This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001560 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2013 
TAGS: PINR PGOV PINS NI KPRP
SUBJECT: NIGERIA:  RULING PARTY COHESION (C-AL3-00674) 
 
REF: STATE 172062 
 
 
Classified by CDA Roger Meece for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 
¶1. (S) Responses to specific reftel questions are below. 
They are based on the assumption that the ruling Peoples 
Democratic Party (PDP) remains the ruling party after the 
various legal challenges to the 2003 elections. 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
 
¶2. (C) The PDP was founded in the wake of Abacha's death in 
1998, and originally included many long-time politicians from 
around the country.  During the 1999 Party convention, some 
supported the presidential ambition of former Vice President 
Alex Ekwueme, and others coalesced around former President 
and retired General Olusegun Obasanjo, recently released from 
prison.  Obasanjo's supporters included both leading 
opponents of Abacha and many pro-Abacha holdovers.  Obasanjo 
won the nomination and sought the support of the political 
machine headed by his former deputy, the late Shehu Yar'Adua, 
by bringing Atiku Abubakar onto the ticket as the 
vice-presidential candidate.  The first Obasanjo 
administration brought a shifting of those alliances and an 
exodus of many of the PDP's founders.  The executive council 
has been remade in Obasanjo's image, and the organization 
that originally sought his participation has since become 
dependent on him for its continued existence. 
 
 
¶3. (S) Responses keyed to reftel. 
 
 
¶A. The political situation in the Southwest remains unsettled 
since the April 19 elections and the loss by the historically 
Yoruba party, the Alliance for Democracy (AD), of virtually 
all of its elected representatives.  Many senior Yoruba 
politicians are not members of the PDP.  Those within the PDP 
are directly beholden to President Obasanjo.  These loyalists 
will likely remain or bolt depending on the access to 
government contracts that they expect from the winners; 
future election victories will be a secondary consideration. 
While the Yoruba are the least likely to support a candidate 
from another ethnic group, the current level of disaffection 
with the President has produced alliances among elements of 
the dominant Afenifere/AD political grouping and other 
opposition parties.  Among others, Ibrahim Babangida has 
apparently begun his 2007 campaign, but it is unclear whether 
he will seek the PDP nomination, some other party's 
nomination or come up with a new alignment of supporters to 
back him. 
 
 
¶B. Lagos Governor Bola Ahmed Tinubu's interest in promoting 
his own political ambitions leads him to work both sides of 
the political fence.  He is striving to establish himself as 
the leader of a "reborn" AD, while working Vice-President 
Atiku Abubakar for a shot at the Vice-presidency on the 
chance that Atiku emerges as the PDP presidential candidate 
in 2007.  Tinubu has access to the Presidency, the 
Vice-Presidency and to Governors throughout the political 
spectrum, although the authorities in Abuja do not trust him. 
 The recent crisis in Anambra state has pushed all of the 
governors closer together in the interest of 
self-preservation, and even PDP governors have been reaching 
out to their ANPP and AD counterparts. 
 
 
¶C. No governor of any party has established national 
prominence by effectively administering his state. 
 
 
¶D. There are no major national power brokers left in the PDP. 
 Obasanjo has taken control of the national party structure 
and shows no sign of loosening his grip.  The local and 
regional power brokers are numerous, but their influence is 
limited to their respective geographic regions.  Even Vice 
President Atiku Abubakar is canvassing for support outside of 
the party structure.  Obasanjo has a stong hold on the PDP 
machinery at the national and local levels through the 
dependency on him of GON Ministers, Special Advisers, 
Ambassadors and most state Governors.  Many of Atiku's 
appointees were rejected, several of them at Obasanjo's 
personal request.  The pre-existing Yar'Adua political 
machine now is on the outside of the PDP, and is less than 
thrilled with the prospect of Atiku's candidacy in 2007 
anyway. 
 
 
¶E. The de facto political power wielded by state governors is 
the ability to distribute money, through appointments, 
contracts or direct cash disbursements downward in the 
system.  The state governors have little influence on the 
national party structure and Obasanjo has gone to great 
lengths to ensure that they remain docile.  Many governors 
owe their election to the security services and INEC, both of 
which are controlled by the President. 
 
 
¶F. The PDP has not made, and is not expected to make, efforts 
to develop a comprehensive policy platform, or even 
substantive policy planks on many important issues.  Public 
statements often outline policy goals but without substance 
or action to implement them.  The party's policies are 
whatever Obasanjo's policies are, with an added layer of 
catering to regional power brokers' pursuit of 
self-enrichment.  Since party cohesion depends almost 
entirely on patronage, for the PDP and the opposition parties 
as well, their constituencies are defined in terms of clients 
and rent-seekers.  The PDP claims a presence in every 
district in Nigeria, but it depends on the loyalty of 
government officials and security operatives in most places. 
 
 
¶G. Many of the original founders of the PDP criticize 
Obasanjo and the party, and have either left or been rendered 
powerless within the party system.  Unification of the PDP's 
factions, and the continued existence of the party, will 
depend on the distribution of favors to various players.  The 
only political force that the PDP can count on in future 
elections is the tendency among voters to choose the party in 
power when they know a vote against it would be wasted, as 
shown in the drop in turnout for the Presidential elections 
after Obasanjo seemed sure to win, and the even lower turnout 
(less than ten percent in some areas and approaching 20 
percent nationwide) for the state assembly elections after 
the April 12 National Assembly election results were 
announced. 
 
 
¶H. While many PDP politicians remain indebted to Obasanjo, he 
also carries a heavy debt to regional power brokers and other 
influential politicians from the 2003 elections.  Those debts 
are more likely to be paid through GON expenditures than 
through policy or administrative perks.  Obasanjo has 
intervened, for example, to keep PDP National Assembly 
members from freely choosing their own chamber leaders, 
committee chairmen or even their own staff.  While they are 
expected to act as a rubber stamp, enabling Obasanjo to 
pursue his own goals without impediment, some cracks are 
already appearing in the monolith. 
 
 
¶I. Given Obasanjo's lame duck status, having been elected to 
two terms, many Embassy contacts say they expect a 
constitutional amendment within the year.  Two scenarios 
which affect term limits would be:  a)  eliminating term 
limits entirely, and b) extending the Presidential term to 
six years and limiting all future elected officials to one 
term.  Many re-elected governors would rather the first 
option if asked, since most are unlikely to graduate to the 
national scene, while Obasanjo is said to favor the second 
option.  By giving him an extra two years, the story goes, he 
might buy some support now from incumbents who would 
otherwise be hard pressed to engineer victories again in 2007 
without his (i.e. the PDP's and GON's) active participation 
in their elections.  Others point to the six-year term limit 
ensuring that Obasanjo would remain the "longest serving 
elected leader" in Nigeria's history.  Obasanjo has not 
mentioned any such constitutional changes, and an open 
endorsement would damage his image. 
 
 
¶J. Babangida would like nothing more than to be accepted as a 
candidate for the 2007 elections.  His popularity at the 
grassroots level is diminished and no longer enjoys the 
"Maradona" reputation.  Given Nigerian elections, grassroots 
support may be less relevant to his ambitions anyway. 
Babangida is more likely to look to the liberal use of money 
and some agreement with Obasanjo on a manner to remove Atiku, 
either from office or at least from the PDP nomination.  Abia 
State Governor Kalu, while enjoying a reasonable reputation, 
is ambitious and would accept the number two position on any 
ticket in order to ensure a chance at an Igbo presidency.  It 
is too early to assess the likelihood of this scenario. 
 
 
¶K. The results of the 2003 elections point to a realignment 
of political forces along ethnic lines.  The ANPP had strong 
showings throughout Nigeria, with the exception of the 
South-West, but the manipulated outcomes of the National 
Assembly elections of 2003 is driving it back to its ethnic 
roots to become the de facto northern (i.e., Hausa/Fulani and 
Kanuri) party.  The APGA likewise is heading toward becoming 
the Igbo party.  The dust has yet to clear, but an AD rising 
from its own ashes, or a disintegrating PDP driven apart by 
competing interests, or some combination thereof, is likely 
to emerge as the Yoruba party.  This alignment leaves little 
room for the numerous South-South and Middle Belt minorities, 
but they are unlikely to come together as a fourth force. 
Instead they will probably seek accommodation within or along 
the margins of the three main groups. 
MEECE