to 
have solid information that Iran promised Shia leader Muqtada 
al-Sadr that he would be "the Hassan Nasrallah of Iraq" (a 
reference to the Lebanese Hizballah leader).  Empowering the 
Iran-supported Sadr would be a disaster for those Shi'a -- 
like himself -- who want to see peace and stability prevail 
in southern Iraq.  "I am not telling (the coalition) to 
stay," he said, "but you should not leave too soon." 
 
¶4.  (C)  Al-Khoei and Jawad said that they would travel to 
Najaf September 3, and hoped to be able to meet officials 
from the CPA in Baghdad on September 6 or 7. 
 
¶5.  (U)  CPA Baghdad minimize considered. 
HALE