This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001639 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2013 
TAGS: KDEM KDEM NI PGOV PHUM PINR PREL XY GZ
SUBJECT: ECOWAS EXECSEC CHAMBAS ON GUINEA BISSAU 
 
 
REF: A. DAKAR 2468 
     ¶B. STATE 267395 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY CDA ROGER MEECE FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) AND (d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) CDA called on ECOWAS Executive Secretary Mohammed Ibn 
Chambas on September 19 to deliver demarche (REF B).  Chambas 
shared his thoughts on recent developments in Guinea-Bissau 
and Liberia (reported septel).  Characterizing GEN Seabra's 
September 14 takeover as a coup d'etat, Chambas said ECOWAS 
and the African Union would not recognize the military junta 
as the lawful government of Guinea-Bissau. 
 
 
¶2. (C) Chambas said that while he and other West African 
leaders recognized the serious shortcomings of deposed 
President Yala, Nigerian President Obasanjo and Senegalese 
President Wade delivered a very clear message to GEN Seabra 
that the military should not lead the proposed transition 
government.  Chambas confided that he and the regional 
leaders had explored the option of a transition led by 
civilian technocrats, leading quickly to a return to full 
Constitutional government.  Chambas noted the Bissau-Guinean 
military's deployment of 650 troops in support of the ECOMIL 
PKO in Liberia and said he counseled GEN Seabra not to 
squander the positive image his military has recently 
cultivated.  Chambas said he explained to GEN Seabra that 
should the military junta remain in power, Guinea-Bissau 
would likely be isolated diplomatically and would have little 
hope of receiving international aid since many prospective 
donor countries are constrained by domestic laws prohibiting 
lending assistance to governments born of unconstitutional 
regime change.  Further, Chambas said GEN Seabra had 
originally agreed to step aside in favor of a civilian 
government once Yala had resigned, probably believing that 
Yala would not in fact step down .  When Yala did so in 
response to the ECOWAS leaders' demarche, however, Seabra 
reneged on the agreement.  Chambas believed the junta will 
not yield power to a civilian transition government and would 
stay in control of Guinea-Bissau for the foreseeable future. 
He observed that the junta is pressuring the representative 
"council" to call for continued military rule. 
 
 
¶3. (C) While ECOWAS is taking a tough stand on Guinea-Bissau, 
Chambas noted that Cape Verde and Senegal would probably not 
fully toe the party line.  Cape Verde, tied to Guinea-Bissau 
by language, culture and history, is unwilling to completely 
isolate the junta for removing a regime that, while 
democratically installed, had cancelled national elections 
three times and done little to improve the lot of the 
Bissau-Guinean people.  Chambas also noted that the Cape 
Verde ruling party is linked with its counterparts in 
Guinea-Bissau, heretofore in opposition to Yala.  Chambas 
observed as well that Senegalese President Wade is in a 
somewhat difficult position, and may seek to maintain at 
least some private relationship with the Guinea-Bissau 
military to avoid potential complications in the Cassamance. 
He emphasized, however, that neither country will take any 
public stance differing with the regional position.  And in 
any event, he added, what could Cape Verde really do? 
 
 
¶4. (C) COMMENT: Chambas was very pessimistic about the 
possibility GEN Seabra's junta might step aside in favor of a 
civilian transition government.  He seemed resigned to the 
isolation of the Guinea-Bissau government for the near term, 
but was very firm that ECOWAS will continue to push for a 
restoration of civilian rule. 
 
 
MEECE